

REVIEWS  
RESEÑAS



ATHANASSIOS VERGADOS, *The Homeric Hymn to Hermes: Introduction, Text and Commentary*. Berlin / Boston, De Gruyter, 2012, 717 pp., ISBN 978-3-11025969-8.

The *Editio Princeps* of the *Homeric Hymns* was published in 1488 with Homeric epics by Chalcondyles. Since then, new editions have always included the hymns with Homeric epics. Around 1800, the hymns were edited by Ilgen (1796), Matthiae (1805) and Hermann (1806). In these editions, the *Homeric Hymns* appeared for the first time without the Homeric epics. Afterwards, many editors published editions of the whole *Homeric Hymns*. In 1974, Richardson released *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* on its own, which was the first time a full commentary for only one hymn was produced. In 2008, Faulkner, one of Richardson's students, created a new edition of the *Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite* with a commentary based on his Oxford Ph.D. dissertation. In 2012, Vergados published an edition of the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* and Olson published the *Hymn to Aphrodite*. Since 2000, many scholars have paid attention to *Homeric Hymns*. West produced a new edition of Loeb Classical Library Series in 2003 and Richardson's Cambridge edition of three hymns (to Apollo, Hermes and Aphrodite) was released in 2010. The prefaces of Vergados's edition and that of Richardson (2010) both indicate that many young scholars have worked on the hymns as their doctoral theses. It is clear that attention to the hymns has peaked recently.

Vergados's edition is based on his doctoral dissertation at the University of Virginia written under the guidance of J. S. Clay; Since he got a Ph.D. in 2007, he has continued to improve his dissertation. At the same time, he has written many articles for top journals. Surprisingly, his research interest includes not only *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* but other topics as well<sup>1</sup>.

This volume consists of an introduction; a text, including an *apparatus criticus*; a lengthy commentary; a bibliography; illustrations, including maps of Hermes's journeys and photos of vase paintings and other ancient artworks; and indices (*index rerum* and *index locorum*).

The introduction includes a summary of the hymn; investigations of major hymn topics (i.e. music and humour); relations to archaic literature (especially to Homer, Hesiod and the *Homeric Hymns*) and to other literature; the date and place of composition; and an introduction of extant manuscripts. He

<sup>1</sup> "P.Mich.Inv. 1715: Letter from Simades to Pynas." *Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists* 46, 2009, 59-68, "Penelope's Fat Hand Reconsidered (*Odyssey* 21.6)." *Wiener Studien* 122, 2009, 7-20, "Corinna's Poetic Mountains (PMG 654)." *Classical Philology* 107, 2012, 101-18.

argues that the hymn was composed in the second half of sixth century in an unknown location. His argument for the date includes a detailed discussion about previous research. Former scholars dated the hymn based on linguistic features; the number of strings on the lyre, which Hermes made in the hymn; or social affairs described by the poet of the hymn. Vergados points out none of the criteria of former scholars are without problems. He dates the hymn based on archaeological materials: for example, the sanctuary of Poseidon Onchestos, which existed from the late sixth century, is emphatically described at vv. 186–7. Moreover, at v. 512, where Hermes invented the syrinx, Vergados argues that Hermes was depicted with it during the sixth century, while from ca. 500 BC onwards we see his son Pan represented with the instrument. We may say that Vergados adopted a moderate dating if we compare his dating with Richardson’s “sixth-century date”<sup>2</sup> and Janko’s argument that “a date for the poem towards the close of the sixth century fits the evidence best.”<sup>3</sup> Concerning whether the hymn was composed orally or not, he argues that the hymn belonged to a grey area between oral and literate composition. Although it was composed with the aid of memorized verse (possibly worked out in writing beforehand), it was performed orally. In the last part of the introduction, he confesses that he did not collate manuscripts and mainly followed Càssola (1975) concerning stemma and *apparatus criticus*. Càssola’s investigation on the manuscripts is trustworthy and not only Vergados but Faulkner (2008) and Richardson (2010) also relied on it.

In his text, the *apparatus criticus* is divided into three sections: the first includes parallel examples from Homer, Hesiod and the *Homeric Hymns*; the second includes those from other works; and the third illustrates information from the manuscripts and the conjectures of other editors. We did not find a new conjecture of Vergados, as he said, “my approach to the constitution of the text is conservative: wherever possible, I attempt to preserve the MSS reading” (p. 157). His text is sometimes different from Càssola’s text, who is the latest editor publishing a full text and commentary of the whole *Homeric Hymns*. Vergados listed the divergences from Càssola’s text in the latter portion of his introduction and discussed them in the commentary. I personally am interested in the places where Vergados’s text is different from West’s text (2003). West is a well-known and distinguished scholar, and he sometimes printed readings that former editors did not print and are based partly on the orthographic rules that he adopted while editing the *Iliad* (Teubner, 1998, 2000). In the preface of the *Iliad*, West explained the orthographic rules in detail. In following cases, Vergados and West

<sup>2</sup> N. Richardson, *Three Homeric Hymns: To Apollo, Hermes, and Aphrodite*. Cambridge 2010, p. 24.

<sup>3</sup> R. Janko, *Homer, Hesiod and the Hymns: Diachronic Development in Epic Diction*, Cambridge 1982, p. 143.

(2003) decided to choose different orthographies: *h.Herm.* 64, 304, 315, etc. ὁ (Vergados) / ò (West), 65 ἄλτο (V.) / ἄλτο (W.), 158 Λητοΐδου (V.) / Λητοΐδου (W.), 159 ἦ σὲ (V.) / ἦ σε (W.), 174 ἦ τοι (V.) / ἦτοι (W.), 174 ἔγωγε (V.) / ἐγώ γε (W.), 188 παρέξ (V.) / πάρεξ (W.), 253 Λητοΐδης (V.) / Λητοΐδης (W.), 309 ὦ πόποι (V.) / ὦ πόποι (W.), 440 ἔσπετο (V.) / ἔσπετο (W.). Also, concerning the movable *v* at the end of a verse, Vergados adds the *v* when the next verse begins with a vowel and omits it when the next verse begins with a consonant. West adds it whenever it can be added<sup>4</sup>. Moreover, concerning an oxytone at the end of a verse, Vergados prints an acute accent before a punctuation mark and a grave accent if there is no punctuation. West, on the other hand, always prints an acute accent<sup>5</sup>. These differences suggest that Vergados did not blindly follow West. Vergados's choice should be respected because such choice should depend on the editor. I do want him to explain why he did not adopt West's forms and orthographic rules. For me, it is regrettable that Vergados hardly commented on West in the cases cited above, neither in his commentary nor in his *apparatus criticus*.

His commentary is very lengthy and includes many topics. First, he argued in detail about humour and music, which are the main topics of the hymn. Although the poet of the hymn used humour in many places, we sometimes fail to see the humour. Vergados attempts to provide for us an understanding of the humour. For example, at vv. 302–3, Apollo who was unable to find the stolen cows through his own skill, claims that he can find them with Hermes's frivolous omens: εὐρήσω καὶ ἔπειτα βοῶν ἴφθιμα κάρηνα | τούτοις οἰωνοῖσι. Vergados states that it is humorous in the phrase “τούτοις οἰωνοῖσι” (with these omens) at v. 303, which is uttered by Apollo (i.e. the oracular god himself). Also, as Vergados points out, there are humorous contrasts between v. 387, where Hermes was called by the terrible and strong nickname Κυλλήνιος Ἀργειφόντης “the Cyllenian, the Slayer of Argus” and v. 388, where the god has his baby clothes. Unfortunately, however, in a few places I do not understand the humour that Vergados suggests. At v. 307, where Hermes called Apollo as Ἐκάεργε, Vergados says, “this form of address is again possibly humorous, since ‘he who works from afar’ is now only too close to Hermes.” This is not interesting to me because Ἐκάεργε is merely a common epithet and the epithet is sometimes used when Apollo spoke with someone in front of him (e.g. *Il.* 7. 34). Concerning music, his argument is so detailed and convincing that I suspect Vergados has significant experience in playing music. His argument about how to construct the lyre (258–9, 266–7, 270) includes many technical terms and is

<sup>4</sup> For the movable *v* at the end of a verse, see M. West, *Homerus: Ilias*. Vol. 1, Stuttgart and Leipzig 1998, XXV.

<sup>5</sup> For the accent of an oxytone at the end of a verse, see M. West, *Aeschylus: Tragoediae*, Stuttgart and Leipzig 1998, XXXI.

very detailed. It is very interesting that we can judge the date of the hymn based on the number of the strings on a lyre (p. 269). He also comments on the plectrum in detail (p. 273) and refers to other artistic elements, such as Statuettes of Centaurus in museums (p. 401).

Of course, he also covers linguistic and literary problems. He comments on special words and phrases (e.g. *hapax*, or rare words and phrases) and also focuses on seemingly common ones. He informs us how the usages of the words and phrases are different from those in Homer and Hesiod. For example, *σμερδαλέον κονάβησε* is found to inspire awe or fear in Homer, but this cannot be the meaning either at v. 54 or v. 420 of the hymn. The common word, *δειρή*, is used only at v. 133 in the context of eating. Vergados focuses on v. 154 *μητέρα δ' οὐκ ἄρ' ἔληθε θεῶν θεός, εἶπέ τε μῦθον* "the god did not pass unseen by the goddess his mother, but she said to him." He says that the subject of the formula *εἶπέ τε μῦθον*, which is common in a speech introduction such as here, is always the same as that of the preceding verb. However, v. 154 is the only one where we have a change of subject. Such arguments could inform readers of the feature of the poet's composition.

He spills much ink on conjectures and treatments of former editors. One important feature of his commentary is his reference to older editions. Vergados referred to not only the editions of the last half of nineteenth century (e.g. Baumeister and Gemoll) but also editions around 1800 (e.g. Ilgen, Matthiae and Herman), which have lengthy commentaries written in Latin. He sometimes discussed their arguments. For example, he accepts *ὠμόργαζε* which is Ilgen's conjecture at v. 361, and says that Ilgen followed another old scholar, Ernesti. Moreover, although Vergados rejects the deletion of vv. 17–9 by Ilgen, he indicates that the deletion was followed by most editors until Gemoll. Matthiae deleted 294–306 and replaced them with *τὸν δ' Ἐρμῆς μύθοισιν ἀμείβετο κερδαλέοισιν*. Vergados lists the reasons for Matthiae's replacement and denies each reason in detail. Hermann thought that vv. 145–9 presented inconsistencies, which he attributed to interpolation. Vergados explains the reasons for Hermann's treatment, and points out that Baumeister followed Hermann. Then, Vergados lists the reasons why he does not accept Hermann's criticism. Although Vergados often denies conjectures and treatments of old editors, I respect his approach of focusing on them again and sincerely discussing them. He thoroughly refers to previous research concerning the hymn and compiles almost all of the valuable works. I think his edition reaches the summit of a body of research that scholars have been building since Chalcondyles published the *Editio Princeps*, and I believe that previous scholars of this hymn would agree with my opinion.

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PETER GROSSARDT, *Stesichoros zwischen kultischer Praxis, mythischer Tradition und eigenem Kunstanspruch. Zur Behandlung des Helenamythos im Werk des Dichters aus Himera (mit einem Anhang zum Motivkomplex von Blendung und Heilung in der internationalen Erzähltradition)*. Leipziger Studien zur Klassischen Philologie 9, Tübingen: Narr Francke Attempto Verlag, 2012, pp. XIV, + 180. ISBN 978-3-8233-6767-3.

In this monograph, P. Grossardt (Gr.) grapples with the complex and thorny problem of Stesichorus' treatment of Helen. This is a problem that remains difficult to resolve, both because of the many different versions of the myth surrounding the life and action of the Spartan princess as well as because so little of Stesichorus' work survives. Moreover, the later testimony does not help clarify the situation but complicates it even further. As Gr. informs us (VII-IX), it was reading an episode in Leo Tolstoy's well-known novel *War and Peace*, where the Virgin Mary blinds and then restores the sight to a Russian general, that inspired him to research further the similar incident of blinding followed by the restoration of sight that it is claimed happened to the lyric poet Stesichorus (7th/6th century BC). Gr. announces that his study is intended for classical philologists (esp. chaps. 1-7, 1-85) as well as scholars of comparative literature and religion (esp. Anhang, 89-140). Nonetheless, the instructions he gives on p. XIII are not necessary for a specialised readership.

In chap. 1, "Einleitung" (pp. 1-5), the following pertinent questions are posed:

1. How did Stesichorus present his poems to the public?
2. In order to construct the mythical narrative, did the poet follow the Panhellenic epic tradition or did he prefer local versions of the myths, in order to satisfy his various audiences?
3. Did the invention of Helen's phantom originate in a local tradition, which Stesichorus copied?
4. Was the image of Helen as a powerful goddess who blinds and then restores sight dictated by a local tradition, or was the poet the first to give her this power, or is it in fact a post-Stesichorean tradition?

As to the first question, Gr. limits himself to two possibilities (a. with the chorus, b. with the poet as singer and the accompaniment of silent dancers), without probing the subject more deeply. The hypothesis that he formulates – that if the second situation is true, then Stesichorus' poetry must be considered more as a branch of epic than as an example of early lyric

– is not correct. Stesichorus was a choral lyric poet who narrated epic themes in lyric metres. To what extent his long poems could, however, be presented as choral has been thoroughly discussed by myself in the article “Some New Thoughts on Stesichorus’ Geryoneis”, *ZPE* 168, 2009, 10 f.

In order to answer questions 2, 3 and 4, Gr. makes a rough distinction between Panhellenic and local tradition. He presents Helen as a goddess who was worshipped only in Sparta and is concerned as to how far the invention of the phantom and the image of the punisher goddess Helen can have come from a local tradition known within Sparta or, at the most, within the boundaries of Laconia.

To be more precise, in Helen’s case we must not distinguish between a Panhellenic and a local tradition but between the epic and the Doric versions. And this because Helen was worshipped as a goddess not only in Sparta but also in many Doric regions of the wider Greek world (Southern Italy, Sicily, Rhodes, etc). There is even evidence for a sanctuary of Helen in Memphis, Egypt (Hdt. 2.112). The epic tradition that is responsible for the censorious image of the unfaithful Helen is certainly more widespread than the Doric tradition, but I would not describe it as Panhellenic. The Doric audience of the aforementioned regions was very large and we ought not, therefore, underestimate it by describing it as local. The Dorians of Sparta, Rhodes, Himera, Epizephyrian Locri, Matauros, Camarina, Acragas, Taras, Heracleia, etc. would not have tolerated hearing such censorious things about their goddess and therefore pushed for the creation of another version, namely that Helen never went Troy and never betrayed her legal husband for the sake of a young foreigner.

In chap. 2, “Helen und die Geburt der Iphigeneia” (7-11), Gr. ponders as to what extent a local Argive tradition, according to which Iphigenia was the daughter of Helen and Theseus (Paus. 2.22.6, fr. 191 *PMGF*), could have a place in *Helen*. He concludes that poet was able to mix something new in along with the generally accepted mythological material. In this way, Stesichorus could incorporate Iphigenia’s sacrifice in *Helen* from a desire to blacken the heroine even further, presenting her as the cause for the sacrifice of her daughter. According to Gr., *Helen* was performed in Sparta, where there was a significant worship of Artemis Orthia and in whose sanctuary it was said that Theseus abducted the young princess (Hellan. 4 F168a *FGH* = Plut. *Thes.* 31.2, Hyg. *Fab.* 79.1). As such, Gr. himself sees in *Helen* a point of comparison between two local traditions, an Argive and a Spartan tradition. Moreover, Gr. sees a clear contradiction in Stesichorus, as at 191 *PMGF* he portrayed Iphigenia as the daughter of Helen and Theseus whereas at 215 *PMGF* she is the daughter of Agamemnon. Since Gr. believes that it is very possible that the *Oresteia* was also staged at Sparta, he concludes that Stesichorus presented to the same audience Helen as Iphigenia’s mother on one occasion while on another occasion he presented Clytaemestra as her mother.

All the above are hypotheses without serious foundations, and this is why there are strong objections to them. Indeed, before the author focused his attention on isolated episodes he should have first presented to the reader (even in a few general lines) the contents of *Helen* and the *Palinode*, and explicated as to whether these are two different poems or two parts of the same poem. The reader must wait until chap. 4 and beyond (29 ff.) in order to understand the author's own positions.

Moreover, a visit to Sparta by Stesichorus is purely hypothetical and there is no strong evidence for this; even less so for the combination of a hypothetical stay with productions of *Helen* and the *Oresteia*! Gr. adopts the unsupported hypotheses first formulated by Bowra (*2Gr. Lyr. Poetr.* p. 111) that: "The particular glory which Stesichorus gives to Helen in the *Palinode* was appropriate to Sparta and to almost nowhere else in the Greek world. At Sparta she had her festivals and special duties..." As I have stated previously, in addition to Sparta, Helen and the Dioscuri were greatly worshipped in other Doric regions, and especially in Southern Italy and Sicily. Stesichorus did not need to travel to Sparta in order to produce *Helen* and the *Oresteia*, as in his own homeland he had a ready audience of Dorian colonists who would certainly have been interested in these themes.

As for fr. 191 *PMGF*, I believe it matches better with the *Oresteia* than with *Helen*, as I consider *Helen* to be a purely encomiastic poem (I will expand on my reasons for this in a future study). In the *Oresteia*, Clytaemestra could justifiably argue that she killed Agamemnon in order to seek vengeance for the unjust death of her daughter Iphigenia (cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 1412 ff., Soph. *El.* 528 ff., Eur. *El.* 1018 ff.), while another character (e.g. Electra, cf. Soph. *El.* 558 ff., Eur. *El.* 1060 ff.) could counter this argument by saying that Iphigenia was not her child. As such, there was no specific need which pushed Clytaemestra to the unholy act of killing her husband, aside from her own immoral sexual desire for Aegisthus. In addition to this, in the *Oresteia* it is expected that reproaches will be fired off at the polygamous and destructive Helen.

In 215 *PMGF*, Iphigenia does not appear "ganz konventionell als Tochter von Klytaimestra und Agamemnon", as Gr. hastily observes. The evidence in Philodemus on this particular fragment is as follows: Στη[σίχορο]ς δ' ἐν Ὀρεστεί[α κατ]ακολουθήσας [Ἡσιό]δῳ τὴν Ἀγαμέ[μνονος Ἰ]φιγένειαν εἶ[ναι τῆ]ν Ἐκάτην οὖν [ὄνομαζ]ομένην. The phrase τὴν Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἰφιγένειαν is not a confirmation that Iphigenia appeared in the Stesichorean *Oresteia* actually as the real daughter of Agamemnon; she is described in this way because this is the view that prevailed. Helen also often appears in the literature as the daughter of Tyndareus (cf. the feminine patronymic Τυνδαρίς); yet, Tyndareus was in reality her adoptive father.

In chap. 3, "Aphrodite und die Töchter des Tyndareos in *PMGF* 223" (pp. 13-28), Gr. compares Stesichorus' fr. 223 *PMGF* with Hesiod's fr. 176

M.-W., and correctly concludes that the two fragments come from the same tradition, which can, however, no longer be fully reconstructed. Section 3.1 (pp. 14-6) is well considered and concludes with the interesting observation that Stesichorus was innovating when he presented Aphrodite as punishing Tyndareus through his daughters, because he had once neglected to offer a sacrifice to the goddess, whereas Hesiod portrayed Aphrodite as taking her revenge because she was jealous of the beauty of Tyndareus' daughters.

In section 3.2, "Die Identifikation der verschiedenen Personen in PMGF 223" (16-8), Gr. observes two different versions between Stesichorus and the *Cypria* (cf. Procl. *Chrest.* 80 Seve., fr. 1 Bern.) for the outbreak of the Trojan War. I do not personally see a conflict between Aphrodite's bile towards Tyndareus and the judgement of Paris. An insulted and bitter Aphrodite finds the opportunity to get her revenge through the judgement of Paris. Through just one move (i.e. the offering of Helen to Paris) she manages also to get revenge on Tyndareus by making his daughter a bigamist, and she also wins the beauty contest too.

In section 3.3, "Stesichoros und der Kult der Aphrodite in Sparta" (18-26), Gr., inspired by the lexical similarities between *Il.* 9.533 ff. and Stes. fr. 223 *PMGF*, argues that Stesichorus copied the motif of the divinity who has been angered by the neglected sacrifice from the Homeric narrative of the Calydonian boar. As such, Gr. continues, Stesichorus introduced elements from a foreign cult into the local Spartan cult, creating his own cult and mythical world. We do not have enough details in order to be able to accept the above position. The version according to which Tyndareus' bigamous (two or three times over) daughters were in no way responsible for their shame, but instead their forgetful father, who had inspired Aphrodite's rage (the poor man was not completely at fault because he had simply forgotten to make a sacrifice, he didn't avoid doing it on purpose), was the cause, was either a local tradition or one created by Stesichorus, inspired by the common folk belief that the appropriate honour due to each god should be neither forgotten nor neglected (cf. Paus. 8.22.8 f.: punishment of the Stymphalians by Artemis, 8.42.5 ff.: punishment of the Phigalians by Demeter; we should also recall the Euripidean *Hippolytus*). Because the version of the embittered Aphrodite's vengeance coincides with and matches in terms of its content with the case of the Calydonian boar, as it is found in the *Iliad*, then in the second case it can be assumed that Stesichorus retrospectively decided to match his own narrative lexically with that of Homer.

In section 3.4, "Die Frage nach Werkzugehörigkeit von PMGF 223" (26-8), Gr. argues that 223 *PMGF* may originate in only a poem in which Helen was the central character; to this purpose, he suggests *Helen* and rejects the *Oresteia* and the *Iliou Persis*. The fact that 223 *PMGF* talks of the daughters of Tyndareus (Clytaemestra, Timandra, Helen) and not just one daughter (i.e. Helen) undermines the above categorical position.

In chap. 4, “Helena und Menelaos in Stesichoros’ *Helena*” (pp. 29-33), Gr. identifies *Helen* with the Ἑλένης κακηγορία and attributes to the poem the frs. 187-191, 223 and *P. Oxy.* 3876 fr. 35 (following W. Luppe, see *ZPE* 95, 1993, 53-8). Gr. believes that the wedding scene in fr. 187 *PMGF* can be reduced to local Spartan customs that were still alive in the time of Stesichorus. Moreover, the material used to make vessels for washing the feet (i.e. the litharge, cf. fr. 188 *PMGF*) was common in Sparta and the poet was familiar with it from having lived there.

As I have argued in my recent article “Stesichorus’ *Helen* fr. 187 *PMGF*: A New Interpretation”, *RFIC* 141.2 (2013), 257-269, this fragment describes Menelaus’ triumphant entry into Sparta as a bridegroom after the difficult contest in which he brushed aside many fine candidates (cf. fr. 190 *PMGF*). Fr. 187 *PMGF* talks of one person (l. 1 ἄνακτι) at whom fruit, myrtle leaves and floral wreaths are being thrown. This is how they would honour all those who emerged as victors after a contest or labour (cf. Simon. F 10 Poltera, Pind. *Pyth.* 9.123 ff., *Isthm.* 8.66a f., Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 723c, *Suda* π 1054, etc.). Furthermore, there is no evidence for the throwing of leaves, fruit and wreaths at wedding processions in either the literary or the visual arts (cf. Hom. *Il.* 18.490 ff., Hes. *Sc.* 270 ff., Eur. *Alc.* 915 ff., *Hel.* 722 ff., Ch. Papadopoulou-Kanellopoulou, *Ἐρὸ τῆς Νύμφης. Μελανόμορφες Λουτροφόροι*, Athens 1997). In any case, the descriptions at 187 *PMGF* do not depict anything specific that could be characterised as a local custom, but instead portray a Panhellenic custom for bestowing honour on victors. Moreover, objects made of litharge are definitely known to have been used in the ancient Greek world (cf. Arist. *Soph. el.* 164b21 ff.); we also know that litharge was used in the ancient mines at Laurion as a watertight coating for the water tanks.

Gr.’s observation that 190 *PMGF* had a Panhellenic scope is correct and his conclusion that Stesichorus used a Panhellenic tradition for the canvas of *Helen* but would also, here and there, throw in a few local colours when describing marriage scenes, is interesting. It’s a shame, however, that the two surviving fragments of the poem do not indicate any such thing.

On p. 32, Gr. is incorrect in believing that Taras was the only Spartan colony in Magna Graecia. We can mention the Epizephyrian Locri who, according to Paus. 3.3.1, were a Spartan colony; moreover, they were described as the “Sparta of the West”, as the socio-economic conditions of the city were reminiscent of those in Sparta, their dialect was closely related to that of Sparta’s and there is a pronounced Spartan influence in a number of their artistic products (see D. Musti, *Le tavole di Locri* p. 9, J. M. Redfield, *The Locrian Maidens* 251 ff.). The Dioscuri were honoured in Epizephyrian Locri, thanks to this Spartan influence, and their cult reached its peak following the battle of Sagra (cf. Strabo 6.1.10, Dio. Sic. 8.32; the battle is dated to between 550 BC and 510 BC).

In chap. 5, “Helena in der *Iliupersis* und in den *Nostoi*” (35–42), Gr., as far as the content of *Helen* is concerned, outlines a biography of the heroine with the following stages: youth, capture by Theseus, birth of Iphigenia, marriage with Menelaus, wrath of Aphrodite, perhaps also capture by Paris. The remaining events of her life were memorialised, according to Gr., in the *Sack of Troy* and *Homecomings*. He even claims that the description ξανθὴ Ἑλένη was an innovation by Sappho (cf. fr. 23.5 V.), which Stesichorus and Ibycus adopted (S 151.5 *PMGF*). Of interest is Gr.’s observation of the similarities between the Stesichorean *Helen* and the Hindu epic *Ramayana*, in which a king’s wife is also abducted, an enemy city falls and the woman is reclaimed once more, after having had her wifely faithfulness and purity tested. Further discussion and explanation of these similarities is, however, needed.

In chap. 6, “Stesichoros und Helena in der *Palinodie*” (43–77), Gr. discusses the subject of the blinding, in particular from where the poet copied this motif and what function he gave it in his poem.

In section 6.1, “Der Inhalt der *Palinodie* und die literarische Polemik in *PMGF* 192” (44–8), Gr. attributes Stesichorus’ phrase οὐδ’ ἔβας (fr. 192.2 *PMGF*) to Homer (*Il.* 24.766) and Sappho (fr. 16.9 V. ἔβα ’ς Τροίαν πλέοισα), and concludes that, although Stesichorus is utilising the two poets, he is also consciously seeking a contrast with the representatives of the Panhellenic tradition (not only with epic but also with lyric poets). The attribution to Homer is correct but with Sappho I have my doubts as we do not know enough about the lives and periods of composition of either Sappho or Stesichorus. In any case, if Stesichorus sought a conscious contrast with other poets aside from Homer and Hesiod, then shouldn’t he have declared this and named them in the *Palinode*?

In section 6.2, “Das Blendungsmotiv in der *Palinodie* und die verschiedenen Versionen der Geschichte von der Heilung des Stesichoros” (48–57), Gr. expresses the belief that in the *Palinode* Stesichorus discussed a real blinding and its cure. He investigates which of the versions – Plato’s (*Phaedr.* 243a), Conon’s (*fab.* 18), Pausanias’ (3.19.12–13) or the *Suda* (σ 1095) – can be traced to the Stesichorean poem. He correctly judges Pausanias’ narrative to be a local history of Croton or Locri that must have been created after the battle of Sagra. With the arguments that divine dreams are a common motif in epic and that Stesichorus copied the appearance of Helen in the dreams of Homer (*Isocr. Hel.* 65, *Vita Romana* 5), Gr. concludes that the version in the *Suda* goes as far back as the *Palinode*.

In sections 6.3, “Das Motiv der Blendung und Heilung als traditionelles Erzählmotiv” (57–9), and 6.4, “Verschiedene göttliche Hüterinnen der menschlichen Augen und die Frage nach ihrer Beziehung zu Helena und Stesichoros” (59–68), Gr. moves away from the subject as he wonders which goddess at the time of Stesichorus protected human sight and had the power to

blind and heal mortals. Gr. follows the wrong path here, seeking this goddess amongst Athena, Demeter and Isis, concluding that Isis is the most likely model from which Stesichorus borrows to give Helen the ability to blind and heal human sight. He should have considered the etymology of the name Ἑλένη much earlier and have incorporated the views of N. Laneres ('L'Harpax de Therapne ou le *Digamma* d'Hélène', Actes du Ve Congrès International de Dialectologie Grecque [Athènes 28-30 Septembre 2006], in: *Meletemata* 52, 237-269) and M. West (*Indo-European Poetry and Myth*, Oxford 2007, 137, 230 f.), who attributes to Helen the name 'mistress of sunlight'. Indeed, the association of Helen with the Hindu Dawn goddess (*Ushas*) and Selene shows a close relationship between her being and light. We should recall that Helen was worshipped in Rhodes, where Helios was the patron god (for further details, see A. Rozokoki in *QUCC* 98, 2011, 63 f.).

The models for the goddess Helen were the Hindu Dawn goddess and, to an extent, the eastern great goddess Istar/Astarte (and not Isis). The Anatolian model for the Dioscuri has been located in the Ásvins, whose powers included restoring sight to the blind. The Spartan trio of the Dioscuri + Helen corresponds to the Indian trio of Ásvins + Dawn goddess; this is the same motif: a goddess of light and her two male companions (brothers, friends or lovers). Moreover, the intervention of the twins in order to save the female figure (mother, sister) from her captor, or to defend or rehabilitate her honour and reputation is a motif in many Indo-European mythologies. The Dioscuri punished the captor Theseus; they would also have punished Paris, if they were still alive. This is why Helen looks for them and wonders why she cannot see them amongst the Achaean warriors in Troy (*Il.* 3.236 ff.). The version presented by Horace (*Ep.* 17.42-44), that the Dioscuri punished the blaspheming poet for the sake of their sister, then, after he had repented, healed him, may be much closer to Stesichorus (for further details, see A. Rozokoki, *QUCC* 98 [2011], 38 f., 65 f.).

Gr.'s line of thinking (p. 66) – that because in the Hellenistic and Roman period Isis was the primary goddess who protected human sight and therefore we must also look for her in the time of Stesichorus (7th/6th century BC) – is wrong. In the Hellenistic and Roman eras, the cult of Isis merged abilities that had not previously belonged to her. In ancient Egypt, Isis was the eye of the sun god Re, but there is no evidence that an ability relating to human sight was attributed to her. When her son Horus, seeking vengeance for his father's death, fights with the evil Seth and loses an eye, it is not Isis who restores it to him but Thoth!

In chap. 6.5, "Die Motivreihe von Blendung und Heilung als indogermanisches Erbgut?" (pp. 69-73), the observation that the cult of Helen has Indo-European elements and that Stesichorus could find the motif of the blinding in either Anatolian, Greek or Western Mediterranean traditions, is correct. We can also accept the conclusion in section 6.6, "Folgerungen" (pp.

73-7), according to which, in order to compose the *Palinode*, Stesichorus mixed and adapted material from the Panhellenic and local traditions and, of course, also added his own elements through his poetic talent.

In chap. 7, “Schluss” (79-85), Gr. recaps the main positions that he has developed in the previous chapters.

The second part of the study includes an appendix in which Gr. traces the sources of various medieval and later narratives (religious, literary, etc.), which contain miracles of blinding and restoration of sight (such as the Russian general in *War and Peace*, Orthodox monks on Mt Athos, the blinding of Thormod in an old Icelandic myth, and other Irish and English tales of saintly miracles; see “Anhang: Der Motivkomplex von Blendung und Heilung in der internationalen Erzähltradition”, 87-140). Wherever the Virgin Mary appears healing the blind, the roots must be sought in Isis, Gr. tells us. This scholar assumes that healing through a vision in a dream may have been known in Egypt between 760-340 BC and that the blinding of Stesichorus and Hermon (cf. *IG* 4<sup>2</sup>122) stems directly from the cult of Isis. According to Gr., Isis was the most prominent goddess with the power to blind and heal out of all the divinities of the Near East (see p. 134 ff.).

The bibliography (141-66) is exceptionally rich and covers a wide range of fields: ancient Egyptian, Greek, Latin, ecclesiastical, Hindu, Icelandic and other texts. The study is rounded off with three indices: a. Names and Subjects, b. Passages Cited, and c. Iconography (167-80).

With a poem very little of which survives, and where the burden falls on later, non-complementary evidence, we must be very careful when attempting to discern what the poet may have borrowed from various myths (Eastern, Panhellenic, local), how he chose and adapted this material and even if he invented new details. Distinguishing the different levels cannot be done roughly: we must be aware that amongst the roughly-determined levels there are intermediary strata that may be recognised after much careful and meticulous examination.

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B. GENTILI – C. CATENACCI – P. GIANNINI – L. LOMIENTO (edd.), *Pindaro: Le Olimpiche*, Scrittori Greci e Latini, Fondazione Lorenzo Valla, Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori, 2013, pp. 663, ISBN 978-88-04-62712-8

Nach dem Kommentar zu den *Isthmien* (Privitera 1982) und den *Pythien* (Gentili – Bernardini – Cingano – Giannini 1995) ist im September 2013 derjenige zu den *Olympien* als erster Teil der auf fünf Bände geplanten kommentierten Gesamtausgabe des pindarischen Œuvres der nach Lorenzo Valla genannten traditionsreichen Schriftenreihe erschienen (*Nemeen* und *Fragmente* stehen noch aus). Den Text, seine Übersetzung und den kritischen Apparat hat der Koordinator der Arbeit, der um archaische Chorlyrik mehrfach verdiente B. Gentili<sup>1</sup>, vorgelegt, der zusammen mit L. Lomiento auch die neue Kolometrie und metrische Analyse der Oden bestimmte, den Kommentar zu *O.* 1, 2, 3, 12 hat C. Catenacci, den zu *O.* 6, 7, 8, 9 P. Giannini, den zu *O.* 4, 5, 10, 11, 13, 14 L. Lomiento geschrieben. Im Folgenden werde ich die konkrete Verfasserschaft nicht berücksichtigen, sondern das Buch als gemeinschaftliche Leistung Vieler betrachten.

Der Aufbau dieser historisch-kritischen Ausgabe ist – in enger Anlehnung an den der Vorgängerbände – folgender: Die Einleitung, bestehend aus der Zusammenfassung der Vita Pindars (XI–XIX), der Geschichte der olympischen Spiele (XIX–XXV), der Darstellung der Handschriften (XXV f. sowie auch LIII–LVI), einer Bibliographie mit öfters zitierter Literatur, Neuerscheinungen seit 2007 und der Auflistung der gängigen Textausgaben und/oder Kommentare<sup>2</sup> sowie der Übersetzungen. Dieser bibliographische Teil soll durch die einschlägige Literatur im Vorspann der jeweiligen Einzeloden ergänzt werden. Auf eine allseitige Würdigung der pindarischen Dichtung konnte verzichtet werden, da die längere Einleitung zu den *Pythien* diesem Bedarf genügt. Auf diesen Abschnitt folgt der erste Hauptteil (9–351) jeweils mit einer Einleitung zur betreffenden Ode, die vor allem den historischen Hintergrund (Siegesrealien, Datum und Aufführung) sowie weitere interpretatorische Fragen behandelt, der relevanten Literatur (in knapper Auswahl), einem Schema des Versmaßes (sowie metrischen Hinweisen zu Problemstellen und Besonderheiten) und schließlich dem

<sup>1</sup> Der Nestor der italienischen klassischen Philologie ist am 8. Januar 2014 im hohen Alter von 98 Jahren verstorben.

<sup>2</sup> Die Oxforder Ausgabe von Richard West und Robert Welsted aus dem Jahre 1697 auf der Seite XLVIII wurde unrichtig Nicolaus Sudorius (Nicolas Le Sueur) als Herausgeber zugeschrieben (so bereits im Band zu den *Pythien*), da er dem Band nur einige lateinische Nachdichtungen im horazianischen Versmaß beigeuert hat.

griechischen Text und dem kritischen Apparat (der Parallelstellen und der *variae lectiones/emendationes*) sowie der italienischen Übersetzung<sup>3</sup>. Auf diesen ersten Hauptteil folgt der zweite, der fortlaufende und nach Lemmata geordnete Kommentar zu den Einzeloden (355–621). Der Band wird von einem kolometrischen Apparat (625–634)<sup>4</sup> und mehreren nützlichen Indices (637–663) beschlossen.

Das augenfälligste Wahrzeichen dieser Ausgabe ist die Absage an die Boeckhianische (sogenannte „moderne“) Kolometrie und die Rückkehr zu der in der Antike aufgrund der Ausgabe (?) des Aristophanes von Byzanz bekannten, deren sich in der Neuzeit zuletzt der Göttinger Philologe, Ch. G. Heyne, annahm<sup>5</sup>. Diese Entscheidung führt zu einer Neuanalyse der Kola in metrischer Hinsicht, deren Dokument das dem Text der Oden vorausgeschickte metrische Schema ist<sup>6</sup>. Um ein adäquates Urteil über diesen schwerwiegenden Neoterismos *in metricis* abzugeben, wäre eine Spezialuntersuchung vonnöten. Hier möchte ich nur Zweifel anmelden, da ich mich wenig für das dadurch erzielte klangliche Gebilde erwärmen kann. Denn so sind statt feierlich-langatmiger Perioden lauter kurzgebunden hüpfende Tanzschritte entstanden (man versuche nur *Olympie 2* in dieser Fassung durchzulesen), die dem inhaltlichen (!) Duktus der Sätze kaum entsprechen. Dafür müssen ziemlich viele willkürliche Worttrennungen in Kauf genommen werden: Ich habe deren vierzig in einer einzigen Ode, *Olympie 6*, die besonders arg zugerichtet wurde, zusammengezählt. Auch weitere Feinheiten gehen dabei verloren: Das κατ' ἔξοχήν hexametrische Gefälle von *O. 6. 16 f.* (abgetöntes Zitat aus der *Thebais*) wird zerrissen (146) und ist nicht mehr erkennbar (auch die Beschreibung mit Anapästsen und Choriamben oder *ionici a maiore* hat nichts mehr mit dem pindarischen Original und der epischen Vorlage zu tun).

Im weiteren erweist sich der Text als ziemlich konservativ. Zu begrüßen ist die Rückkehr zum Text der Handschriften in *O. 3. 30*: Ὀρῳσία ἔγραψεν, wo L. Ahrens zu Unrecht den Genitiv Ὀρῳσίας statt des Dativs vorschlug, um dem Hiatus abzuhelfen. Aber Pindar ist alles andere als pedantisch im Umgang mit dem Hiatus, und die epigraphische Evidenz, die der Kommentar als neuen Befund liefert (429), ist aufschlussreich. So ist die Beibehaltung des handschriftlich bezeugten Hiatus in *O. 6. 82* ebenso berechtigt wie die

<sup>3</sup> Die Beurteilung dieser frei rhythmisierten Übersetzungen, die an die metrische Eigenart der Gedichte D'Annunzios erinnern, überlasse ich den Kennern der italienischen Literatur. Die bereits mit dem Kommentar zu den *Isthmien* initiierte Praxis, der Übersetzung am Rande „Diple“-Zeichen hinzuzufügen, die den Anfänger auf sachliche Erklärungen im Kommentar hinweisen, finde ich besonders gut und nachahmenswert.

<sup>4</sup> Bedingt durch die unorthodoxe Kolometrie dieser Ausgabe (s. den Fließtext gleich unten).

<sup>5</sup> Zu einem Legitimationsversuch dieser „alt-neuen“ Kolometrie vgl. den Kommentar zu den *Pythien* (XCI f.).

<sup>6</sup> Das neue metrische System wurde bereits in Priviteras *Isthmien*-Kommentar angewandt, aber dort hielt sich die Neufassung der Kolometrie noch in Schranken.

Textfassung ὑπὸ σπλάγχων ὑπ' ὠδίνος τ' ἐρατᾶς in derselben Ode (V. 43), ein Passus, der mit Wilamowitz meistens emendiert wird. An anderen Stellen kann ich jedoch die Entscheidung des Herausgebers – sei es zu Gunsten, sei es zu Ungunsten der Paradosis – nicht billigen: In *O.* 2. 46 resultiert aus dem mit ῥίζαν endenden Kolon (Textfassung des Didymos) eine verstümmelte Satz- und Gedankenabfolge. V. 52 scheint mir ἀφροσυνᾶν dem enkomiastischen Ziel der Ode(n) wenig angemessen. V. 97 f. dürfte wohl Aristarchs Emendation das Richtige treffen („das Schöne durch böse Taten unsichtbar machen“ ist für Pindar zu schal). Was *O.* 6. 29 anbelangt, wird im Text (152) μειχθεῖσα (Schroeder), im Kommentar (454) μιχθεῖσα (codd.) geschrieben, ein unscheinbarer Fall der Inkonsequenz. Schwerer wiegt allerdings V. 30 die Bewahrung des unmetrischen ἰοπλόκαμον statt Bergks geglückter Emendation ἰόπλοκον. Zweifelhaft erscheinen mir auch die Textfassungen τελεσθέντων (V. 15), eine schwierige Stelle, die im Kommentar (449) ziemlich leichtfertig behandelt wird, παρέστασέν τε (V. 42), wobei im Kommentar (457) kein Wort verlautet bezüglich der Anomalie der Stellung von τε, ἀλλά / κέκρυπτο (V. 53 f.), βατεία τ' ἐν ἀπειράντων (V. 54), λαότροφον (V. 60) und Θραύσοι (V. 97)<sup>7</sup>. Hinsichtlich *O.* 10. 9 wird G. Hermanns Emendation τόκος ὁ θνατῶν unbegründet abgelehnt, während angesichts von τόκος θνατῶν das Genitivattribut bestimmt auf τόκος und nicht auf ἐπιμομφάν bezogen werden müsste (558 ad loc.). Die Wendung τόκος ὁ θνατῶν würde eindeutig ausdrücken, dass es um der *Menschen* (spezifizierend!) Zins geht. So wird angezeigt, dass man es mit einer Metapher aus der menschlichen Handelspraxis im Gegensatz zu der musischen Sphäre zu tun hat. In *O.* 13. 88 kann die Konjekture ψυχρᾶν ἀπὸ κόλπων sicher nicht stimmen, da κόλπος nur als Maskulinum belegt ist. Aber diese Unzulänglichkeiten werden durch den vorzüglichen kritischen Apparat aufgewogen. So wird dem Leser die Möglichkeit nicht vorenthalten, die Wahl des Herausgebers jederzeit revidieren zu können. Insbesondere der *apparatus locorum* ist reichhaltiger als der in Snells und Maehlers Ausgabe (1987<sup>8</sup>).

Was den Kommentar betrifft, ist es trotz der variierenden Verfasserschaft gelungen, einen stilistisch und inhaltlich einheitlichen exegetischen Teil zustande zu bringen. Einige Stärken, die diesem Teil insgesamt innewohnen, seien hier hervorgehoben: [1] Auf die Quellen einer mythischen Erzählung wird stets mit großer Genauigkeit eingegangen (z.B. in Bezug auf die Strafe des Tantalos in *O.* 1[375], die Donauquelle in *O.* 3[422], Verbindung von λαός und λᾶας in *O.* 9[536], Zähmung des Pegasos in *O.* 13[605]) – ein löbliches Bemühen, da dem Mythos in den Oden eine wichtige paradigmatische Funktion zukommt und nur dann die Absicht des Dichters klar zu Tage tritt, wenn sich der Hintergrund, den er abwandelt oder von dem er abweicht, klar

<sup>7</sup> Ausführlicher zu diesen Stellen vgl. meinen Kommentar: *Pindars sechste olympische Siegesode. Text, Einleitung und Kommentar*, Mnemosyne Supplements 370, Leiden 2014.

abzeichnet. [2] Auch dem Zeugnis der Vasenbilder (Darstellungen der Hindenjagd des Herakles [82]) und dem der archäologischen Funde (Verbreitung der Schriftlichkeit mit Hinweis auf das neuentdeckte ‚Dichtergrab‘ mit Schreibutensilien) wird ziemlich große Bedeutung beigemessen, wodurch sich ab und zu eine ganz ungewöhnliche Dimension auftut. [3] Im Großen und Ganzen ist der Kommentar von einem ungewöhnlich feinen Gespür für historische Realien (insbesondere für Machtkonstellationen) im Hintergrund der Oden geprägt. Nach wie vor scheiden sich die Geister, ob sich hinter der eindringlichen Gnomik des Schicksalswechsels in *O.* 2 etwa eine konkrete und akute historische Situation verbirgt. In der Einleitung zu der Ode (17–19) wird umsichtig für die Relevanz der geschichtlichen „Sternstunde“ argumentiert (392 ad 15–17 etwas zurückhaltender). Mit Blick auf *O.* 13. wird die Hypothese der aufstrebenden Gruppe der korinthischen Händler geschickt behandelt und durch das dem Bereich der τέχνη geltende Interesse des Gedichts unterstützt (304–307). [4] Ein weiterer willkommener Zug des Kommentars ist die etymologische Erklärung einiger Begriffe, vornehmlich Eigennamen: In *O.* 1. 23 wird ἵπποχάρμῳ (Hieron zugeschrieben) mit χάρις (V. 18 auf Hierons Pferd Pherenikos bezogen) in Zusammenhang gebracht (363 ad loc.). Man muss aber nicht vergessen, dass χάρμη (‚Kampf‘) und χάρις (‚Freude‘) auf denselben Stamm zurückgehen<sup>8</sup>, so dass Pindar eine eindeutige Festlegung von ἵπποχάρμῳ wohl nicht beabsichtigt. Die Erklärungen der Namen Pelops, Γαῖόχοος und Poseidon stehen in den Anmerkungen zu derselben Ode dicht nacheinander (364 f.) und die der Hippodameia folgt ihnen nach (379 ad 70). Was man einigermaßen vermisst, ist die Abwägung der Frage, ob Pindar um den jeweiligen etymologischen Gehalt weiß und wenn ja, dann welche poetische Funktion der Etymologie beschieden wird. Auch die poetische Volksetymologien hätten besser berücksichtigt werden sollen: In *O.* 10. 54 legt ἐτήτυμον sicher eine Verbindung von Κρόνος (50) und Χρόνος nahe, so bedeutet es mehr (‚etymologisch richtig‘) als *autentica* (eine Ausklammerung des Pelops-Mythos, wie man 569 ad loc. annimt, ist hier gar nicht indiziert). [5] Ein besonderes Augenmerk gilt auch dem Nachleben verschiedener Motive (vor allem in italienischer Literatur) – eine ganz erfreuliche Bereicherung über die obligaten *loci classici* hinaus. Hier sei nur auf die Rezeption der Priamel (355 ad *O.* 1. 1–7), die Ansichten von Picasso und Gaudì hinsichtlich der Eigenart der künstlerischen *inventio* (418 ad *O.* 3 ad 4a), ein Zitat von Dante in Bezug auf die schwankende Fortbewegung der Schiffe (584 ad *O.* 12. 6), das Motiv von ‚Leben als Tag‘ (395 ad *O.* 2. 32) bei Petrarca und Quasimodo, den Vergleich Goethes ‚wie Schwerter‘ bezüglich Pindars (410 ad *O.* 2. 86–88) und das negative Emblem der Krähen bei Tasso und Lorenzo da Ponte (410 ad *O.* 2. 87) hingewiesen.

<sup>8</sup> Vgl. J. Latacz, Zum Wortfeld „Freude“ in der Sprache Homers, *Helikon* 13–14, 1973–1974, 35–110.

Weniger ansprechend sind einige Lösungen, bei denen etliche unverbunden- aberwitzige Meinungen der Scholien kritiklos übernommen werden. Auf *O.* 2. 87 bezieht sich die alte Streitfrage, ob man in den schwatzhaften κόρακες etwa Simonides und Bakchylides erkennen soll, eine Ansicht, die der Kommentar im Gefolge der Scholien geneigt ist zu bejahen (50–53). Dass diese Annahme durch nichts gehindert wird, bedeutet aber noch gar nicht, dass sie auch zutrifft. Und auch umgekehrt: Die Rivalität Pindars mit den beiden keischen Dichtern könnte historisch wahr sein, ohne den Schluss zu erzwingen, dass der Thebaner mit den beiden Krähen dieselben ins Visier nehmen wollte. Auch Walther von Stolzing ergeht sich am Ende des ersten Aktes der *Meistersinger von Nürnberg* in Schmähworten über die *Krähen und Dohlen*, aber dies steht auf einer höheren Stufe der dichterischen Verallgemeinerung als dass es sich ohne weiteres mit Sixtus Beckmesser gleichsetzen ließe. Insbesondere der Kommentar zu *Olympie* 6 zeigt einen starken Hang zu Übernahme von prekären Scholienmeinungen. Die Freundschaft des Siegers Hagesias mit Hieron ist alles andere als ausgemacht, wie auch seine Ermordung in den Wirren nach Hierons Untergang keine unumstößliche historische Tatsache darstellt (137). Im Vers 85 wird apodiktisch festgestellt, dass das Relativpronomen τᾶς, wie es auch einige Scholien aufgefasst haben, auf die stymphalische Quellnymphe Metope bezogen werden muss, weil die Ode dort gesungen wurde (467 ad loc.). Aber das Moment des Trinkens gehört dem Dichter als Inspiriertem zu und nicht dem Chor als aufführender Gruppe, so entfällt das Argument mit dem Hinweis auf den Darbietungsort. Die Begründung der Delegation des Aineas (V. 88) durch die schütterere Stimme des Dichters (468 ad loc.) ist eine der lächerlichsten Vorstellungen der Scholiasten, die sich bei genauerem Hinsehen als ein Wandermotiv entpuppt, das mehreren Dichterpersönlichkeiten zugeschrieben wurde. Was die Scholien-Interpretation der σκυτάλη (V. 91) als einer Form der spartanischen Geheimschrift betrifft, dürfte sie nach S. Wests Aufsatz<sup>9</sup> endgültig aus der Welt geschafft worden sein, folglich sollte sie nicht wieder zum Leben erweckt werden (470 ad loc.).

Abschließend seien noch einige kurze Einzelbemerkungen zum Kommentar der Oden zur Sprache gebracht:

*Olympie* 2: Es ist ein guter Ansatz, die orphisch-pythagoreischen Züge der Jenseitsbeschreibung unter Berücksichtigung der Enkomien-Motive auszulegen (54–56), aber dieser Punkt wird nicht ausgearbeitet, um ein schlüssiges Bild zu ergeben. Der Hinweis bei εὐθρόνοις (V. 22 auf die Kadmos-Töchter bezogen) auf die Tatsache, dass das Attribut sonst nur neben Göttinnen vorkommt, wodurch hier über die menschliche Misere hinaus gleich ein Ausblick auf die göttliche Sphäre geschaffen wird, ist sehr einleuchtend (393 ad loc.). Bei der Interpretation der besonders stacheligen Passage 57–60 bin ich allerdings nicht überzeugt von der Dreiteilung der

<sup>9</sup> S. West, Archilochus' Message-Stick, *CQ* 38, 1988, 42–48.

Unterweltbewohner in *peccatori minori, cattivi* und *buoni* (401 ad loc.), da so die *Gesamtdreiteilung* der Unterweltsszene verkannt wird, die aus Bösen, Guten und Besten besteht. Es wäre noch vielleicht zu überlegen, ob die lässlichen Frevler, die der weiteren Wiedergeburt unterworfen sind, nicht etwa den Guten zugerechnet werden können. Es wäre allerdings hanebüchen, wenn Frevler nach drei bestandenen Probeleben ein höheres überirdisches Glück erlangen könnten als die *ab ovo* Guten, und das Pronomen ὅσοι, mit dem die Lehre der Metempsychose eingeleitet wird, suggeriert eine Gesamtheit, keine Teilung (in Gute und weniger Gute, die dann noch die Besten sein werden). Wie diese Widersprüche doch zu einem aussagekräftigen poetischen Gebilde zusammengereimt werden können, habe ich anderswo gezeigt<sup>10</sup>.

*Olympie 3*: Ein Stück eiszeitlicher Vorgeschichte zeichnet sich vor unseren Augen ab, als wir erfahren, dass das zoologische Paradoxon der gehörnten Hinde ein Erinnerungsreliquie aus jener Zeit sein dürfte, als die Rene, bei denen auch die weiblichen Tiere Hörner tragen<sup>11</sup>, im nördlichen Gebiet Griechenlands verbreitet waren (427 f. ad 29). Aber der alte Erklärungsansatz ist nicht von der Hand zu weisen, dass die gehörnte Hinde ein Symbol des gehörnten Mondes darstellt, wovon sich das bis in die frühmittelalterliche Arthus-Legende hinunterreichende Mythologem der Jagd des Sonnengottes nach der Mondgöttin in Hindengestalt auf dem wie das Rehfell gesprenkelten nächtlichen Himmelsgewölbe herleitet<sup>12</sup>.

*Olympie 7*: Der Bezug von τῆς (V. 1) auf den Vater der Braut im breitangelegten Gleichnis des Prooimions dieses Siegeslieds ist alles andere als eindeutig (475 ad 1–10). In der ganzen Analyse sollte das durch das Indefinitpronomen exemplarisch angekündigte ‚Unbestimmtheitsprinzip‘ besser berücksichtigt werden. Das auf den Dichter bezogene Verb ἰλάσκομαι (V. 9) sollte vielleicht eher absolut aufgefasst werden (‚ich agiere als Priester‘) statt mit dem Dativobjekt (‚ich mache mir [Medium] die Sieger gewogen‘ oder ‚ich mache [den Gott (elliptisch)] den Siegern gegenüber gewogen‘ n: 478 ad 8f.). Denn es ist das Vermittlertum des Dichters zwischen göttlicher und menschlicher Sphäre, das in diesem feierlichen Verbum emphatisch zum Ausdruck kommt<sup>13</sup>.

<sup>10</sup> Zs. Adorjáni, *Auge und Sehen in Pindars Dichtung*, Spudasmata 139, Hildesheim 2011, 172–196.

<sup>11</sup> Selbst das Wort ‚Ren‘ (verdeutlichend auch ‚Rentier‘) geht auf den Stamm von κέρας (‚Horn‘) zurück (altnordisch: *hreinn*).

<sup>12</sup> C. Pschmidt, *Die Sage von der verfolgten Hinde. Ihre Heimat und Wanderung, Bedeutung und Entwicklung mit besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer Verwendung in der Literatur des Mittelalters*, Greifswald 1911.

<sup>13</sup> Zur Interpretation des gesamten Gleichnisses vgl. mein Buch (wie Anm. 10) 27–39.

*Olympie 8*: In der Anmerkung zu τερτάτοις (V. 46) bezüglich der Abfolge der Aiakidengenerationen (513 f. ad loc.) fehlt eine Auseinandersetzung mit Lattmanns bahnbrechendem Beitrag<sup>14</sup>, in dem er die glänzende Lösung vorschlägt, πρώτοις (V. 45) und τερτάτοις in Eins zu setzen: Die vierte Generation des Neoptolemos ist *zugleich* (ἄμα ... / καί: V. 45 f.) die erste, die Troja in der Tat erobert. Die Berücksichtigung von Lattmanns Untersuchung der athletischen Metaphorik im Ganzen des Gedichts als eines einheitsstiftenden Elements wäre auch der Gesamtinterpretation (vor allem 199 f.) zugute gekommen (auf jeden Fall hätte aber dieses wichtige Buch in der Spezialliteratur zur Ode verzeichnet werden sollen).

*Olympie 10*: Die einleitende Deutung dieser Ode ist eine der Besten in diesem Kommentar. Die dynamischen Gegensatzpaare ‚Schriftlichkeit–Mündlichkeit‘, ‚Genauigkeit–Wahrheit‘ und ‚Zeit–Ewigkeit‘ sind überzeugenderweise der Interpretation dienstbar gemacht worden (249–253). Es ist schön und gut, dass die τόκος-Thematik nicht – wie in den Scholien – zur Bestimmung einer realen Chronologie von *O. 10–11* eingesetzt wird (247–249), sondern ihren metaphorischen Charakter an den Tag legen kann. Die Parallele des Siegers Hagesidamos mit Asopichos aus *Olympie 14* im Zeichen der erotisch anziehenden Jugend leuchtet besonders ein. V. 10 f. (ὄπα ... / ὄπα τε) nehme ich allerdings statt einer Hypotaxe mit komparativer Bedeutung (558 ad loc., vgl. auch 263: *come ... così*) eine durch ὄπα τε geforderte Parataxe von zwei unabhängigen Fragesätzen an: ‚Wohin wird aber jetzt die schwellende Woge den Kiesel schwemmen und wie werden wir die gemeine Rechnung zur allgemeinen Befriedigung begleichen?‘ V. 63: ἀγώνιον ἐν δόξῃ θήμενος εὖχος, ἔργῳ καθελῶν bedeutet eher: ‚Den Sieg in Aussicht/Erwartung stellen (~ erwarten) und in der Tat erringen‘. Im Kommentar (570 ad 63, vgl. auch 269) wird ἐν δόξῃ θήμενος εὖχος als ‚den Triumph berühmt machen‘ interpretiert, wo doch ἐν δόξῃ θήμενος in dieser Bedeutung nicht idiomatisch gebildet zu sein scheint. Der temporale Gegensatz von δόξα (Erwartung) und ἔργον–εὖχος (Siegestat) wird dem Wortlaut eher gerecht.

*Olympie 12*: Als Aufführungsdatum der Ode wird 470 v. Chr. (nach dem akragantischen Krieg zwischen Hieron und Thrasydaios, Sohn des Theron) vorgeschlagen, aber Barrets stringente Beweisführung<sup>15</sup>, die auf das Jahr 466 v. Chr. (nach der Absetzung des Thrasybulos, Bruders von Hieron) hinausläuft, wird etwas leichter Hand abgefertigt (289).

<sup>14</sup> C. Lattmann, *Das Gleiche im Verschiedenen. Metapher des Sports und Lob des Siegers in Pindars Epinikien*, Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte 102, Berlin 2010, 78–116.

<sup>15</sup> W. S. Barrett, *Pindar's Twelfth Olympian and the Fall of the Deinomenidai*, *JHS* 93, 1973, 23–35.

*Olympie 14*: Die heterostrophische metrische Analyse der Ode (337 f.) scheint mir äußerst hypothetisch, da eine antistrophische Responson durch sehr naheliegende Texteingriffe bewerkstelligt werden kann und die ἀπολελυμένα bei Pindar kaum unbestreitbar bezeugt sind.

Als Fazit halten wir fest: Diese kommentierte Ausgabe ist der Tradition der Lorenzo-Valla-Reihe und insbesondere der vorangehenden Pindar-Bände vollkommen würdig. Sie wird dem Programm der Serie (665 f.) gerecht, eine kommentierte Standardausgabe für diejenigen zu präsentieren, die mit wenigen bzw. mittelmäßigen Griechischkenntnissen ausgestattet, aber von einem lebhaften Interesse an griechischer Dichtung geleitet die ersten Schritte zur Erschließung der Reichtümer dieses schwierigen Dichters wagen. Sie werden darin ein vorzügliches Arbeitsinstrument finden – abgesehen vielleicht von der Kolometrie und der metrischen Interpretation, die krass vom *sensus communis* abweichen und vornehmlich für Anfänger irreführend sein könnten. Manche Stellen dürften – wie die vorige Auswahl angedeutet haben soll – unrichtig ausgelegt, textkritische Probleme unzulänglich geheilt worden sein, aber es ist unleugbare Tatsache, dass dieser Kommentar ein aufrichtig-ernstes und ernst zu nehmendes Unterfangen zur Erklärung der olympischen Siegesoden darstellt. Über schwierige Passagen und interpretatorische Cruces, deren es sehr viele in Pindar gibt, wird die Fachwelt nie aufhören, sich den Kopf zu zerbrechen. Unbestreitbares Verdienst dieses Buches bleibt aber, wenn diese Probleme nicht endgültig gelöst, doch zum weiteren Nachdenken über dieselben angeregt zu haben. Nichtsdestoweniger besteht weiterhin die Forderung nach eingehenden Kommentaren zu Einzeloden, darunter einigen groß(artig)en olympischen, von denen allein eine möglichst vollkommene Durchdringung des jeweiligen Gedichts zu erhoffen ist.

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ENRICO MEDDA, *La saggezza dell'illusione*. Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2013, pp. xvi + 487, ISBN 978-8-846-73579-9.

This volume consists of fourteen studies on tragedy and two on comedy. All but one (ch. 11, on problems in the text of Euripides' *Phoenissae*) have appeared previously – in journals, in edited volumes, or as introductions to translations – between 1997 and 2007; they are republished essentially unchanged (except for ch. 10, to which has been added a one-page response to critics), but references have been updated when necessary, cross-references inserted, and occasionally an important new item of bibliography has been added (marked off by square brackets). The plays most fully discussed are Sophocles' *Ajax* (ch. 2) and *Electra* (ch. 3, 4) and Euripides' *Electra* (ch. 4), *Orestes* (ch. 5-7), *Phoenissae* (ch. 8, 9, 11) and *Cresphontes* (ch. 12 and part of ch. 13). Aeschylus, on whom M. has also worked extensively, has only two chapters (ch. 10 on *Agamemnon* 1649-54, ch. 16 on Pasolini's treatment of the *Oresteia*), but M. intends to devote a subsequent volume to him (p. xi). Of the remaining studies, ch. 1 is concerned with the ways in which tragic dramatists make it clear to their audience that a character is to be imagined as weeping, ch. 14 with Aristophanes' use of the monologue, and ch. 15 with hymnic language and motifs in the passage in Aristophanes' *Wealth* (124-221) where Wealth is persuaded that if he is healed of his blindness he can be master of the world.

In his introduction (pp. ix-x) M. defines an important theme of the book: the relationships constructed in particular plays between the characters and the dramatic space in which they move, a construction largely effected by means of 'verbal illusion'; hence the book's title, alluding to the famous saying of Gorgias (fr. 23 D-K) that in the theatre 'he who is deceived is wiser than he who is not deceived' (see p. x).

Many of M's discussions are highly illuminating or at least valuably thought-provoking. These include (the listing is not exhaustive) his analysis of the gestural business associated with weeping (pp. 10-18); his emphasis on the continued loneliness of the Sophoclean Electra even after the return of Orestes (pp. 69-73) and on the importance of the city-country contrast in Euripides' play of the same name (pp. 97-108); his perception of the strong tendency in *Orestes* for characters to converge on the palace (p. 114) – though we may add that at the end not one of them remains in it, or even in Argos at all; the comparison (pp. 145-150) between the exit of Orestes and Pylades at *Or.* 806, and the aborted exit of Neoptolemus and Philoctetes near the end of a play of the previous year (Soph. *Phil.* 1408); the absence of the Theban community

from *Phoenissae* (pp. 228-9) – it might be argued that the only characters who have Thebes truly at heart are Teiresias and young Menoeceus; and the contrast between Antigone's *teichoskopia*, with its emphasis on sights, and the *parodos* of Aeschylus' *Seven* with its emphasis on sounds (pp. 241-6).

Some suggestions are more dubious. In *Ajax*, for example, it is hardly likely that the *skene* was physically removed between 814 and 815 (pp. 36-37); it is one thing to hang up suitably painted panels, but quite another to dismantle and take away, in mid-play, a structure which, temporary or not, must have been of some size and complexity. Ajax is not seen 'lying prostrate' among the victims of his madness (p. 44); already before he appears we have been told he is *sitting* among them (325 θακεῖ). His reappearance at 646 is certainly a surprise (p. 47), but the audience will not have been expecting a 'predictable messenger announcing the hero's death', since Ajax had been alone in his hut; they would have expected, rather, that someone (probably Tecmessa) would *go into* the hut and find Ajax dead there – but at the moment when that might be thought about to happen, Ajax comes out instead. M seems (p. 47) to regard the ensuing *Trugrede* as a true monologue, not intended (until 684) for the ears of Tecmessa or the chorus; that requires us to believe that all its notorious ambiguities are, so far as Ajax is concerned, purely coincidental. It is worth remarking, incidentally, that the 'lonely place' (657) where Ajax goes to die eventually becomes more crowded than the place he leaves, as his corpse attracts to itself every significant human person in the play – the chorus, Tecmessa, Teucer, Eurysaces, Menelaus, Agamemnon and Odysseus.

The new chapter (ch. 11) is mainly concerned with passages of disputed authenticity in *Phoenissae*. The principle is laid down (p. 316) that our best chance of identifying interpolations is to consider the compatibility of a passage with the general plan of the work and the typical dramaturgy of Euripides. M. then turns to the notoriously problematic *exodos* of the play. He quickly gets rid of 1737-66 (absent in an early Hellenistic papyrus) and also rejects the Colonus prophecy (1703-7) while strongly defending the lines preceding it (1693-1702) on the ground that they contain standard features of tragic lamentation over the dead which had not appeared, where we might have expected them, in 1485-1581. Beyond this, he grants in general terms that there has been some revision in the rest of the section 1625-1709, and points to some particularly suspicious sections; and he rejects the parade of the Seven (1104-40) on the ground that elsewhere in the narrative neither Eteocles nor Polyneices is associated with a particular gate, and emphasis is placed on the mass armies, not on individual champions; actually this messenger has quite a lot to say (1153-86) about the exploits and fate of some of the Seven, but he begins by introducing Parthenopaeus (1153) in a manner hardly consistent with his having been prominently mentioned earlier in the same speech (1104-9).

Since in the update to chapter 10 (p. 306) M. responds to my criticism of his original article (in *Prometheus* 36 [2010] 104-7), I should say a little more about his discussion of *Ag.* 1649-54. The crucial question is who speaks line 1651: any decision about that pretty much automatically determines all the other assignments. The options for 1651 (εἶα δῆ, ξίφος πρόκωπον πᾶς τις εὐτρεπιζέτω) are (i) Aegisthus, (ii) the chorus-leader, and (iii) the captain of Aegisthus' bodyguard. M. brings good arguments (pp. 295-6) for rejecting (i), and having already rejected (iii) (p. 290) for lack of any adequate parallel (more on this presently) he is driven to adopt (ii). But he rightly argues (pp. 298-301) that the chorus-leader cannot here be addressing his colleagues; for one thing they cannot possibly be wearing swords, and for another the third-person imperative, with or without πᾶς τις, is not used in these circumstances in tragedy. M. therefore revives a suggestion by Bothe that the call is addressed to other citizens of Argos. As he himself notes (p. 302), there is nothing in 1651 to make it clear who is being addressed, and no call to them to come to the spot; M. tries to explain this away as due to 'the pressing rhythm of the stichomythia in trochaic tetrameters', but in fact it would have been perfectly easy to make the meaning clear within a single line, e.g. δεῦρο δὴ ξίφει προκώπωι πᾶς τις Ἀργείων ἴτω. Furthermore, as M. also notes, no Argives do in fact appear in response to the call – which would suggest to the audience, wrongly, that there is little opposition in Argos to Aegisthus' usurpation, and cast doubt on the chorus's claim that being nice to tyrants is not the Argive way (1665). M. cites the parallel of *Eur. Or.* 1625ff, but the intervention of a *deus ex machina*, which by well-established convention puts a stop to the dramatic action, is not at all the same thing as the intervention of a mortal character. One may also observe that Clytaemestra at 1654, appealing for the avoidance of violence, addresses herself only to Aegisthus, and makes no mention of any danger from the Argive public (neither does he).

In my 2010 article I argued for solution (iii), criticizing as inconsistent M.'s reasons for rejecting the parallels of *Cho.* 657 and 900-2. M. in his addendum rejoins that I mistook the rationale of his arguments; in particular, he explains, the Porter's single line at *Cho.* 657 is 'merely instrumental', whereas at *Ag.* 1651 the Captain would be intervening 'at the climactic moment of a fiery, quarrelsome stichomythia, only then to fall immediately silent'. But the latter (apart from the word 'stichomythia') is precisely what Pylades does at *Cho.* 900-2! That, says M., is different because Pylades 'has a prominent presence throughout the tragedy [one might doubt that, considering e.g. that he is never mentioned between 208 and 561, and only once – without being named – between 564 and 899], and the breaking of his silence has an enormous dramatic effect'. At the end of the day it is always possible to find differences between any two dramatic roles (unless they were intentionally written so as to be indistinguishable); the fact remains that the

*Oresteia* certainly contains two extremely short speaking parts that have no parallel elsewhere in surviving tragedy, and M. has unintentionally shown that there is no acceptable alternative to positing a third at *Ag.* 1651.

This book will be found rewarding by any student of Greek drama, especially Sophocles and Euripides.

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EMILY BARAGWANATH & MATHIEU DE BAKKER (eds.), *Myth, Truth, and Narrative in Herodotus*, Oxford: University Press, 2012, pp. 384, ISBN 978-0199693979.

Herodotus has always posed a problem to his readers: how to reconcile his masterful storytelling with the pursuit of historical truth? He has been weighed in the balance many times and found wanting, from antiquity to modern times. Part of the problem (if it is really a problem) has to do with precisely with Herodotus' use of myth, with which he firmly engages in the very first part of his work, that curious rationalization, carefully attributed to Persian *logioi*, of familiar Greek myths involving the abduction of women. It is his engagement with myth that forms the subject of this rich collection of papers, originally given at a conference at Oxford in 2007.

The introduction to the volume, jointly written by the editors, is substantial (at fifty-six pages, it is the longest contribution) and gives a very good description of the paths modern scholarship on Herodotus has taken up to the present as well as giving an excellent exposition of the ways that myth may work in the *Histories*.

It is clear that Herodotus uses myth. The questions contributors ask are how and why? Whereas earlier scholarship might have viewed the mythical material as embarrassing remnants of an archaic mode, the contributors fully subscribe to the idea that Herodotus embraced myth as a way to enrich his work and as part of his toolkit to find out about and present the past.

The contributions are divided between two sections, both of which deal in some way with Herodotus' treatment of and attitude toward myth. The first ("From Myth to Historical Method") investigates how Herodotus applies historical method to "the form and content of the traditional legendary heritage" (57), which presumably is another way to say "myth". The second concerns itself with "the status of myth in relation to historical truth, as source for history and in historical explanation" (192).

Carolyn Dewald's chapter ("Myth and Legend in Herodotus' First Book") focuses on the first book of the *Histories*, so important in the way it introduces themes or moral and ideological patterns (a major one is "unjustified aggression tends to lead, both in supernatural and entirely human terms, to catastrophic results" [83-84]) that will surface again and again in subsequent books and that suggest a way of reading this vast work. One conclusion she comes to, which applies not just to Book One and is echoed by other contributors, is that mythic materials are a way for Herodotus to position and present new (and foreign) material for his (Greek) audience in terms that

are more familiar to them. *Logoi*, which seem to adhere to certain places and people, are gathered and presented by Herodotus to organize and suggest connections between past and present as well as foreign and native. They may also enable figures within the work to explain, motivate, and persuade. Herodotus may use myth to help the audience make these connections, to “grid it in the larger Greek *imaginaire*” (60).

Further, the first book acts “as a methodological *mise en abyme*, in which the mythic *logoi* within the narrative allow Herodotus as narrator tacitly to reflect upon the power of traditional stories and mythic beliefs to shape actions taken by historical actors in the nearer past of concern to him, the world of the Persian Wars fought in his father’s generation” (83). Figures in the work may realize the myths they are caught up in (as when Croesus realizes he is in a story that Solon the Athenian once told) but as Dewald concludes, “we do not generally see our own myths for what they are until, like Croesus, we look back from an already burning pyre” (85).

Suzanne Saïd (“Herodotus and the ‘Myth’ of the Trojan War”) concerns herself with this significant complex of myths in the *Histories*. An important question she addresses is whether Herodotus differentiates between a *spatium mythicum* and a *spatium historicum*. Saïd does not think so, but considers that Herodotus sees the past in its entirety as a continuum right from the abduction of Io to the capture of Sestos by the Athenians at the end of Book Nine. In her view, Herodotus rejects the Persian and Phoenician accounts of the snatchings of women as the *aitiê* of the conflict between Greeks and Easterners because of the problem of lack of accurate knowledge. He uses “distancing techniques” such as source attribution. But this does not mean that the Trojan War cannot function as a chronological landmark for him, as it clearly does at 7.20 and 7.171. The Trojan War is what Saïd calls part of the “deep past” (90) and accordingly falls in the *spatium historicum*. She wants us to take the proemium seriously: it is not a false start or a feint but introduces major themes in the work (transgression, women as objects of lust, reciprocity and punishment). But does the one have to exclude the other? It is worth comparing the take of fellow-contributor Rosaria Vignolo Munson on Herodotus’ rejection of the Persian and Phoenician account: he does so not just because of the problem of knowledge but because they connect stories that have nothing to do with each other and contrive connections where there are none (see further below).

As Saïd points out, Herodotus himself rationalizes the Trojan War myths in Book Two, removing the gods and the supernatural so that Proteus, for example, is no longer the all-knowing shape-shifter hiding among evil-smelling seals but a king of Egypt, who upbraids Paris for his unjust behaviour and makes him leave Helen there. But what differentiates Herodotus from Hecataeus or the Persian and Phoenician *logioi* is that in addition to this demythologizing he brings in the authority of the Egyptian priests, who

preserve accounts of King Proteus' meeting with Alexander and Menelaus, and reads this evidence against internal evidence of the *Iliad*, adding his observation of monuments in Egypt and also appealing to probability and likelihood (the Trojans would have been mad not to surrender Helen if she had been at Troy [2.120.2]).

Saïd then considers the rhetorical use made by individuals and collectives of the Trojan War stories and Herodotus' own rhetorical use of these. Far from avoiding the Trojan War, "he employs the story, in a fashion typical of contemporary Greek art and literature, as a means of deepening his audience's understanding of the more contemporary events that are the subject of the *Histories*" (97).

Mathieu de Bakker ("Herodotus' Proteus: Myth, History, Enquiry and Storytelling") and Irene de Jong ("The Helen *Logos* and Herodotus' Fingerprint") focus in particular on Herodotus' treatment of the Paris-Helen-Menelaus in Egypt *logos*. Herodotus uses information from Egyptian sources not only to maintain that Helen was brought to Egypt by Paris on the way to Troy and did not go on to Troy, but that not even her *eidôlon* was present at Troy, since the Egyptian king Proteus forced Paris to hand over Helen. Further, when Menelaus called to retrieve Helen he had a run-in with Proteus over Menelaus' attempt to sacrifice two Egyptian children to ensure a safe sailing home. De Bakker sees this remarkable take on the Helen in Egypt *logos* as significant and important in a number of ways. Firstly, it illustrates Herodotus' methodology: he is able to top the traditional (mythical) account by the sensational coup of introducing fresh and direct evidence from the Egyptian priests. They (or presumably their predecessors) claim they know the facts from *historiai* conducted with Menelaus himself (2.118.1)! Secondly, the episode models the key theme of respect for *xenia*, and the proper acknowledgement of the responsibilities and rights of guest-friendship is tied to the theme of justice, reciprocity, and the effects and punishment of aggression and violence. For de Bakker, Proteus is an example of the trope of the foreigner pointing out to a Greek wrongdoing and educating them. This is of a piece with Herodotus' claims in the rest of Book Two about the Egyptians as being the source for several Greek rituals and institutions. Proteus also models the kind of inquiry Herodotus practices. Thirdly, using a comparison originally suggested by Dewald, de Bakker argues that the characteristics of the mythical Proteus, the tricky shape-shifter of *Odyssey* 4 who grudgingly yields up his valuable information about the future only after being physically subdued by Menelaus, still operate in Herodotus' text. Proteus is emblem and symbol "of the struggle he has to undergo himself in this process, the search for the truth, and the presentation of it by means of a convincing story" (126).

De Jong's approach to the same *logos* is characteristically narratological: she wants to find Herodotus' fingerprint on this material. "The Helen *logos*,

said to derive from Egyptian priests, upon closer inspection reveals the hand of Herodotus everywhere” (141). “Just as Homer exploits the Muses, eyewitnesses of history ... to pass off his *Iliad* as the one and only true story of the Trojan War, Herodotus uses the Egyptian spokesmen/eyewitnesses to authorize his particular version of the Helen *logos*.” (141-142). De Jong, as do other contributors, tackles the question of *spatium mythicum* vs *spatium historicum* in Herodotus and concludes that there is no decisive break between them: “... though for Herodotus ‘myth’ or the time of the heroes may be distinct from ‘what is called the human age’ (3.122), it is not a completely separate category: it is, at least in this case, open to historiographical enquiry and connected with the present via a chain of information, and displays the same patterns and motifs as elsewhere in the *Histories*.” Though de Jong does not want to get into the insoluble question to what extent Herodotus’ account is based on authentic Egyptian material, it is refreshing that she offers an opinion. Her feeling is that it is all his own, based on a kernel known from Greek sources: “I would hazard a guess that at most he heard that Helen had stayed with Proteus in Egypt. ... He put it in the mouths of Egyptian priests in order to promote it to his Greek readers” (141).

Elizabeth Vandiver’s piece (“Strangers are from Zeus’: Homeric *Xenia* at the Courts of Proteus and Croesus”) touches some of the same passages and themes as the preceding contributors: she too visits the *logos* of Paris, Helen, Proteus, and Menelaus, which clearly revolves about the theme of proper *xenia*. As does de Bakker, Vandiver notes that Proteus and his Egypt “provides a template of true civilization against which the misdeeds and violations of both Trojan and Greek can be evaluated. Proteus and the Egyptians protect and obey the obligations of *xenia*, which is expanded from its essentially Greek status to appear as a moral value of the much older Egyptian civilization; Herodotus backreads Greek constructs into Egyptian culture in the case of *xenia*, much as he does in the case of religious beliefs and ceremonies” (154). Herodotus’ pronouncement at 2.120 is of major importance: “This sentence, with its assumption that Paris’ theft of Helen was a crime deserving of divine punishment, foregrounds Trojan wrongdoing over Greek, and especially foregrounds the tendency of Eastern potentates [here Paris] ... to grasp more than belongs to them. The reason for this is to be found, I think, not just in Herodotus’ view of the Trojan War but also in the overall construction of his entire narrative. Divine retribution for Greek misdeeds in and after the Trojan War was not his main topic, but a demonstration of the inevitability of divine retribution for the transgressions of non-Greek monarchs was. Thus, the text can allow Menelaus’ sacrifice of two Egyptian children to go unpunished, while Paris’ theft of Helen brings down divine wrath upon his city and leads to its total destruction” (155).

Vandiver also considers the Croesus, Atys, and Adrastus *logos* as an episode that revolves around correct *xenia*. Here too she is concerned to

point out that Homeric allusions mean that it is a specific flavor of *xenia* that is presented, one grounded in Homeric tradition: "...the remote past of Troy and the almost-legendary past of Croesus and Solon are made paradigmatic for the recent past of the Persian Wars through the traditional Homeric concept of *xenia*" (165).

From myths surrounding the Trojan War, Vivienne Gray ("Herodotus on Melampus") moves to myths surrounding the healer-seer-ritual specialist Melampus. One of the interesting things about Melampus (and the other seers with which he is linked in Book Nine, on which see the contribution of Baragwanath below) is the way in which Herodotus has two different ways of looking at this figure. He is the ritual specialist or cultural hero who acts as a bridge between the far more ancient Egyptians and the Greeks, introducing the rites of Dionysus to the latter (2.49). Then he is again the ritual specialist, curing the women of Argos of madness (9.34): this is the madness of Dionysus, though Herodotus does not say so here, so that this is connected to his knowledge of the rites of Dionysus described in Book Two. But the emphasis is quite different: his knowledge and skill in ritual seems to take a back seat to his skill and cunning in bargaining as he manipulates the Argives into giving him a half of the kingship and then a third again to his brother, Bias. This story Herodotus introduces by saying that the seer Tisamenus "imitated" Melampus in using the same technique of making an initial outrageous offer for his services; when his clients in desperation are forced to return and agree to the initial outrageous offer they find he demands even more outrageous terms. Gray analyzes the narrative structure of both accounts of Melampus. She finds traditional patterns in this narrative which Herodotus adapts to his own purposes. In the passage from Book Two, however, the narrative of the importation of culture, while attested elsewhere in the *Histories* (Lycurgus imports system of *eunomia* from Crete or Delphi [1.65], Cadmus imports writing [5.57-61]) seems to draw on new elements that "produce a new version of the 'myth', which includes a pattern of the cultural hero's importation of customs from abroad in the case of Melampus" (190-191). Gray explains the two different Melampodes as a result of the combination of his three "heritages": that of critical enquiry, storytelling, and poetry.

I found the language of Proppian analysis confusing at time, especially the term "Hero" amidst stories involving cultural, cultic, and mythic heroes (e.g. "The story of how Melampus acquired kingship of Argos (9.34) is an abbreviated form of the pattern established for Tisamenus. The Argives are the Heroes, and their Task is to cure the madness of their women. Melampus is the Helper, and his healing ability is the supernatural power they seek." [172]; "Lichas is in fact the chief Helper in the story, and he comes from the ranks of the Heroes rather than outside." [174]) I also find the distinction Gray draws between storytelling and poetry one that is hard to define and

maintain, like the distinction between legend, myth, and folktale that the editors of the volume reject (15).

Rosaria Vignolo Munson considers Herodotus and the heroic age, concentrating in particular on the figure of Minos, whom Herodotus, in a move similar to his rejections of the abductions of mythical (but rationalized) women as cause of the Greek-Easterner enmity, declines to recognize as the first to *thalassokratein* (3.122.2). She points out that this is not simply because the remote past is difficult to know (which is Thucydides' position) but because "the heroic age is a special sort of past that also objectively partakes of another level of reality" (196). Why does Herodotus reject the Persian interpretation of the heroic age? Because the heroic characters have not just become "fully human (as in Thucydides' Archaeology), but downright ordinary" (198). The Persian *logioi* do not just reinterpret causes (as in Thucydides' Archaeology) but "string together in a continuous causal chain heroic-age events that no one had ever before represented as factually connected. This is a parody of super-secularized, super-rationalized mythology," a game (198). Munson seems to say that Herodotus preserves a sort of mystery surrounding the heroes, such as when she comments on the Artayktes episode that "the causality Herodotus here establishes is, unlike that of the proem, entirely transcendent and mysterious" (200), revolving as it does about the hero Protesilaus. (She compares Herodotus' request at 2.45 that the gods and heroes forgive his audacity in saying the Greek Heracles is different from the Egyptian god.) The heroic age "is a mysterious time, subject to special rules: as such, it often lies beyond the competence of the *histôr*, who investigates and records *ta genomena ex anthrôpôn*, events of *men*" (201). *Historiê* can reveal factual truths from this period, but remoteness and the tendency of people to change the facts for their own purposes make this difficult. This may be because of political motivations but also for reasons of genre, as Homer does, choosing a (false) version that has Helen present at Troy because it is more fitting for poetry (*euprepês*, 2.116).

Munson then turns to Minos in the *Histories*, an important figure in fifth-century Athenian self-definition and myth. She points out that he could be presented as the antagonist of the Athenian hero Theseus (now being figured as the founder of Athens) or as "the archetypal ruler of the Aegean", the first hegemon of the sea. This is the Minos of Thucydides' Archaeology: "as the early analogue of contemporary Athens, he justifies the very existence and mission of the Athenian empire" (203).

In mentioning but ultimately bypassing Minos, Munson argues, Herodotus is showing disapproval of myth used in politics. "What Herodotus is saying is this: we do not need the heroic age, *in this case*, either to do history or talk politics" (212). Polycrates, who comes with an attractive narrative of rise and disastrous fall, "provides a more useful paradigm for present realities

than Minos" (212). Herodotus thus follows the same principle as he does when selecting Croesus over mythic actors of the more remote past.

Charles Chiasson ("Myth and Truth in Herodotus' *Cyrus Logos*") approaches the question of myth and truth in Herodotus' account of Cyrus. How can Herodotus claim to tell *ton eonta logon* (1.95.1) about how Cyrus and the Persians came to power, when Herodotus' own *logos* clearly possesses such mythical elements? Chiasson makes the distinction that Herodotus is mainly talking about Cyrus' birth and the accession of the Persians to power when he claims to tell *ton eonta logon*, and claims that Herodotus' contribution is the presentation of the vengeance of Harpagus. The latter is moved to rebel against Astyages and help Cyrus to power because of Astyages' killing of Harpagus' sons and the *Atreusmahl* that he serves to him. In other words, Herodotus chooses to show the reason for Persian overthrow of Median authority in an act of personal vengeance that conforms to well-known Greek mythic patterns (the vengeance of Atreus for example). As several other contributors underscore, Chiasson shows that these mythical patterns seem to be there to present foreign material in a way meaningful to Greeks, to give them heightened importance and impact by assimilating them to the heroic age, and to make them more persuasive or truthful, and, not least, to assert the authority of Herodotus.

Rosalind Thomas also considers Herodotus' account in relation to Eastern traditions, concentrating on his *logoi* about Deioces the Mede, who secures absolute power for himself by making himself in the eyes of the people an indispensable judge and arbitrator in a lawless period, and Pythius the Lydian, whose eldest son is cut in half, with Xerxes marching his army between the two halves. Did Herodotus draw on authentic near-Eastern material and, a point that Thomas is more interested in, could one say that these are really just Greek stories? What is the process of Greek or Herodotean transformation? In the case of the Pythius story, there is in fact evidence from several places in the ancient Near East for the ritual of marching an army between the halves of an animal, and more pertinently, a description of a Hittite ritual of marching an army (after defeat) between the halves of not just animal victims, but a human victim. The Pythius story begins to look like it could be based on actual ritual practice (laying aside the fact that the Hittites are not Persians or Lydians) and not wholly constructed by Herodotus as an example of foreign despotic cruelty. Greeks (and Herodotus) did not have to make this all up, but could make it fit into their own categories: "We surely have here a religious rite whose importance Greek observers were incapable of appreciating" (242); "Herodotus did not need to do all the work of making this a repulsive tale of Persian autocracy" (242). Thomas suggests that the ritual behind the action described in Herodotus could have been one of purification, either in connection with the eclipse mentioned by Herodotus (7.37.3) or as a preliminary to the army's embarkation on its

campaign. Thomas is inclined to see Herodotus' contribution or angle in the interaction between Pythius and Xerxes. She views Pythius as "a strangely Croesus-like figure" and notes the Herodotean emphasis on the theme of imperfect reciprocity, where Pythius' previous favours and his request for favour to be granted to his eldest son are answered with a perverted favour in return: Pythius and his other four sons will be saved because of Pythius' *xeiniê*, and that is Xerxes' more generous response to Pythius' (who is after all his slave) lack of gratitude.

The Deioeces story might seem, by contrast, to be a completely free, Greek invention, clothed in Persian (or Median) garb to function as a meditation on state-formation and the beginnings of tyranny (it has been linked to constitutional debate at 3.80-82). But Thomas is reluctant to write it off in this manner as a Protagoras-like invented myth, and does not exclude the possibility that there may have been some Near Eastern founder story which then received undeniable Hellenization and Herodotean reworking. She points out the emphasis on justice in the story (it is as a judge that Deioeces is particularly in demand and he puts an end to the *anomiê* suffered in the region) and connects this to the Persian (and Zoroastrian) idea of the king as guarantor of justice and cosmic order (*arta*). Thomas' general conclusion is that Herodotus and the Greeks may have misunderstood much, or chosen to develop certain themes they found in a purely Greek fashion that had little or nothing to do with their Near Eastern sources, but that a fascination with the Near East lay behind these reworkings and that they were not necessarily based on nothing. One could also mention the ruse of Dareios' groom, Oibares, to obtain the kingship for his master by making his horse neigh at the right moment, which may in fact be connected to Indo-Iranian kingship rituals, mentioned by Bowie (270).

Pietro Vannicelli ("The Mythical Origins of the Medes and the Persians") stays with the Medes and Persians and considers Greek mythological traditions that linked them to the Greeks through the figures of Perseus and Medea. He points out the presence in the proem of two heroines, Io and Medea, who are connected with these mythical origins: Io as representative of the Inachid line, which produces Perseus, whom Xerxes is made to claim as the eponymous ancestor of the Persian (7.61.3), and Medea, in whose honour the Arioi renamed themselves Medes when she settled in their country after leaving Athens (7.62.1). The Persian account of the origins of the conflict between Greeks and Easterners thus pointedly includes the two heroines connected with the Persians and Medes. The two references to kinship via figures of Greek mythology are connected, Vannicelli emphasizes, with Greek regions charged after the Persian Wars with collaborating with the Persians: Argos (Perseus) and Thessaly (where Medea lived with Jason). Seeing that Herodotus gives the information about the Persian connection to Perseus in the context of a story in which Xerxes makes an overture to the Argives

relying on their common Perseid ancestry (7.61.3), Vannicelli postulates that this ancestry could have formed a convenient tool for the Spartans to present the Argives and Persians as a connected threat, “a battle of propaganda conducted by means of genealogical tools” (261). The oracle given to the Spartans before Thermopylae could be seen to play on this connection, where it is foretold that their city will be destroyed by the Perseids or that a Heraclid king will die and preserve Sparta (7.220.4) and where “Perseid” could refer to Persians or to Argives. The Perseid genealogy seems to be at odds with the passage in Book One which describes the Perseid kings as descended from the *phrêtrê* of the Achaemenidae (1.125.3). The Achaemenid descent of the great Persian kings reflects Persian traditions. The “vacuum” between Greek genealogies of the Persian kings using Perseus and the Persian Achaemenid genealogy is one that is “plugged” in later attested sources such as Nicolaus of Damascus (*FGrH* 90, F.6), who has Achaemenes as a son of Perseus, and makes an etymological link between this name and the place Achaea. This genealogy thus has Achaemenes as the ancestor of all Persians, not just the kings. Vannicelli’s comment on this is that Herodotus at 1.125.3 reflects the problem of the two genealogies, one Greek, the other Persian, and “attests to the variety and complexity of the genealogical material he investigated and worked with” (268).

Angus Bowie (“Mythology and the Expedition of Xerxes”) turns to the later books of the *Histories* and “the interplay of myth with events about which reasonably good ‘factual’ knowledge was available to him [i.e. Herodotus]” (269). Is there a difference between the use of myth here and in the earlier books? The later books share a good deal of the types of myth found in the earlier ones but Bowie notices in the later books a greater integration of the myths into the narrative of Xerxes’ campaign. The more detailed mythological references “offer various viewpoints on the significance, moral quality, and likely failure of Xerxes’ campaign” (274). Mythological references attach also to the Greeks, in particular in debates, where they may be used to persuade and to argue a point, often in a hostile and competitive manner. As Bowie puts it, “if the myths surrounding Xerxes signify divine displeasure, those involving the Greeks paint a sad picture of deception and disunity” (279). Examples of this come from the beginning (e.g. when in Book Seven the Greek allies attempt to convince Argives, Syracusans, and the Cretans to participate) and towards the end of the conflict (e.g. wrangling between Athenians and Tegeans at Plataea over who will command the other wing, 9.26–27). Another category of myth in the later parts of the work involves stories about seers, whose skill is displayed here not just in their ability to read the signs of sacrifice accurately and favorably but rather in their ability to exploit situations to their advantage (e.g. Tisamenus and his demand for Spartan citizenship for himself and his brother, imitating Melampus (9.33–34)). Bowie concludes

that panhellenic myth does not always make for panhellenic spirit; rather it is used to obtain personal gains. He moves to a conclusion about myth in the work as a whole: the stories Herodotus records and which men tell “are not innocent tradition, but weapons in the selective creation of an identity, the claiming of a privilege, or the justification of an act” (286). But do we need to see Greeks fighting each other in debate using mythology as a weapon as a “sad picture of deception and disunity”? Perhaps, if one wants to see the *Histories* as a warning about the excesses and dangers of the Athenian empire, as Bowie and some other contributors do, one can read this as a celebration of the independent, fiery spirit of the Greek poleis before the Athenians attempt to subdue them.

Emily Baragwanath (“Returning to Troy: Herodotus and the Mythic Discourse of his own Time”) is also interested in use of mythic discourse to persuade, propagandize, and think with. She looks first at the mention of Theseus’ theft of Helen and how the people of Decelea in Attica, where Theseus had hid her at Aphidnae, revealed her whereabouts to the Tyndaridae in order to prevent the whole of Attica suffering an invasion (9.73.1-2). In remembrance of this service the Spartans even in the time of the Peloponnesian War avoid laying waste to their territory. Baragwanath thinks that it significant that instead of myths that show Theseus as the benefactor of the Athenians and of Greece Herodotus refers to a myth which shows him as a “hubristic abductor of women”, just like Paris. For Baragwanath this is an “implied contrafactual”: what might have happened had the Deceleans not turned Theseus in, would there have been a great Spartan-Athenian war instead of the Trojan War? And what would have happened if the events leading to the Trojan War had been similarly avoided? She also sees the episode as raising “the spectre of future inter-Hellenic conflict and disunity” coming as it does as a discordant note in the description of Greek unity (especially between Spartans and Athenians) and success at Plataea.

Baragwanath moves next to the figure of Mardonius, whom she repeatedly calls “self-mythicizing” (though it seems to me that mythic elements gather about him rather than that he mythicizes himself). Through close reading she points out several possible instances of allusion and intertextuality: Aeschylus’ *Persians* as well as the *Oresteia* lurk in the background (the image of desire to take Athens “dripping into” Mardonius and his wish to send off a victory message eastward across the Aegean by fire beacons seem to recall striking passages from the *Agamemnon*). It is interesting that the allusions to the Trojan War here work not just to draw connections between the imminent defeat of the Persians and the destruction of Troy, with the Persians as easterners having a natural affinity to the Trojans, but precisely to “Greek excesses in destroying Troy, with grievous consequences.” She sees here also a turning of the “mirror” to Greeks and, in line with interpretations of the *Histories* as a warning to late fifth-century Greeks (and in particular

Athenians) about imperialism and conquest, she sees also “a reminder that the pattern of lust-impelled conquest applies equally to Greek ... that grand and deluded desires are not confined to Persia—nor to the legendary past” (309).

Baragwanath’s piece is a fitting conclusion to the volume, whose contributors agree (and demonstrate) that myth in the *Histories* is not the embarrassment it was once perceived to be but a vital part of Herodotus’ toolkit that not only elevates and enriches his discourse but also allows him using *historiê* to access the past and communicate in subtle and effective ways between past and present with messages for those that have ears.

This is a well-produced volume both in terms of contributions and presentation. I found only a few typos: “archaiological” (257), “straights” for “straits” 298, reference in index s.v. Solon to 220 n32 where no such footnote appears.

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EDITH FOSTER AND DONALD LATEINER (eds.) *Thucydides and Herodotus*. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. xiv + 399. ISBN 9780199593262.

Comparison of Herodotus and Thucydides has become an increasing focus of scholarly endeavor over the past generation. A full-scale treatment of the two authors at every level, in all relevant facets of their works, probably lies beyond the capability (or the career-span) of any single scholar. This volume gives us a taste of such a project by bringing together a dozen or so well-known scholars of Greek historiography. It is an edited volume of the best sort, originating from and maintaining a clear purpose while allowing individual voices to be heard. The essays are generally of a high quality and reflect the richness of these two foundational texts. Students of Herodotus, Thucydides, and ancient historiography will read them with benefit and pleasure.

After a very brief introduction by the editors, the essays are divided into three parts: 1) methods of reasoning, 2) common themes, 3) reception. Essays are footnoted, with bibliographical references at the end of each contribution. Three indexes include passages, names (ancient and modern), and a fairly detailed topics index.

Richard Rutherford, “Structure and Meaning in Epic and Historiography” (13–38), stresses epic’s importance in providing a model for large-scale narrative. He focuses on structural elements used by Homer to achieve effects of meaning which are also found in Herodotus and Thucydides: repetition of motifs and scenes, especially between the first and second halves of a work, or “progressive iteration” (“Fenik’s Law”) in which a minor incident recurs later with more narrative and emotional force. One difference which Rutherford highlights is the fact that Thucydides now had Herodotus as a model, in addition to Homer.

Philip Stadter, “Thucydides as ‘Reader’ of Herodotus” (39–66), examines how Thucydides borrowed from and adapted his predecessors’ technique in four areas: chronology; dealing with events which Herodotus wrote about; the proem; and the opening narrative section. He offers many valuable insights, including how Herodotus – normally seen as ignoring or complicating chronological concerns – in fact showed Thucydides the way to his summer/winter framework. Stadter also illuminates the similar purposes of the Croesus *logos* and the Corcyrean narrative, with some key differences in the latter (for example, Thucydides eschewing individuals and focusing on cities).

Carlo Scardino, “Indirect Discourse in Herodotus and Thucydides” (67–96), lists many examples of *oratio obliqua* in the two authors along with their use of argumentative *topoi* and instances of rhetorical sophistication. It is interesting to see both historians utilizing indirect speech in similar ways (such as the juxtaposition of direct and indirect) despite the overall differences in their employment of direct speech. More analysis along the lines of Scardino’s final two examples (Hdt. 9.41, Thuc. 6.72) would have been helpful to further elucidate the conclusions he draws. For example, he notes the heavy presence of money and materiel in the indirect speeches; is this a way for the ancient historian to avoid dealing with “mundane” matters in his own voice?

Catherine Rubincam, “The ‘Rationality’ of Herodotus and Thucydides as Evidenced by Their Respective Use of Numbers” (97–122), starts from a critique of Paul Keyser’s 2006 article on the issue to argue that the differences in the two authors’ treatment of calculations stems from historiographical roots. As she has done elsewhere, Rubincam illustrates how we must set aside our modern attitudes toward the numerical when evaluating ancient historians’ practice in this regard. She also makes the intriguing suggestion that Thucydides was affected, in his own approach to numbers, by the unbelievable nature of some of those found in Herodotus – namely, that Thucydides gave the information he felt he could authoritatively present, but refused to go any further in performing calculations (using the battle of Mantinea in Book 4 as an example).

Hans-Peter Stahl, “Herodotus and Thucydides on Blind Decisions Preceding Military Action” (125–153), investigates the way both authors portray decision-making before military action, taking as his examples the Athenian invasion of Sicily and Xerxes’ campaign against Greece (in that order). After beginning with brief comments on what he describes as a classic case of blind decision-making – Melos’ refusal to surrender to Athens in 416 – Stahl details the language of blindness, ignorance, and illogic with which Thucydides opens Book 6, up through Nicias’ and Alcibiades’ speeches concerning the Sicilian Expedition. The rest of the essay entails a much lengthier review of the stages of Xerxes’ decision to invade Greece at the opening of Herodotus’ Book 7: the apparent initial overpowering of reason by flattery and self-interest; reversal followed by “supernatural guidance (seductive and therefore easily misread)” (142); the advisor recanting. A similar pattern appears later when Artabanus and Xerxes discuss their chances at the Hellespont. Stahl concludes that Herodotus and Thucydides share an outlook in which blind decisions, often accompanied by confidence and pride, precede disastrous outcomes.

Donald Lateiner, “Oaths: Theory and Practice in the *Histories* of Herodotus and Thucydides” (154–184), gives a rich and fast-moving overview of oaths in both authors. Herodotus of course finds room for exotic oath

rituals, but his literary imagination finds fuel in oaths among the Hellenes too; his Spartan stories highlight the gap between theory and practice (i.e. swearing oaths versus keeping them). Thucydides mentions oaths much more frequently and records many details, at the same time as he displays their almost constant violation and ineffectiveness, reflecting his view of the decline of Hellenic morals and values under the pressure of the Great War. *Tisis* is a factor only in Herodotus, but both historians “demonstrate both the poetics and problematics of oaths” (179).

Edith Foster, “Thermopylae and Pylos, with Reference to the Homeric Background” (185–214), interweaves detailed analysis of the language and structure of Herodotus’ narrative of Thermopylae and Thucydides on Pylos in order to show how closely the latter followed the former’s lead in composing battle narrative, as well as Herodotus’ adaptation of Homeric techniques. The most important change is the addition of narrator explanation of the major actions of the battle. Thucydides, while following in Herodotus’ footsteps, reintroduces two Homeric elements – psychological updates and description of battlefield experience – and he provides a general’s strategic thinking. Foster sees Thucydides using echoes of Thermopylae in the Pylos narrative perhaps to demonstrate that the Spartan virtue of the earlier battle no longer suffices.

Wolfgang Blösel, “Thucydides on Themistocles: A Herodotean Narrator?” (215–240), goes against the grain of the volume in attempting to deny a close relationship between the two authors in a particular passage, Thucydides’ portrayal of Themistocles in Book 1. Picking up on his earlier treatments of Herodotus’ Themistocles, Blösel argues against the historicity of the building of Athens’ walls via the ruse of Themistocles; rather, Thucydides used the story because he needed to for his “narrative aims” (222). He restates Westlake’s case for Chares of Lampsacus as the source for this story and for Themistocles’ death, based especially on Ionic elements of the passage (linguistic and otherwise). Rather than reading the excursus as an attempt to “correct” Herodotus, Blösel concludes that Thucydides felt he could not combat the predominant defamatory view of Themistocles and thus praised his general intellectual abilities without taking a position on the treason charges.

Rosaria Munson, “Persians in Thucydides” (241–277), investigates elements of Thucydides’ rejection and imitation of Herodotus in this area, revisiting the topic in light of Rood’s 1999 essay. Her review of the evidence confirms that “Thucydides . . . pays attention to the Persians only insofar as they potentially affect Greek interests” (250), with the major and striking exception of the Pausanias-Themistocles excursus. Munson suggests this was a “farewell to Herodotus” (cf. Blösel, above) and emphasizes that Thucydides must have chosen to include it at a relatively late date. The Persians’ other major presence is in Book 8, but these are not Herodotus’ Persians: Thucydides

focuses almost exclusively on the western satrapies, and while eastern wealth is a factor, it is not presented in exotic extravagance, but simply as “hard cash” (261). However, Thucydides does at times echo his predecessor, such as on the fate of the Ionian Greeks, and his treatment of Tissaphernes includes Herodotean narrative techniques (such as variant versions) reflecting a lack of reliable knowledge about Persian motives.

Christopher Pelling, “Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, and the Speeches in Herodotus and Thucydides” (281–315), argues that (*pace* Hornblower) the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* can be useful for analyzing Thucydides when we find subtle differences between its advice and his speeches. This is followed by a demonstration using alliance speeches, building on the work of Colin Macleod. He then compares Aristotle on pity in Book 2 of the *Rhetoric* with notions of pity in Thucydides’ speech for Cleon and in the Melian Dialogue, noting how a sharp focus on expediency pushes pity to the side. Pelling’s final section looks at the “expedient” (*xumpheron*) and the “just” in the three authors. For Herodotus, he emphasizes the difficulty in disentangling the two notions, concluding with the allies’ visit to Gelon in Book 7: Herodotus implies that the Greeks’ “perceptions of what is just [for their own cities] have got in the way of what is expedient” for Greece as a whole (304). Combining this with the evidence from Aristotle, Pelling suggests, we can understand better the lack of the ethical in Thucydides’ speeches: forefronting expediency is not cynical *Realpolitik* but reflects “the moral claim that the city has on its citizens” (306). He also sees the change in discussion of morality over the course of the work not as an indication of moral decline but a response to the failure of arguments based on justice early on in the war.

Emily Baragwanath, “A Noble Alliance: Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon’s Procles” (316–344), argues that Xenophon’s “explicit self-positioning” in the *Hellenica* reveals that both Herodotus and Thucydides were essential components of his historiography. She finds adaptations of their methodological themes, a redefining of “greatness” to include individual character as “worthy of record” (under the influence of Socratic philosophy) while still focusing on the political and military narrative of (mostly) major cities. Most of the essay consists of a close reading of Xenophon’s two speeches for Procles (Books 6 and 7) as a case study for these notions. There are specific echoes of ideas and vocabulary from both predecessors (for example, Procles as a warner figure in the second speech), but Xenophon also challenges some prevalent notions in their works. More importantly, she argues that his intention here is to mark the historical significance of the moment – that is, these are not just literary allusions, but an invocation of his two models for an historiographical purpose. Especially since the first speech has no real effect on the narrative and the second is somewhat implausible, it makes sense to read them as “the statement of an ideal that was important to

Xenophon” (329), reflecting the changed political nature of the Greek world after the Peloponnesian War.

Iris Samotta, “Herodotus and Thucydides in Roman Republican Historiography” (345–378), posits that the historians of the Roman Republic show “a lengthy tradition of reliance on and response to Herodotus and Thucydides” (346). Her stated approach is one of “thick description” à la Geertz; this, combined with the fragmentary nature of the evidence, produces more food for thought than convincing conclusions. She argues that Fabius Pictor was influenced by Herodotus and Thucydides both through the western Greek historians (Timaeus, Diocles of Peparethus) and directly, since individual episodes and structuring techniques reveal knowledge of them (and thereby assume his readers’ knowledge too). Other examples include Cato’s adaptation of the story of the 300 at Thermopylae for Roman, and self-aggrandizing, purposes; Coelius Antipater making truth claims and offering variant accounts based on inquiry; and the atticism of the latter portion of the first century as seen in Tubero, Cicero, and Sallust, reflecting the increased presence of Thucydides.

The volume is very nicely produced and carefully edited. I found only three errors: at 359 n. 87, the citation should read Hdt. 7.229; at 369, “Thucydideism”; and in the topical index, the entry for Battle of Pylos is left blank (but Pylos fortunately can be found in the index of names).

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ANDREAS MARKANTONATOS, *Euripides' «Alcestis». Narrative, Myth, and Religion*, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2013, 223 pp. ISBN 978-3-11-033097-7

Il volume di M. propone una analisi di carattere narratologico del dramma euripideo con il doppio scopo di avanzare una nuova soluzione interpretativa dell'*Alceste* e, insieme, di dimostrare l'efficacia ermeneutica della moderna teoria narrativa applicata al dramma antico. In relazione a questo secondo aspetto, M., in coerenza con le sue pubblicazioni precedenti, sottolinea come nel panorama degli studi classici non si sia colta l'occasione fornita da questo approccio critico. Ben presto dimenticati i furori talvolta troppo astratti della stagione di marca strutturalista, che pure hanno portato agli studi significativi di De Jong su Omero, gli studiosi del mondo antico, secondo M., hanno perso interesse per gli sviluppi della narratologia poststrutturalista, in virtù della quale è possibile considerare la narrazione all'interno di un complesso sistema dinamico culturale. Lontano da tecnicismi asettici, come anche da troppo algide analisi, la nuova teoria narrativa, felicemente rivitalizzata anche dalla stretta relazione con lo sviluppo delle scienze cognitive applicate alla letteratura, si propone di collocare il mondo della comunicazione narrativa al centro di un universo di relazioni e di strutture cognitivamente significative, ponendo quindi in felice contatto la *factio* con il *factum*, il reale e l'universo letterario. Da questo assunto di partenza e da questa convinzione muove anche il percorso critico di M., interessato a indagare le costellazioni di intrecci che danno vita a una complessa profondità, nella quale il dramma che si svolge sulla scena dialoga con un più articolato prisma di costruzioni narrative, in prima istanza di carattere mitologico e religioso. Come recita il sottotitolo del volume, infatti, l'analisi proposta da M. è scandita in tre momenti, profondamente legati tra di loro: una prima parte in cui viene analizzato l'intero svolgersi del dramma, con un occhio particolarmente attento alla 'messa in racconto' delle tensioni ideologiche che animano i diversi personaggi (cap. 2); una seconda nella quale il racconto primario viene riletto in una chiave di matrice mitologica (cap. 3); e, infine, una terza, in cui si osserva lo stretto legame che il dramma, specie nella sua ultima parte, istituisce con le credenze di carattere religioso (cap. 4).

Del capitolo dedicato alla costruzione dell'intreccio pare particolarmente significativo il ricorso alla categoria del *disnarrated*, un termine con il quale il narratologo americano Gerald Prince poneva la sua attenzione su di una modalità narrativa centrata soprattutto - in chiave negativa o ipotetica - su fatti non accaduti, ma che potenzialmente potrebbero accadere. Si tratta, come osserva M., di una strategia di costruzione del racconto che si presta

particolarmente a un uso fortemente ideologizzato delle singole narrazioni, come dei punti di vista, in un aperto gioco di continuo dialogo con l'uditorio. Il fitto gioco inferenziale che Euripide richiede ai propri ascoltatori di necessità provoca infatti un moto dinamico, con tensioni e controtensioni, create dalle parole dei personaggi in scena e dalle loro allusioni al mondo extra testuale. Nel terzo capitolo è indagato a fondo da M. il rapporto con il mondo mitologico, specie per il complesso gioco di interferenze tra la figura di Eracle - e il mondo narrativo che il personaggio evoca - e i personaggi di Admeto e Alceste stessa. Ben lontano dall'essere una riproduzione in scala ridotta delle fatiche dell'eroe greco, il dramma rappresenta, secondo M., una sua nuova prova, la «fatica di Alceste», non a caso collocata da Euripide tra la settima e l'ottava, cioè prima del secondo ciclo delle sue prove, che lo allontanano dalla dimensione umana e lo pongono in contatto con il potere delle divinità ctonie. Sotto il segno della trasformazione e del passaggio infatti si caratterizza la figura di Eracle, e con lui anche degli altri protagonisti del dramma. In una sorta di progressiva *bildung*, anche l'eroe, riflettendo la sua immagine allo specchio della forza etica del martirio di Alceste e della ospitalità di Admeto, trova la strada per affrontare il sacrificio imposto da una prova. Sotto agli occhi del pubblico avviene, dunque, un processo di graduale crescita di Eracle, una eroizzazione che nasce dalla comprensione, sofferta ed esperita, della sofferenza umana ma, insieme, anche del valore profondamente positivo della stessa. Una metamorfosi che acquista un significato ulteriore, però, soprattutto se posta in relazione all'universo narrativo mitologico che accompagna la figura di Eracle; il personaggio diventa infatti una sorta di strumento di interpretazione critica, attraverso il quale, in un gioco di affinità e discordanze, acquistano una diversa complessità anche Admeto e Alceste o, forse, i loro personali destini sono letti in una chiave diversa. E lo stesso Eracle, figura ancora alla ricerca di una sua completa maturazione in quanto eroe, si muove all'interno di un universo morale forte delle sue zone d'ombra, ancora incerto e per certi versi bisognoso di una sua fortificazione. Il momento cruciale del dramma, secondo M., si colloca proprio quando Eracle, dopo il confronto con il Servo, comprende fino in fondo la necessità di un risveglio, una vera e propria rinascita che lo allontani dalla barbarie cui si era lasciato andare, da attuare attraverso una nuova e piena fiducia nella forza fisica e nella dirittura morale. In questo senso il rapporto del racconto mitologico con la storia di Alceste, capace di dare vita a un gioco di rifrazioni intertestuali particolarmente ricco, specie per la diversa luce in cui pone i personaggi, acquista ulteriore significato quando venga posto in relazione alle credenze religiose, in particolare ai miti eleusini e orfici. Si tratta, secondo M., di un rapporto che deve essere letto in stretta relazione con il desiderio di Euripide di offrire una sorta di antidoto alla disperazione umana, inevitabile conseguenza di una logica adottata da Thanatos. La convinzione basilare di M. è che i riferimenti ai misteri eleusini offrono una potente metafora per

rappresentare il valore profondo dell'esperienza sottesa non solo da Alceste nel suo dispiegarsi del coraggio e amore incondizionato nei riguardi di Admeto, ma anche da Admeto ed Eracle, nel loro assumere posizioni contrastanti nei riguardi della fragilità della natura umana. Al centro della narrazione letta attraverso il filtro orfico si colloca allora, secondo M., una riflessione sulla morte e sulle conseguenze che essa comporta rispetto alla dimensione etica dell'uomo.

Nell'insieme, ciò che pare particolarmente apprezzabile nel volume è la volontà di proporre una lettura fortemente unitaria, che trova soprattutto nella dimensione etica e nell'analisi del pensiero di Euripide il suo punto di convergenza. L'analisi delle forme della narrazione tragica diventa, in questo modo, un interessante strumento interpretativo per cogliere la fitta matrice ideologica, intellettuale, mitologica e religiosa, centrale non solo per comprendere il dramma euripideo, ma anche per mettere la stessa tragedia in rapporto dialettico con la cultura e l'ideologia della società ateniese del V secolo per la quale è stata composta.

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PAUL POTTER (ed., trans.), *Hippocrates: Volume X*. Loeb Classical Library 520, Cambridge, Mass. – London: Harvard University Press, 2012, pp. xxii + 432, ISBN 978-0-674-99683-0.

With its tenth volume, the ongoing Loeb edition of Hippocratic texts reaches near completion. This is Paul Potter's fifth contribution to the series<sup>1</sup>. The present offering features five treatises, four dealing with human reproduction (*Generation and Nature of the Child*) and female reproductive disorders (*Nature of Women* and *Barrenness*), the fifth, *Diseases IV*, developing a general theory of physiology and pathology. The volume is prefaced by a general introduction which includes short synopses of the individual works, a brief account of the manuscript tradition and a *stemma codicum*. A short section is also devoted to an explanation of some problematic technical terms. Also provided is a list of references and bibliography to earlier editions, translations and commentaries, and to more general works. The volume concludes with a lexicon of the therapeutic agents included in the text, both in Greek to English and English to Greek format. As almost all agents are also included in the index, this is a most useful feature.

Textual correspondences, cross-references and common theories unite all five treatises in this volume<sup>2</sup> but, since no consensus has been reached as to whether any or all are linked to a common author or form a single work, they are treated here as independent texts. Volume and page references to Littré's nineteenth century edition are made in the margins. The individual treatises are each preceded by a short introduction that outlines the historic evidence for the text's connection to the Hippocratic corpus, and a summary of previous editions, translations and studies. Also include is a handy outline of each text's organization. Potter has made full use of previous editions where available, but has supplemented these in the case of the *Nature of Women* by a collation of manuscripts Θ, M and V from microfilm. His edition of *Barrenness* is based entirely on the collation of M and V (Θ ends

<sup>1</sup> Potter's previous contributions are *Hippocrates Vol. V* (1988) (*Diseases I & II*, and *Affections*), *Hippocrates Vol. VI* (1988) (*Disease III*, *Internal Affections*, and *Appendix to the Regimen in Acute Diseases*), *Hippocrates Vol. VIII* (1995) (*Places in Man*, *Glands*, *Flesh*, *Prorrhetic I & II*, *Physician*, *Use of Liquids*, *Ulcers*, *Haemorrhoids*, and *Fistulas*) and *Hippocrates Vol. IX* (2010) (*Anatomy*, *Nature of Bones*, *Heart*, *Eight Months' Child*, *Coan Prenotions*, *Crises*, *Critical Days*, *Superfetation*, *Girls*, *Excision of the Fetus*, and *Sight*). *Hippocrates Vol. VII* (1994) (*Epidemics II*, *IV-VII*) was edited and translated by Wesley D. Smith. *Volumes I-IV* date to the 1920's and 1930's.

<sup>2</sup> Potter (p. viii) notes that *Superfetation* and *Diseases of Women I* and *II* are also related to the five treatises under discussion here.

after chapter 95 of *Nature of Women*), since its previous editors, Littré and Ermerins, had access to neither of these independent witnesses. As is usual for the Loeb series, the *apparatus criticus* is not comprehensive, but does note significant variants.

Potter's clear translation does not stray very far from the Greek text. Expansions necessary for sense, but not present in the Greek, are bracketed off. He also notes useful cross-references to the other texts. Occasionally, the translation gives the impression that Greek medicine had a more technical vocabulary than it did, as in "she suffers dyspareunia" (ἀλγέει *Nat. Mul.* 7), for example. In places, the translation could also have benefitted from an explanatory note; some may be unfamiliar with the term "treated with tents" (ἔμμοτοι *Nat. Mul.* 6) for instance, or may be puzzled by the rendering of νομὸς μὲν πάντα κρατύνει (*Genit.* 1) by "now whereas food gives everything strength" rather than the footnoted "law rules all things." The inclusion of the table of weights and measures that appeared in the volume *Hippocrates: Volume VI* would also have been appreciated. But these are minor blemishes on an otherwise important offering.

This volume should appeal to classicists, social historians and anyone interested in the history of science and ideas, as well as historians of medicine, since the treatises also touch on themes of philosophy, biology and gender. Together, *Generation* and *Nature of the Child* form a speculative system of embryology. It explains the origin of strong and weak seed in both men and women, and how the relative mixing of the two influences sex determination and inherited characteristics. The roles of heat, breath, and blood in the formation and development of the infant are expounded, with birth occurring, generally after ten months, because of diminished food supply. Validation of the theory is argued through a series of analogies, and by experimentation with hen's eggs. *Nature of Women* and *Barrenness*, by contrast, are in a much more practical vein, dealing with diseases of the womb, and disorders leading to menstrual and fertility problems. A variety of treatments are outlined, mostly pharmacological, through an assortment of douches, suppositories, fomentations and fumigations, but also minor surgical procedures, and marriage and pregnancy. *Disease IV* is notable for one of two Hippocratic accounts of humoral theory, whereby food and drink in the stomach are separated off into phlegm, blood, bile and, in this version, water (or, a watery substance ὕδρωψ *Morb.* IV 1), to be stored in the head, heart, gall bladder and spleen respectively. Evacuation of these humours occurs through four routes, the mouth, nostrils, anus, and urethra. If the equilibrium is disturbed, a propensity to illness ensues which surfeit, violence or bad weather can bring to pass. The treatise ends with a discussion of specific diseases, those of intestinal worms, bladder stones and dropsy.

There is much in this volume for specialist and non-specialist alike. Both text and translation are commendable, and *Nature of Women* and *Barrenness*

are now available in English for the first time. Potter has made a potentially difficult set of treatises accessible to a modern audience and, hopefully, this ready availability will encourage close analysis of these under-studied texts.

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CHRISTOPHE CUSSET - ÉVELYNE PRIOUX - HAMIDOU RICHER (edd.), *Euphorion et les mythes. Images et fragments*, Actes du Colloque International (Lyon, 19-20 janvier 2012), Naples: Centre Jean Bérard, 2013, pp. 340, ISBN 978-2-918887-16-4.

Editar los escasos restos que han llegado hasta nosotros de la obra poética de Euforión de Calcis (siglo III a. C.) ha sido desde Meineke (1843) y Scheidweiler (1910) una importante tarea de la Filología Clásica, tanto más cuanto que a lo largo de los últimos cien años han ido apareciendo nuevos fragmentos de la misma, procedentes sobre todo del universo de los papiros, tan pródigo siempre en este tipo de aportaciones. Tras las ediciones citadas vinieron las de Powell (en sus *Collectanea Alexandrina* de 1925), la mía de 1976 (Fundación Pastor de Estudios Clásicos), la de Van Groningen (1977), la de Clúa (1992) y, más recientemente, la de Lightfoot (2009) y la de Cusset (2012). Esta última, inserta en la benemérita colección “Fragments” de Les Belles Lettres, dirigida por Michel Casevitz, lleva por título *Oeuvre poétique et autres fragments*; bajo ese rótulo figura el siguiente texto: “éditée, traduite et commentée sous la direction de Benjamin Acosta-Hughes et Christophe Cusset”, aunque parece haber sido este último quien se ha encargado de las labores propiamente ecdóticas, pues es únicamente su nombre el que aparece en las “Concordances” del tomo. De Acosta-Hughes, profesor de lenguas clásicas en la Ohio State University, conocíamos ya importantes ensayos sobre poesía helenística, como *Arion’s Lyre. Archaic Lyric into Hellenistic Poetry* (Princeton University Press, 2010).

Estoy plenamente convencido de que en la historia de la crítica textual euforionea habrá —lo hay ya— un antes y un después de la de Cusset, profesor de lengua y literatura griegas en la École Normale Supérieure de Lyon (Universidad de Lyon) y reputado especialista en poesía alejandrina. Fue precisamente con ocasión de la aparición en librerías de esa edición de los fragmentos de Euforión cuando el propio Cusset, secundado por É. Prioux y H. Richer, organizó en Lyon (enero de 2012) un Coloquio Internacional con el objetivo primordial de situar al poeta de Calcis en el alto lugar que le corresponde dentro de la literatura griega de época helenística, pues no deja de ser un autor minusvalorado desde una perspectiva estética y crítica, fruto, tal vez, de su desmesurado barroquismo y de su voluntad de pasar a la historia como la personificación del poeta oscuro, hermético y alambicado. Que eso es verdad lo atestiguan las muestras de su poesía que se nos han conservado, pero no deja de ser cierto que esas mismas muestras lo encumbran hasta cimas de delirio barroco que solo poetas como Góngora en nuestro Siglo de

Oro o el Señor de Racan en el XVII francés han alcanzado. No hay que olvidar tampoco que Euforión ejerció una gran influencia en la poesía latina de finales de la época republicana y del período augusteo, hasta el punto de que a aquellos *poetae noui* (Cornelio Galo y Catulo, entre otros) que reinauguraban el mundo de la creación poética en la Roma del siglo I a. C. los llamó Cicerón (*Tusculanas*, III 45) *cantores Euphorionis*.

El volumen que nos ocupa reproduce las intervenciones que tuvieron lugar en Lyon en enero de 2012 bajo el doble epígrafe de “Euphorion et les mythes” y “Poétiques d’Euphorion”. En una primera parte del epígrafe mítico, dedicada al poeta de Calcis en su relación con los mitos del Ática, Eubea, Beocia y la región de Corinto, Stéphanie Wyler se ocupa de “Dionysos chez Euphorion”, Françoise-Hélène Massa-Pairault lo hace sobre “Orion” y una de las editoras del libro, Évelyne Prioux, estudia las “Figures de devins et signes du destin” en Euforión. Completan esa zona Claude Pouzadoux (“Figures de devins et signes du destin dans la céramique apulienne”) y Noëlle Icard y Anne-Violaine Szabados (“Des couronnes pour Mélicerte”). La segunda y última parte del análisis mitográfico está consagrada a Euforión entre Asia Menor y el Próximo Oriente. En ella participan Renaud Robert (“Euphorion, entre Claros et Grynium”), Pascale Linant de Bellefonds (“*L’ardente Sémiramis*: fragments d’une image contrastée”) y Enrico Magnelli (“Myth and History in Euphorion’s Eastern Tales”).

Las poéticas de Euforión se subdivide también en dos partes: “L’obscur et l’insolite” y “L’art de la malédiction”. Cusset y Acosta-Hughes abren el fuego en la primera de ellas, con un estudio titulado “Euphorion et Lycophron” (el otro gran poeta hermético de la época helenística). Valeria Gigante Lanzara se refiere a “La *Musa sottile* alla corte di Antioco”, Evina Sistakou analiza “The Dark Side of Euphorion” y el catalán Joan Pagès Cebrian se centra en “Euphorion dans les scholies mythographiques à l’*Illiade*”. En la segunda parte, es otro estudioso español, y conspicuo editor de Euforión, Josep Antoni Clúa i Serena, quien aborda el tema “Euphorion, la malédiction mythique et le comique intentionnel”, cerrando ese apartado el trabajo “Les chevaux d’Asbotos et les génisses des Téléboens: les fragments du *Thrace* comme échantillons de la poétique d’Euphorion”, de Antje Kolde. Vienen después unas iluminadoras conclusiones a cargo de los tres editores del libro, unos índices muy bien contruidos (general, de lugares y de obras de arte citadas) y los resúmenes de rigor (en francés).

Un libro, en suma, imprescindible para la rehabilitación de un poeta que goza ahora, desde 2012, de una edición inmejorable y que comienza a ser situado en el alto lugar que se merece.

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DAVID BUTTERFIELD, *The Early Textual History of Lucretius's De rerum natura* (Cambridge Classical Studies), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. xi + 342. ISBN 9781107037458. €65.00.

La presente monografía sobre la tradición manuscrita del *De rerum natura* (*DRN*) fue la tesis doctoral defendida por David J. Butterfield (desde ahora B.) en la Universidad de Cambridge el año 2010 (p. ix). Revisada y ampliada, ofrece ahora a los críticos y editores de Lucrecio nuevas conclusiones, probadas textualmente, que dada su solidez habrán por fuerza de tenerlas presentes o, en caso contrario, refutarlas con mejores argumentos. El autor es en la actualidad Miembro del “Queen’s College” y Profesor de Clásicas de la Universidad de Cambridge. Ha publicado con anterioridad numerosas enmiendas y conjeturas al texto de Lucrecio en revistas de referencia como *Eranos*, *Latomus*, *Emerita* o *Athenaeum*. En mi opinión, el mayor logro es el mazazo casi definitivo que da a los mss. *Itali*: no tendrían ya, según las pruebas que aporta, autoridad textual alguna en la *constitutio* del *DRN*, salvo como depositarios de brillantes conjeturas (272-73).

El misterio que envuelve al ms. hallado por Poggio tiene casi el mismo encanto que la conjura de silencio que rodea la vida de Lucrecio. No en vano *El giro* (2011) de Stephen Greenblatt, que recrea el redescubrimiento (1417) e impacto cultural de Lucrecio en el Renacimiento, ha sido todo un *best-seller*. Fue, en efecto, ese códice, perdido hoy y denominado *Poggianus*, el que impulsó aquella revolución filosófico-científica; pero la importancia editorial de sus *codices descripti* [54 conocidos (p. 18)] ha ido perdiendo peso, sobre todo desde la seminal edición de K. Lachmann [Berlín, 1850 (p. 22)], a favor de los mss. carolingios, en particular el *Oblongus* (O). Gravitan, no obstante, todavía dudas sobre la genealogía del apógrafo poggiano ( $\pi$ ). Y pueden resumirse en tres: si desciende directa o indirectamente del O, si desciende del arquetipo ( $\Omega$ ) conformando una tercera rama frente al O, al *Quadratus* (Q) y las *Schedae* (S), o si procede, como defiende hoy E. Flores<sup>1</sup>, de un arquetipo anterior al entonces subarquetipo ( $\Omega$ ), por lo que constituiría así una segunda rama [ $\pi$  frente a  $\Omega$  (OQS)]. Fue H. Diels en su edición del *DRN* de 1923 (Berlín) quien primero defendió que el *Poggianus* descendía del O. Medio siglo después, reforzaron esta hipótesis K. Müller<sup>2</sup> y G. F. Cini<sup>3</sup>. Recientemente M.

<sup>1</sup> *Titus Lucretius Carus: De rerum natura*, vol. I (Libri I-III), Napoli: Bibliopolis, 2002, esp. p. 25.

<sup>2</sup> “*De codicum Lucretii italicorum origine*”, *Museum Helveticum* 30 (1973), 166-78.

<sup>3</sup> “La posizione degli ‘Italici’ nello stemma lucreziano”, *Atti e Memorie dell’Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere ‘La Colombaria’* 41, 1976, 116-69.

D. Reeve ha afianzado aún más esta posible filiación de los códices italianos con el O gracias al estudio detenido de omisiones, errores conjuntivos y lecturas singulares<sup>4</sup>. Siguiendo el magisterio de Reeve (p. ix), B. intenta dar una respuesta definitiva a los interrogantes que plantea esta propuesta estemmática. Y la conclusión final (248-56), tras aportar numerosas pruebas históricas, paleográficas y textuales, es que el *codex Poggianus* ( $\pi$ ) fue transcrito por un negligente escriba comisionado por Poggio a partir de un códice ( $\chi$ ), el *Murbacensis* posiblemente, que era a su vez copia del O realizada en torno al año 950, después de haber sido corregido éste por el monje Dungal *ex ope codicis* y por una segunda mano carolingia *ex ope ingenii* (O<sup>2</sup>); pero antes de recibir las enmiendas también *ex ope ingenii* de esotra tercera (O<sup>3</sup>).

Aunque la lógica de las coincidencias textuales y las explicaciones de las excepciones resultan asaz convincentes, falta a mi parecer una *collatio* exhaustiva de los *meliores Itali* para zanjar definitivamente esta cuestión. El a veces denostado W. A. Merrill<sup>5</sup> fue el primero que con gran sentido común intentó la hercúlea tarea de cotejar los códices italianos. Y Reeve (2005: 117), al hilo de la colación de E. Goebel<sup>6</sup>, hace hincapié en este *desideratum*. Si, como B. viene a admitir (41-42), el *Poggianus* era una copia imperfecta, convendría reconstruir con la mayor exactitud posible su texto y éste sólo puede emerger tras colacionar en detalle los mss. que se consideran más fieles y que el propio B. relaciona, a saber (p. 23, n. 68): L (Laur. 35.30), d (Laur. Conv. Sopr. 453), Ja (Madrid Nac. 2885), A (Vat. Lat. 3276), B (Vat. Barb. 154), o (Vat. Pat. 312) y x (Malatesta. Ces. S. 20 4).

El códice Ja (Madrid Nac. 2885) ha sido un códice italiano (S. XV<sup>med.</sup>) desconocido por la crítica lucreciana hasta que Reeve (2005: 121) llamara la atención sobre él. Con su habitual pericia, Reeve (137) descubrió, tras el estudio del escudo heráldico, que perteneció a Martinozzi de Siena. Con todo, su escriba, *Ambrosius*, aún no ha sido identificado<sup>7</sup>. Éste transcribió en letra *formata*, bastante clara y homogénea, su ejemplar y todo indica que con bastante exactitud y pocas interpolaciones<sup>8</sup>. No obstante, según el *stemma*

<sup>4</sup> "The Italian tradition of Lucretius revisited", *Aevum* (2005), 115-64, esp. 161-62.

<sup>5</sup> *The Italian Manuscripts of Lucretius*, Berkeley: Berkeley UP, 1926-29.

<sup>6</sup> *Quaestiones Lucretianae criticae, quibus et de codice Victoriano disputatur*, Salzburg, 1857.

<sup>7</sup> Este códice fue incorporado en 1814 a la Biblioteca Real (Nacional a partir de 1836) desde los fondos depositados en el Convento de la Merced de Madrid. Procedía de la biblioteca del convento benedictino de San Martín, también de Madrid. Es probable que el ms. lucreciano se encontrara entre las obras de la biblioteca del VII Duque de Medinaceli, Antonio Juan Luis de la Cerda (1607-1671), que quedó en el Puerto de Santa María a su muerte y que los padres benedictinos adquirieron por una cantidad de entre 20 ó 30.000 reales. Cf. Julián Martín Abad, "Crecimiento de la colección de manuscritos de la Biblioteca Nacional en el siglo XIX: breves apuntes para una historia necesaria", *Boletín de la ANABAD* 42: 1, 1992, 97-117, esp. 99-102.

<sup>8</sup> Mantiene, por ejemplo, unidos sintagmas preposicionales como en III 992 (*inamore*), IV 53 (*decorpore*), IV 97 (*Inpromptu*), IV 211 (*subdiu*), IV 348 (*intenebris inluce*) o pega palabras como en IV 936 (*conchisa ut*) y IV 616 (*iserationis*). Escribe también en minúscula los

*codicum* de B. (p. 32), no fue copiado directamente de  $\pi$ , sino de  $\mu$ , que sí lo fue del *Poggianus*.

La cuestión es que han pervivido seguramente en él lecturas singulares del *Poggianus*. Unas confirmarían el *stemma codicum* de B. (p. 32), pero otras no. Voy a exponer a continuación algunas de ellas.

1. II 482 *Curbascunt* Ja: *Cur ea sunt* L: *Curba sunt* OQ.

Lachmann (1850: 172, ad 11482) comenta sobre este verso: “CURBA SUNT. Sic uterque Vossianus sine ulla correctione, nequis Havercampo credat in utroque esse *Curbascunt*. impressi recte, ut Itali, *Cur EA sunt*”. Niccoli entonces habría corregido esta *antiqua lectio* de  $\pi$ . Y el escriba de  $\chi$  habría leído en O, como Havercamp, *Curbascunt*.

2. I 120 *preterea* Ja: *praeterea* O: *praetereat* O<sup>D</sup>QS

3. I 651 *disiectatiisque supetatis* Ja: *disiectisque supatis* O: *disiectisque disque supatis* O<sup>D</sup>

4. II 216 *auemus* JaQ<sup>2</sup>: *abemus* O: *habemus* O<sup>D</sup>QS

5. III 289 *feruescet* JaL(Merrill): *feruescat* O: *feruescit* O<sup>D</sup>QS

6. III 941 *offenso est* Ja: *offensast* Itali: *offens* / / / O: *offensost* O<sup>D</sup>Q

7. III 960 *discernere* Ja: *discedere* L: *dicere* O: *discere* O<sup>D</sup>Q

8. IV 545 *nece tortis* JaL(Merrill): *nectitortis* O: *nete tortis* O<sup>D</sup>Q

9. IV 1124 *uigilans* Ja: *uicillans* O: *uigillans* O<sup>D</sup>Q

10. V 533 *petedenti* Ja: *pedetemtum* L(Bailey): *pedetem* O: *pedetemti* O<sup>D</sup>Q

11. V 1253 *altis* JaL(Merrill)O: *altas* O<sup>D</sup>Q

12. V 1259 *capiti* JaL31(Bailey)F: *capite* O: *capiti* O<sup>D</sup>Q

13. VI 524 *inter* JaL: *in/e* O: *inte* O<sup>D</sup>Q

14. VI 747 *-e cri-* Ja: *egri* O: *ecri* O<sup>D</sup>QS

El *Matritensis* no adopta estas *lectiones ex ope codici* de Dungal. Salvo una (3), las doce restantes están entre las veinticinco destacadas por B. (p. 213). Y si algunas pueden considerarse el resultado de conjeturas y correcciones de humanistas (n.º. 4, 8, 10, 11 ó 12), cabría preguntarse por qué razón este códice contiene tantos errores imperdonables y de bulto. ¿Es acaso una suerte de híbrido, donde conviven conjeturas elegantes y aberraciones morfológico-sintácticas como *Curbascunt* (II 482), *exheliconis* (IV 545) o *his locus cumasapude crisui per montis* (VI 747)?

15. II 694 *constant* JaQ: *constet* O: *constant* O<sup>2</sup>S

16. III 656 *animai* JaQ<sup>2</sup>: *animi* O: *anima* O<sup>2</sup>

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nombres propios de, por ejemplo, *ancus* (III 1025) y *democritum* (III 1039).

17. IV 351 *obsidit quia* JaL(Merrill)OQ: *obsiditque uias* O<sup>2</sup>: *obseditque uias* Q<sup>1</sup>(Lachmann)

18. IV 736 *suaq fluunt* Ja: *questunt* O: *quae fluunt* O<sup>2</sup>

19. V 295 *licui* Ja: *lichni* L(Merrill): *lyclini* OQ: *lychni* O<sup>2</sup>

Estas enmiendas *ex ope ingenii* de O<sup>2</sup> tampoco están presentes en el *Matritensis*. Es quizás la última (19) la más interesante. Macrobio (*Sat.* VI 4, 18) cita la lectura correcta *lychni*, la misma que O<sup>2</sup>. Es posible que en el antígrafo (μ) la lectura fuera *lichni* o *licni* pero el apógrafo *Niccolianus* muestra casi la correcta (*lichni*). ¿Cual es la *lectio poggiana*? Posiblemente ésta última. Pero merecería la pena comprobarlo entre los mejores *Itali*. Es probable que Niccoli consultara la cita de Macrobio. Este tipo de indagaciones en filólogos y gramáticos antiguos para mejorar el texto de π está atestiguado en el propio *Matritensis*, que inserta al final (ff. 154r.-163r.) *excerpta* de Macrobio (Reeve, 2005: 137).

Parece claro que el *Poggianus* fue transcrito o negligentemente o χ, su antígrafo, era una copia pésima de un buen códice, el O. Y apenas recibirlo el propio Poggio debió de sentir la necesidad de enmendarlo. Este proceso paulatino de restitución se trasluce en casi todos los *Itali* (*interpolati*) y, en concreto, el *Matritensis* contiene un ejemplo singular en II 553: *Disiectare solet magnum mare cauerna carina*. Ambrosio olvidó *transtra*, descifró la lectura correcta del ms. μ ζο π? (*cauerna*) e insertó la enmienda humanista [*carina* Ja: *carinas* L (Munro)].

En mi opinión, esta monografía de B. viene a ser un acicate para la estancada crítica lucreciana. Además de exhaustiva y densa, pues aporta un sinfín de nuevos datos que precisarían reseñas por capítulos, el autor ha abordado la cuestión con el mejor método posible: autopsia de los principales códices, conocimientos paleográficos, bibliofilia por las ediciones y comentarios renacentistas de Lucrecio y una amplia bibliografía lucreciana, que incluye sabiamente la hoy casi olvidada del siglo XVIII.

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FABIO TUTRONE, *Filosofi e animali in Roma antica. Modelli di animalità e umanità in Lucrezio e Seneca*, Edizioni ETS, Pisa 2012, pp. 394, 978-8-846-73233-0

Il volume è la rielaborazione della tesi di dottorato discussa dall'Autore all'Università di Palermo nel 2009. La posizione di partenza, enunciata esplicitamente nell'*Introduzione* (13-26), è che gli animali siano spesso considerato dai filosofi «specchio» del mondo umano e quindi «chiave interpretativa» per comprendere «il patrimonio ideativo» dell'uomo stesso. Il volume è bipartito: la prima sezione riguarda Lucrezio (27-154), mentre Seneca è il protagonista della seconda (155-291). L'interesse di Tutrone non si ferma però a questi autori: mediante l'analisi della loro opera, egli tenta di ricostruire il ruolo degli animali nel dibattito filosofico che si svolge nel mondo romano dal I secolo a.C. al I d.C. (non senza risalire al retroterra greco).

In primo luogo, spicca un rilievo attinente al 'metodo' di Lucrezio, che muove da un approccio col mondo naturale definito «realismo simbolico», consistente nel cogliere l'animale come 'fenomeno', «oggetto reale e ambientale», per poi considerarlo «un ente significativo» sul piano dottrinario, un esempio di meccanismi da indagare e conoscere scientificamente, ma senza perdere nulla della sua «originaria trasparenza realistica» (34-5). Più in generale «il fatto di natura acquisisce una sua collocazione – semantica e relazionale – nel reticolato ideologico di fondo», mediante un processo denominato da Tutrone «adattamento cognitivo», che presuppone il «rilevamento empirico del dato naturale» e il suo inquadramento in un sistema di pensiero (p. 47). Questa definizione della strategia lucreziana sottolinea la portata scientifica dell'esposizione poetica, ma non ne sminuisce l'adesione immediata (finanche autoptica) alla realtà naturale: il *De rerum natura* è caratterizzato quindi come resoconto filosofico sui principi del mondo (*rerum natura*) senza cessare di apparire «il poema della natura» (non a caso, di solito il titolo è tradotto così, specialmente nelle edizioni divulgative).

Nell'esame del ruolo svolto dagli animali nel ragionamento filosofico, il punto centrale mi sembra il «paradigma alternativo» costruito dal poeta, in antitesi alla *communis opinio* di una scala piramidale delle creature viventi, che trova una giustificazione nella concezione gerarchica e provvidenzialistica della dottrina stoica (per il mondo romano è emblematico, a riguardo, l'umanesimo antropocentrico di Cicerone). Lucrezio inquadra l'uomo nel medesimo meccanismo cosmico-fisico e biologico degli animali, in una visione orizzontale di «assoluta parità», con un «afflato critico e innovativo»

che ha un impatto demistificante e perfino «decostruttivo» sul pregiudizio umanistico tradizionale (50-1, 68-72 e *passim*).

Questa nuova «antropologia filosofica», basata sulla «parificazione cosmologica della collocazione umana e di quella animale», non si contrappone solamente alle opinioni comuni e ad altre correnti filosofiche: il punto più interessante è infatti il conflitto di Lucrezio (almeno per questo aspetto) con altri pensatori epicurei, come Ermarco e Filodemo di Gadara, che considerano gli animali come esseri 'bruti', inferiori in quanto irrazionali, quindi incapaci di comprendere il messaggio filosofico e irrimediabilmente in balia di pulsioni istintive e di angosce ataviche (41-3 e *passim*). Lucrezio, al contrario, rivendica la dignità degli animali e arriva perfino ad additare nel loro stile di vita un esempio di «antibellismo» e di propensione naturale alla pace, che gli uomini dovrebbero seguire (139-47).

Un altro punto rilevante mi sembra il riconoscimento di «una coscienza cognitiva degli affetti parentali e della stessa dimensione diacronica», vale a dire la percezione del tempo, «che riporta la condizione animale fuori dal limbo della subordinazione a un eterno, contingente presente». La trattazione lucreziana di questa complessa e fascinosa materia non si esaurisce in un'acquisizione puramente speculativa, ma sfocia nella critica di una prassi ordinaria e quasi mai messa in discussione nel mondo antico, accettata e anzi pienamente giustificata anche dagli Epicurei, quale il sacrificio cruento (58-67).

Se questo è il cuore del discorso condotto da Tutrone sul *De rerum natura*, molti sono gli argomenti che si sviluppano su tali presupposti. Qualche esempio: l'anticipazione lucreziana della «prospettiva di base della moderna ecologia, ossia la nozione di ecosistema come articolato sistema ambientale costituito da un insieme di concatenate relazioni energetiche fra elementi biotici e abiotici» (85); la demistificazione sia della «fortunata tradizione culturale dell'onirocritica antica», sia del modello etico tipicamente romano del *negotium* (impegno politico, foriero di turbamenti e affanni), mediante la descrizione dei sogni degli animali, contrapposti a quelli umani (98-105); la contestazione lucreziana del sistema di valori vigente nella lirica amorosa (in particolare, nella coeva poesia neoterica) in una sorta di dialogo polemico tra i generi letterari e i rispettivi paradigmi etici (105-11).

Al medesimo Lucrezio e al sostrato culturale del suo tempo è dedicato poi un interessante contributo, *Lucrezio e la biologia di Aristotele*, pubblicato precedentemente da Tutrone in una sede poco nota ("Bollettino della Fondazione Nazionale Vito Fazio Allmayer" 25, 1/2, 2006, 65-104 e ristampato in appendice a questo libro (295-328). Si tratta di un lavoro notevole, che intende dimostrare la presenza delle opere aristoteliche «nelle biblioteche e nel mercato librario del I secolo a.C.», nonché il loro influsso diretto (non prettamente indiretto, come spesso si ripete) sul *De rerum natura*. La ristampa è pienamente giustificata dall'importanza della tematica e dalla sua pertinenza col presente volume (la concezione lucreziana degli

animali non si comprende pienamente, se non si inquadra nel contesto culturale coevo e se non si tiene conto del ruolo rivestito da Aristotele), ma anche dalla scarsa diffusione e dalla difficoltà di reperibilità della prima pubblicazione.

La parte del volume dedicata a Seneca muove dalle *Epistulae ad Lucilium* (157-211), da cui emerge «una visione dell'animale che si dispiega in due versanti»: da un lato «un umanesimo antropocentrico» che prevede una struttura gerarchica, piramidale, culminante appunto nell'uomo; dall'altro, una posizione ideologica non ugualmente esplicita ed evidente, «che valorizza negli animali una spontanea prossimità col mondo etico della natura», non senza metterne in luce, almeno «in qualche caso, la nobiltà e la dignità».

L'analisi dei *Dialogi* (pp. 213-49) conferma questo dualismo, in quanto Seneca di volta in volta «inclina versol'uno o l'altro dei due versanti dell'animale-specchio», a seconda delle esigenze contingenti dell'argomentazione. L'animale appare quindi alternamente «volto di un brutalità cruda ed efferata o nobile riflesso di una natura mite e più sapiente», oscillando tra i due poli opposti. In entrambi i casi, l'animale è comunque «un segno, un simbolo denotativo», di cui il filosofo si serve per veicolare il proprio messaggio morale.

L'idea principale, che si riscontra ancora nella lettura dei trattati (251-91), resta quella di «un cosmo di viventi orientato verso l'alto, verticalmente disposto, in cui chi, come l'uomo, è più vicino ai luoghi delle sublimità celesti è benedetto dalla natura». Nondimeno l'animale funge da «specchio ambiguo», che talvolta rappresenta la possibile degenerazione dell'uomo, talaltra incarna un modello etico positivo. In generale il messaggio morale di Seneca ha «il senso di un viaggio progettato per il bene dell'uomo-*proficiens*», a cui partecipa «per larghi tratti» anche l'animale.

Le conclusioni (293-4) ribadiscono sinteticamente la diversità nelle idee di Lucrezio e Seneca, in quanto il primo propugna un «paradigma animalistico» fondato sulla «parità ontologica tra uomo e animale», mentre il secondo sembra ritornare allo schema gerarchico tradizionale. A ben guardare, però, Seneca non abbraccia *tout court* il finalismo umanistico di Cicerone e Sallustio, ma vede l'animale come «uno strumento duttile, un reagente simbolico altamente funzionale, in parte degradato, in parte elevato a paradigma di virtù naturale».

Il volume comprende due appendici. Utile e pertinente la prima, che contiene il contributo su Lucrezio e Aristotele, di cui si è già detto. Forse si poteva rinunciare alla seconda, che propone «le traduzioni italiane dei brani lucreziani e senecani analizzati nei paragrafi» (329-58): il libro è rivolto a un pubblico specialistico, peraltro non prettamente italiano; per di più, molti di questi brani sono ben noti anche al di fuori dell'ambito accademico. L'aggiunta delle traduzioni potrebbe essere motivata se mai (in qualche caso) dal proposito di fornire un'interpretazione innovativa, diversa da quella invalsa tradizionalmente: ma non è così, dal momento che tale appendice riporta versioni italiane già pubblicate in edizioni divulgative

largamente diffuse (segnatamente quella di G. Milanese per Lucrezio; quelle di A. Marastoni e M. Natali per Seneca). Inoltre le traduzioni non sempre corrispondono alla ricostruzione testuale dei brani citati nel volume, come Tutrone avverte preliminarmente (329): non mi sembra che ciò capiti spesso; mi chiedo però se sia accettabile in linea di principio e se non rischi di essere fuorviante, soprattutto per un ipotetico lettore che avesse realmente bisogno del riscontro italiano.

A uno sguardo d'insieme, si tratta di un volume di notevole spessore. Tutrone mostra una conoscenza approfondita dei testi di Lucrezio e Seneca, una fine sensibilità di lettura e una capacità di penetrarne la complessità, non scevra di risvolti contraddittori. Lo studioso padroneggia una vasta bibliografia, da cui non si lascia però ingessare, discutendo sempre criticamente le tesi altrui e non esitando ad assumere posizioni personali e innovative. Pari spazio e attenzione sono dedicati ai due filosofi (la sproporzione di questa recensione nella trattazione delle due parti del libro è dovuta soltanto al mio interesse attualmente prevalente per Lucrezio). Inoltre lo sguardo si allarga spesso sul contesto storico-culturale coevo e sul retroterra greco, ricostruendo un dibattito filosofico che ha origine nella Grecia del III secolo a.C. e si sviluppa nel mondo romano nel corso di due secoli (dalla tarda repubblica all'età giulio-claudia). Si tratta quindi di un volume prezioso per lo specialista di Lucrezio e/o di Seneca, ma anche per lo studioso di storia delle idee e antropologia dell'antichità.

Ampia e aggiornata la bibliografia (359-73), seguita da un utile indice dei passi citati (375-88).

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J. C. ROLFE - JOHN T. RAMSEY, *Sallust. The War with Catiline. The War with Jugurtha. Translated by J. C. R. Revised by J. T. R.*, Loeb Classical Library 116, Cambridge, MA - London: Harvard University Press, 2013. Pp. LXXXVIII + 440. ISBN 978-0-674-99684-7.

Los primeros volúmenes de la Loeb, superado ya el siglo desde la fundación de esta magnífica colección (1911), están en gran parte necesitados de una modernización. No se trata solo de que los derechos de autor caduquen o de que se haya avanzado más o menos en el conocimiento de autores u obras, se trata también de que las exigencias de la serie, por más que haya mantenido los fundamentos de su filosofía a lo largo de todos estos años, han cambiado. Los últimos libros, en efecto, son más completos en introducciones o notas, por ejemplo, y en todas partes es notorio el esfuerzo por conseguir traducciones a la vez más fieles y en un lenguaje más actual. La gran disyuntiva que se abre ante estas viejas publicaciones es si reemplazar las ediciones antiguas, como en el caso de *Odas* y *Epodos* de Horacio o Marcial, o revisar el original, que es lo que se ha hecho con Salustio.

El volumen único que constituía el Salustio de Loeb, obra de Rolfe, data de 1921: tuvo una revisión diez años después y sucesivas reimpresiones. Contiene las dos monografías completas, la obra pseudosalustiana y, de *Historias*, solo los discursos y cartas del código V (Vat. lat. 3864). La obra necesitaba clamorosamente una actualización: aunque aprovechaba los estudios de Ahlberg, muy presente en el aparato crítico, o los fragmentos de Maurenbrecher, es anterior a la mayor parte de la obra de Kurfess, la trascendental edición de Reynolds (OCT) o el clásico libro de Syme, por poner solo los ejemplos más sobresalientes y sin entrar en los numerosos y valiosos estudios parciales y comentarios aparecidos desde los años veinte. Por otra parte, la introducción, que añade a una sucinta presentación de autor y obra una lista de manuscritos junto con una cortísima bibliografía, y, especialmente, las notas están reducidas a lo mínimo. Aunque el índice de nombres, bastante más completo, palía en parte la escasez de estas, era evidente que debían ampliarse.

El encargo de esta adaptación, que constituye realmente una nueva edición, ha recaído sobre el profesor Ramsey, un conocido especialista en Salustio y autor de un notable comentario a la *Conjuración de Catilina* que cuenta ya con una segunda edición de 2007 y una reimpresión con correcciones de 2010, además de otros estudios trascendentales sobre Cicerón.

La revisión ha sido muy completa y profunda. Antes de nada, lo que ha aparecido es el primer volumen de una nueva edición, que cubre solo *Catilina* y *Jugurta*. Los fragmentos de *Historias*, completos esta vez, aparecerán en

un segundo volumen junto con las cartas a César. El propio Ramsey presenta las novedades con respecto al libro anterior y sus razones (IX-XIII). Entre los cambios más notables está una nueva y excelente introducción general al autor y sus obras, con referencias constantes a las fuentes y discusión de estas, contexto histórico y literario, y un apartado sobre su estilo (XLII-LII, con capítulos sobre las relaciones con Tucídides y Catón), que en un escritor como el presente resulta inexcusable. Aunque muy completo, quizá se eche de menos en este último más ejemplos concretos de la peculiar lengua del autor en vez de las citas, casi todas, por otra parte, de *Catilina*; también sorprenden algunos casos aducidos al tratar el orden de las palabras (*domi militiaeque; homo nouos*). Con todo, es una exposición magistral y remedia una carencia flagrante de la edición anterior. Rematan esta introducción un resumen tan claro como bien hecho de la trasmisión manuscrita, con nómina de los principales códices, lista de las diferencias entre el texto y el de Oxford, bibliografía y siglas. Con respecto a las obras consultadas, probablemente deba considerarse un acierto el hecho de que, al tratarse de un escritor tan estudiado y en esta colección, estas se limiten a lo más relevante y realmente imprescindible, y, dentro de estos principios, la selección es impecable. Además, a cada una de las monografías les precede una pequeña, pero inmejorable introducción a las fuentes de Salustio, una cronología y un esquema del contenido.

Por lo que respecta a otros aspectos del libro, el índice, que ya en la versión de Rolfe estaba mucho más elaborado de lo que es habitual, no solo se ha adaptado a la nueva edición, sino que se ha expandido, añadiendo datos nuevos e incluyendo como novedad referencias a la introducción y, en el caso de los personajes históricos, a la *Real-Encyclopädie*. Estupendos igualmente los mapas de Roma, Italia y África que presenta Ramsey.

En cuanto a la traducción, se ha conservado, lógicamente, el grueso de la de Rolfe, pero sometido a una reelaboración completa y bastante profunda, incluida la ortografía, de tal forma que no hay párrafo ni, prácticamente, frase que no haya sufrido alguna alteración, en la que no se haya cambiado una u otra palabra o, en algunos casos, la estructura de una oración entera. Por lo general, se observa una versión más atenta a la traslación del texto latino, como se anuncia en la introducción, y con las debidas reservas de quien no es hablante nativo, se percibe mayor agilidad y soltura en una lengua más actualizada. Lo que no se advierte generalmente es que se haya conseguido reproducir en una medida mucho mayor que Rolfe las peculiaridades del estilo salustiano de acuerdo con lo que se promete en página x. Es posible que ninguna lengua moderna sea capaz de reproducir cabalmente la brevedad y rapidez del texto original, pero quizá podría haber sido más fiel. Así, por ejemplo, en *Catil.* 61.6 se aproxima más al latín que Rolfe, pero en los capítulos 60 y 61 apenas se acerca más a la expresión del original, que en estos párrafos reviste importancia especial. Con buen criterio, por otra parte, Ramsey renuncia desde el principio y salvo casos muy concretos a reflejar los

arcaísmos y términos poéticos. En cualquier caso y con la salvedad ya dicha, la traducción mejora patentemente la primitiva.

Las notas de Rolfe, como se ha visto, fueron muy escasas: Ramsey las ha mejorado y ampliado: compárense, por ejemplo, los capítulos 18 y 30 de *Catilina*; también el error corregido en 6.7, además de 47.2, *Iug.* 63.1, 95.3, donde la nota aclara y justifica la adecuada intelección de texto, o 95.4. Quizá, a pesar de que la serie no suele ser demasiado pródiga en este sentido y de que generalmente se da cuenta de todos los aspectos reseñables, hay algún aspecto todavía que hubiera necesitado alguna aclaración mayor (e.g. *Catil.* 6.1, 57.1-2).

Por lo que se refiere al texto latino, la revisión parte, como no podía ser de otra manera, de la edición de Reynolds, aunque con las peculiaridades de quien conoce muy bien las obras y plasma su saber en una selección propia. Desde el punto de vista formal y contra la costumbre de Rolfe, se señalan la adición o eliminación de algún elemento, incluso cuando no llegan a alterar palabras enteras. Las intervenciones en el texto son generalmente adecuadas y en numerosos ocasiones suponen una mejora evidente con respecto a Rolfe. En no poca medida lo que hace es reflejar, como se ha observado, el texto de Oxford: cf. e.g. *Catil.* 3.2, 8.4, 35.3, 55.1, 57.4, 58.12, 59.2; *Iug.* 1.3, 1.5, 3.1, 4.4, 4.5, 12.3, 18.11, 28.5 (con traducción, sin embargo, en nota de la lectura alternativa), 38.2, 41.1, 44.5, 53.8, 63.7, 73.7 (quizá errata de Rolfe), 74.3 (bis), 80.6, 85.13, 85.26, 88.4, 93.3, 95.3, 97.5, 100.4 (con una conjetura de Reynolds que este no llegó a consignar más que en notas), 102.3 (quizá no estrictamente necesario), 104.1 (Tucca), 111.1, 113.3. No pocas veces, sin embargo, la elección de Ramsey es más juiciosa que las de la edición Oxoniense: véase, por ejemplo, cómo evita drásticas injerencias en *Catil.* 14.2, 22.2, 59.3 (con la transposición de Vretska), opta por una corrección en *Cat.* 53.5 — por más que la solución de Ritschl sea tan plausible como cualquier otra— o la convincente defensa del mantenimiento del *dixerat* transmitido en *Catil.* 50.4. También en otros pasajes se decide, en general con buen criterio, por otras soluciones: véase especialmente *Catil.* 55.6, 59.3, *Iug.* 14.6, 19.4, 27.4, 43.2, 44.5, 53.7, 95.3, 100.1, 100.5 y la lista completa de divergencias en las páginas LXIII-LXV. Mucho más discutible es la superficial adición de *satis* en *Catil.* 20.2, que ni Reynolds ni Rolfe reflejan siquiera en el aparato crítico: es dudosa además alguna corrección como la de Linker en *Catil.* 41.5 (*fort. recte* según Reynolds), la de Kunze en *Iug.* 78.2 o la de Wirz en *Iug.* 93.8, a pesar de la explicación en la nota a la traducción. Parece extraño también que en algún pasaje, con diferencia de pocas líneas, adopte una vez la lectura de un testimonio indirecto (Frontón) y otra la de los manuscritos (*Catil.* 31.1 y 3). A pesar de todo, la independencia de criterio con la que está elaborada esta edición redonda normalmente en la mejora del texto, supone una mejora innegable con respecto a Rolfe y no pocas veces un avance general.

La colección Loeb, como es bien sabido, presenta un aparato crítico muy resumido. Hacer una correcta selección de este puede ser un grave problema

en algunos casos, pero no aquí: Ramsey ha mejorado las notas de Rolfe, remediando omisiones (e.g. *Cat.* 5.9, 60.7, *Iug.* 107.1) o completando información (e.g. *Iug.* 3.2, 107.1), y ha realizado una elección certera, en muchos sentidos, una vez más, de acuerdo con Reynolds.

El volumen está muy bien editado, como es norma de la casa, aunque siempre se desliza alguna errata, escasa e intrascendente: entre las que he advertido, véanse *Fluery* (p. LIX *bis*), *tibi* (app. crit. n. 160, p. 394) o *Iug.* 103.5 (ya presente en Rolfe, por cierto).

En definitiva no hay un solo aspecto de esta edición que no mejore con creces la anterior. La introducción entera y las notas son excepcionalmente valiosas y un alarde de concisión y sabiduría. Lo mismo cabe decir del aparato crítico y el texto latino, en los que Ramsey ha puesto de manifiesto su profundo conocimiento de las obras y ha demostrado su pericia filológica. Todo esto, sumado a la traducción, muy mejorada, y al trabajo cuidadoso y esmerado de todo el libro, convierte a este, sin ningún género de duda, en una edición bilingüe de Salustio ejemplar. Quedamos a la espera del segundo volumen.

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ANDREW R. DYCK, ed. *Marcus Tullius Cicero: Pro Marco Caelio*. Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 218, ISBN 9781107843482

Readers of Andrew Dyck's Green and Yellow editions of *In Catilinam* and *Pro Sexto Roscio* will not find large changes in approach in his new edition of *Pro Caelio*. Dyck is a careful, thorough, and reliable scholar; his introduction covers the necessary background to the law, the trial, and the *dramatis personae*, as well as (what one also expects from him) some discussion of style and prose rhythm. He has also constructed a careful text, accepting emendations perhaps more than I would, but all reasonable. He gives detailed outlines of the sections of the speech and elucidates Cicero's rhetorical strategies. His commentary is very precise, giving many cross-references to other Ciceronian examples of usage as well as to *OLD* and Gildersleeve-Lodge.

In most cases, the previous paragraph would be all the review that is needed, but in this instance it is not. Dyck himself raises the main question in his preface: why a new student commentary on *Pro Caelio* when it is one of those rare speeches where a good commentary in English already exists? R. G. Austin's commentary was originally published in 1933, and the most recent (third) edition was published in 1960<sup>1</sup>; the text was taken from Clark's (excellent) OCT, and changes from the second edition were made only by adding a set of additional notes at the end of the third. As Dyck rightly points out (ix), Austin's commentary is not always easy to use, particularly since important material is relegated to the appendices, and it does not always address the problems faced by current students. On the other hand, this is, so far as I know, the first Latin Green and Yellow to compete directly with a comparable Oxford Red, and the most compelling reason to recommend Dyck over Austin—for both commentaries have their merits, and both editions deserve respect—is the price. As I write, the CUP website lists the price of Dyck's edition at \$34.99, and the OUP lists Austin ed. 3 at \$82.00. But comparison between the two is necessary and inevitable, and such comparison is not always in Dyck's favor.

Much as one welcomes a more affordable student edition that provides excellent assistance as well as value, Dyck's edition, like Austin's, has its weaknesses of which anyone assigning it to students should be aware. For the sake of comparison, I have taken §13 from Cicero's speech, part of his characterization of Catiline. On the first sentence, Dyck points out that the thought is

<sup>1</sup> On Austin and his commentaries, I am very much indebted to John Henderson, "The Way We Were: R. G. Austin, *In Caelianam*," in R. Gibson and C. Kraus, eds., *The Classical Commentary* (Leiden, 2002) 205-234.

repeated from the previous section, with a cross-reference to his earlier note, followed by noting that Cicero uses the comparative without an object of comparison as an intensive, again with a cross-reference to his earlier note on the same phenomenon at §6b. He also notes that *quodam tempore* alludes to “Catiline’s loss of favor after C. revealed his plotting in the senate.” Austin has no note on the sentence as a whole, but links *clarioribus viris* to *quodam tempore*, suggesting that the unnamed individuals may be Caesar and Crassus, and that this might point back to 66-65 rather than, as Dyck would have it, to the opening months of 63. In this, I incline to Austin’s point of view: Cicero is not being so precise in referring to his own unmasking of Catiline, but he is trying to show how much support and even affection Catiline once received. Austin here also points out that Fronto cited this passage, with its repeated *quis*, as an example of *epanaphora*. In subsequent notes, Dyck pays close attention to the historical background, the opposition of *civis* and *hostis*, and the use of *taeter* as an epithet for *hostis*. He dilates on the meanings of some words and phrases (*admirabilis*, *versare*, *servire temporibus*), he points out repetition of ideas within the passage, and he connects the pursuit of varieties of friendship in campaigning for office to a passage in *De Officiis* on the same topic. Austin too talks about *taeter*, but in connection with its medical use, as in *In Cat.* 1.11; he too explains *temporibus* and *admirabilis*, but translates the sentence using *versare*. He also discusses the meaning of *tristis* and the morphology of *facinerosus* and *audaciter*. He quotes part of the parallel description of Catiline from Sallust, again cites Fronto, and also adduces an epitaph in Gloucester Cathedral for the meaning of *obsequium*.

With the possible exception of Gloucester Cathedral (in Austin’s home town), nothing said by either scholar does not contribute in some way to understanding Cicero’s words, but Dyck’s notes are, here as elsewhere, more limited in range. This was a famous passage, an example of high rhetoric; if I were writing a commentary on it and had the space, I would quote Fronto rather more than Austin does, and I would also say more about the repetition and antitheses. Austin has a few sentences on the rhetoric in his note on *tristibus* and gives references to the *Orator*, Quintilian, and Norden’s *Antike Kunstprosa*. Dyck has nothing on the topic here, and even in his useful discussion of Ciceronian rhetoric in the preface, there is nothing that I can see about this passage. Austin also reminds the reader, not only here, of the parallels in Sallust. Dyck, in short, sticks to the principle of explaining Cicero from Cicero, one that I agree with in theory; however Dyck follows this rule so closely that he excludes much else that is relevant or that places this speech, or Ciceronian rhetoric, in a broader context. There is nothing wrong with what he says, and indeed I learned much from the commentary that is not in Austin; but there are losses too.

What struck me most about the notes on *Cael.* 13, however, is not so much what Dyck or Austin says that the other does not, but that neither one

says anything at all about the style and rhythm of the passage as a whole: not just the brilliant set of rhetorical questions at the beginning of the section and the equally impressive set of adverbial phrases (*cum tristibus severe...*) at the end, but that the two sets balance one another and that within each set there are parallel pairs of prepositional phrase + comparative adjective (the rhetorical questions) or prepositional phrase + adverb (the phrases) that are balanced against one another, often producing rhyme and often isosyllabic (thus *in rapacitate avarior . . . in largitione effusior*, each 5+4 syllables; or *cum tristibus severe, cum remissis iucunde*, each 3+3 syllables). This failure surprises one in Austin, who is much more inclined to explain stylistic brilliance or irony. It does not surprise one in Dyck: when he does comment on stylistic technique, he generally does no more than label it.

At times, moreover, what they see is different. Dyck's greater emphasis on historical or biographical context sometimes is irrelevant to one's understanding of the speech (e.g. the detailed prosopographical note at §32 on Cn. Domitius, the president of the court), but at times adds point and texture to Cicero's words: on Appius Claudius Caecus' indignant reference to his aqueduct (§34), Austin merely identifies it, while Dyck shows that Caecus is assimilating himself to an *aquariolus*, a slave who brought water for whores. On the other hand, on the famous phrase Cicero uses to describe Clodia, *muliere non solum nobili verum etiam nota* (§31), Dyck gives a cross-reference to an earlier discussion of *nobilis* (in its technical sense) and adduces the Funeral Oration as parallel to *nota*. Neither half of this is useful or even relevant; what Austin gives is a much more interesting parallel to uses of *nobilis* to describe prostitutes.

Clodia, inevitably, brings one to Catullus—but not in Dyck's edition. The sum total of what he says on that score is a single sentence in the introduction at the end of his discussion of Clodia (p.14): "Since antiquity Clodia has also been identified as the Lesbia of Catullus' love poems (Apul. *Ap.* 10), an identification widely accepted by scholars but contested in some quarters; the question is complex and cannot be settled here." The sentence is accompanied by a footnote including references to the work of Wiseman and Skinner on either side of the question. Yes indeed, it is not certain which Clodia should be identified with Lesbia, but even Wiseman, who opposed the traditional identification with Clodia Metelli, knew that it was *a* Clodia and that the sisters had similar characters and experiences (including incest with their brother). The prosopographical problems will never be definitively solved: not just Lesbia, but whether either or both of the Caelius and Rufus in Catullus should be identified with the M. Caelius Rufus of this speech. But that is no excuse at all for leaving the evidence of Catullus out entirely. Austin noted (in his long discussion of *urbanitas* on §6) that "The best picture of what was meant by the *homo urbanus* as a type may be seen in the poems of Catullus," and he was absolutely right. But not on this passage, not on the caricature of Clodius, not on any of the passages about Clodia does Dyck say anything worthwhile

about the manners and language (other than a reference to Krostenko) of the social circles in which Caelius, Catullus, and both Clodias moved. It is hard to imagine any reasonable explanation for Dyck's reticence in this regard, and there is certainly no excuse for it in a book intended for use by students. Indeed, there are times when one suspects that Dyck has no sense of his audience at all. His preface begins abruptly with a very technical discussion of the charge of *vis* and the nature of the *quaestio* procedure, and it is hard to imagine an aspect of this speech less likely to draw a student (or even scholar) into the book. (Anecdotal evidence: one student I know, on starting to read Dyck's introduction, turned back a page thinking something was missing. It is, but that was apparently deliberate.)

In some ways, the sheer dullness of Dyck's exposition and his avoidance of anything that calls for aesthetic judgment or historical speculation is a real gift to someone using his edition in a classroom: he has done all the dirty work, and leaves the fun parts to the teacher (although I rather doubt that was his intention). But a further feature of this edition, almost certainly the fault of Cambridge University Press and the editors of the series rather than of Dyck himself, will remain an obstacle to classroom use. In the first place, the organization of the lemmata: most of the time, notes are introduced with a long lemma shortened to unintelligibility by heavy ellipsis. Thus, the second sentence of §39, which occupies 6 ½ lines of text in Dyck's edition, is reduced to six words: *ego, si quis . . . atque ornatum puto*. And although there are further bold-faced lemmata that excerpt bits of this sentence, there are also subordinate comments (e.g. on *robore*) that have no head-word to place them in the text and which will require the student (and the teacher) to flip madly back and forth between text and commentary to understand what Dyck is talking about. What is more, finding one's place in the text is even harder than finding one's place in the commentary. In his earlier edition of the *Catilinarians*, each section of the text was provided with line numbers, which were used in the commentary for greater ease of reference. No such line numbers here (or in Dyck's edition of *Pro Roscio*); and it might be noted that the sentence that takes 6 ½ lines in Dyck takes 8 lines in Austin and the OCT, and that in this edition the bottom margin of the page is smaller, and on average 1-2 more lines of text or commentary are jammed into the page than in earlier Green and Yellows. That, as I say, is obviously not Dyck's fault, but it is a serious problem in using this edition, particularly in a class. I will certainly use it, since despite what I have said in most of this review, what Dyck gives us is serious, careful, and reliable, and his work shows very clearly what Austin's commentary lacked. But Dyck's book is not only less expensive than Austin's; thanks to the Press, it is also much cheaper.

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JOHN BRISCOE, *A Commentary on Livy Books 41-45*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 844 ISBN13: 978-0-19-921664-2.

This is the last of a series of commentaries on the later books of Livy, starting with 31-33 in 1973, followed by 34-7 in 1981 and 38-40 in 2008. Though B[riscoe] has published on and edited other Latin authors—notably the Teubner edition of Valerius Maximus—he is to a considerable extent a one-author scholar. That shows in the depth of expertise and familiarity which he brings to his Livy.

Because this is the fourth in B.'s series of commentaries on Livy, and because (as will become clear) it is inextricably entwined with his career of research on the Paduan historian, in this review I will treat matters not historical but historiographical, asking three primary questions: (1) does this Livian text—books 41-45, covering the years 178/7 through 167/6—demand a particular kind of commentary? (2) What kind of text does B. give us and what kind of questions does he ask of and about it? (3) What kind of audience does B. write for, and what kind of text/author does he present?

First, does Livy demand a particular kind of commentary? B.'s commentaries are not titled or even subtitled “historical”, and he has consistently concerned himself as much with textual as with historical questions. There are special problems entailed in dealing with an ancient historical text, of course: in establishing (or agreeing on) a text to be commented upon, one has not only to produce a “good” Latin text, but one that reproduces in some degree what an editor thinks the historian thought happened in the external reality to which that text claims to refer. How do you do that? There is an uneasy triangulation between (1) what “really” happened (often reconstructed with the very text one is editing, especially when—as with some years of Livy—that work is the only textual evidence), (2) what the ancient historian believed to have happened (which may or may not be identical with [1]), and (3) the pressures put on reader and historian alike by the norms and code of the genre—which may not affect (1) but certainly determines how the ancient writer expounds (2), and must affect how the modern commentator understands both (1) and (2). B. is especially interested in restoring the sense of what Livy wrote, and so must also try to understand what really happened to measure that narrative against it. Some examples: “[T]his must mean that the tabula was in the shape of Sardinia and that it contained pictures of battles.... One wonders, though, whether this correctly represents the facts” (149 on 41.28.10). “[N]either *parere* nor *adparere*.... is used in the sense of ‘report for duty’: in any case, it is

much more likely that Perseus told his army to get ready to march than to report for it" (340 on 42.52.14). "Hippias and Pantauchus are described as *principes amicorum* and *princeps amicorum* also ... though ... L. [also] writes *primos amicos*. L. probably did not realize that προῶτοι φίλοι were a particular class of Hellenistic courtiers" (538 on 44.23.2). Anyone who has read a lot of historical/textual commentary on Livy will immediately recognize how charitable this is to the ancient author. B. really does take Livy as he finds him: confused where he may well have been so (e.g. 43.12.5, "A puzzlingly expressed passage"), but generally thoughtful and deserving of attention. Not infrequently (e.g. 610) he notes in response to earlier textual critics that Livy "could have written thus, but he did not do so." That said, even considering books of Livy that cover non-legendary periods, there is room for other kinds of commentary. B. fits neatly into the OUP Livy write large (Ogilvie – Oakley – Briscoe); it is unfortunate, in my view, that there are no other options with which to engage B. (My own work on Livy 6 is too far afield from B. in both Livian and scholarly areas, but it might suggest a parallel track of interpretation and analysis.)

That B. himself edited these books of Livy (for Teubner in 1986) means that he is often editing a Livy of his own making, especially given the dreadful state of the text of this pentad. Commentators may come to believe that they come upon questions in the text that need answering, but in fact they themselves ask those questions. What kind of questions does B. pose to this/his Livy? Some things he is *not* interested in (and this reader, at any rate, rejoiced): the evolution of Livy's style (though B. does give some examples of word distribution across the *History*, e.g. 125 on 41.23.18 *immaturus*, 569 on 44.32.5 *aduentare*); its relationship to the styles of Cicero or Sallust as an index of Livy's political or moral stance on anything; mocking Livy's translation of Polybius (problems are noted at e.g. 104-5, 128, but the solution is not always to blame Livy's Greek); condemning Livy as a historian or overpracticing *Quellenforschung*. B. takes it for granted that one will "naturally" prefer Polybius (615)—though he does not say why—but that is pretty mild given the kind of pejorative rhetoric about Livy the Historian that is still easily found in the literature.

Apart from the history of the period and reconstructing the text, the areas in which B. is interested include figures of repetition, rhetorical devices, synchronism (invariably referred to as *autoschediasm*, which he defines as a "false chronological link," p10), sentence structure, prosopography, adversative asyndeton, chronology, and types of scribal error. The last is particularly impressive: taking a relatively random set of pages, B. has useful notes suggesting the cause of MS corruption on pp631, 632, 633, 636, 638, 639, 640, 642, 644, 647, 648. The commentary is worth close attention for these notes alone, especially for a student or scholar seeking to understand how good texts go bad.

What kind of reader, finally, is envisioned for this commentary? First of all, a discerning one: not only will he naturally prefer Polybius, he understands that “no one could imagine” that a particular adjective went with the (grammatically possible but wrong) noun in a sentence; he accepts that some repetitions “are of no significance” (584), some assonances “unmotivated” (91). Secondly, it will be a reader who is not bothered by finding the ancient author of this text a little elusive. B.’s Livy is definitely Augustan (comparisons with *Res Gestae* 34 recur), and he has certain linguistic and historiographical habits—though these are apparently more usefully explicated by being noted than via the more overtly interpretative methods of metahistory and other unpersuasive approaches. B. often, in fact, gives us lists without much interpretation. L.’s frequent use of *spectaculum* is noted but the idea or implications of “spectacle” in Livy’s or other historiographical texts is not explored; the frequent autoschediasms are not interpreted, nor is the often-flagged “ecphrastic idiom.” The famous *antiquus animus* (43.13.2) is explicated by a reference to an earlier note (42.50.7) that explicitly says that 43.13.2 is different from itself, but does not say how—nor is this, unfortunately, the only such instance of a note chasing its own tail. I do understand that a commentary, especially one as crowded as this one, cannot do everything; but B. sees so many things in L., on both the micro and the macro levels, that it is frustrating not to know why we should look closely at them, too.

The chief trouble here is that it is often hard to tell who we are in fact reading. For B. tells us far more about scholars of Livy—their working methods, their frailties, their anxieties—than he does about the historian. And the writer about whom we learn the most is, in fact, the commentator. The problem is exacerbated by three things: no text of Livy is included (this is OUP’s style for these large commentaries); the text the commentary is keyed to is B.’s; and this commentary explicitly and repeatedly regards itself as a continuation of the earlier B. volumes—to the extent that we may be told that a given discussion continues the discussion from earlier volumes (e.g. 29 n.29), and the book ends with *addenda and corrigenda* both to itself (777-8) and to the previous volume (775-7). By necessity we are reading Livy through B., but often, it seems, we are reading—or, better, our attention is being directed toward—not Livy but B. himself.

B., and the readers of this commentary even more than of his earlier ones, are caught between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, it is impossible not to make mistakes; on the other, scholarly discourse demands that mistakes be pointed out. B. tells you if you are wrong, and it does not matter whether you are dead or not (so we learn a lot of useful tips about understanding Madvig, e.g., and his “excess[es] of logicity,” 272, 626 etc.). He remains his own favorite target, however, whether he is trying to rectify his errors in transcription, mistakes in judgment, failures to see things, inadvertences

(e.g. 373 n.2 “In my apparatus I wrongly, and perhaps not deliberately...”), or even his failures in generosity to fellow scholars. There are glimpses of an almost physical struggle: “if forced,” he says more than once, he might—obelize. Ultimately his abundant self-criticism threatens to swamp the voice of the guide. But it also balances out the abundant rhetoric of “clearly”s and “but in fact”s and “should not be seen”s, “no justification”s, “obvious”s, and “quite unnecessary”s that populate this commentary landscape – the kind of rhetoric of clarity that this reader, at least, often suspects of marking gaps in the argument or possible fudge.

B. does not knowingly fudge. But he does shy away from many kinds of reading that threaten to take one too far away from the (always absent, always desired) text of Livy. And though he tries to nail this text down, he knows that others may—will—take the roads he clears in different directions from his own, just as he knows that Livy “could have written this way” but need not have. To a certain extent, his relentless self abuse reminds us of that: there will always be another question to answer about Livy, however much one thinks one’s first, or second, or third analysis marks the end. B. ends this *magnum opus* with a very Livian, forward looking gesture: “For the resumption of the war, which resulted in a Pergamene victory, see Walbank 454 (it is uncertain whether it belongs to 167 or 166); there is no mention of it in the *periocha* of book 46” (765). Despite the differences between my Livy and this one, I hope that these last words are not B.’s last word on the matter.

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OVIDIO, *Metamorfosi*, vol. V (libri X-XII), a cura di Joseph D. Reed, traduzione di Gioachino Chiarini, Milano: Fondazione Lorenzo Valla / Arnoldo Mondadori editore, 2013, XLVI-446 pp, ISBN 9788804626930

L'edizione Valla delle *Metamorfosi* di Ovidio è arrivata al quinto volume (dei sei complessivi previsti). Include i libri X-XII dell'opera ovidiana ed è stato curato da Joseph Reed (i volumi precedenti sono stati curati da Alessandro Barchiesi, coordinatore dell'intera serie [libri I-II, 2005], Giampiero Rosati e lo stesso Barchiesi [libri III-V, 2007], Rosati [libri V-VI, 2009] e Edward J. Kenney [libri VII-X, 2011]). Il volume comprende una breve introduzione (pp. XV-XXI), il testo ovidiano con traduzione italiana a fronte (pp. 9-161) ed un ampio commento (pp. 165-446). La traduzione, come già nei volumi III e IV, è opera di Gioachino Chiarini (nei primi due volumi la traduzione di Ovidio era della compianta Ludovica Koch).

Nell'essenziale ma densa introduzione Reed porta il lettore *in medias res*, delineando gli schemi narratologici che caratterizzano questa sezione dell'opera ovidiana. Protagonista della prima parte di essa è Orfeo, che dopo la definitiva perdita di Euridice narra una serie di vicende fra le quali spiccano quelle di Giacinto, Pigmalione ed Adone (libro X). Dopo la morte di Orfeo ad opera delle Menadi, il poema si sofferma sulla vicenda di Mida ed introduce poi il ciclo troiano, con la narrazione della fondazione della città e delle imprese di Peleo. La sezione centrale del libro XI è occupata dalle metamorfosi narrate da Ceice e dalla vicenda dello stesso Ceice e di Alcione. Alla fine del libro fa la sua comparsa Priamo, anche se la vicenda di Troia sarà narrata solo nel libro XIII: il libro XII è in larga parte occupato dal flashback di Nestore sulla battaglia fra Centauri e Lapiti. Solo nella parte finale la narrazione si sposta sulla morte di Achille e sulla disputa fra Ulisse ed Aiace, tema ripreso e concluso nel libro XIII.

Nel commento Reed è particolarmente a suo agio con le vicende narrate: sono ben noti i suoi lavori sulla vicenda di Adone e più in generale la sua competenza non solo letteraria ma anche mitografica. Le note di commento sono ben articolate e facilmente consultabili, come negli altri volumi di questa edizione ovidiana: esse forniscono al lettore non solo un indispensabile ausilio per la lettura dei versi ovidiani, ma anche strumenti critici e bibliografici per ulteriori approfondimenti. Reed riepiloga efficacemente lo stato degli studi sulle diverse questioni ed utilizza opportunamente i commenti precedenti (anche il pregevole commento di Luigi Galasso incluso nell'edizione ovidiana di Einaudi, pubblicata nel 2000).

Il testo, come è d'uso nella collana, è corredato da un sintetico apparato, introdotto da una breve nota critica (pp. XLV-XLVI). Fin dal primo volume

l'edizione Valla si è basata sul testo delle *Metamorfosi* stabilito da Tarrant nell'edizione oxoniense (2004), lasciando liberi i curatori dei singoli volumi di apportare le modifiche che ritenevano opportune. Reed si è allontanato dal testo di Tarrant in una decina di casi, sui quali mi soffermo brevemente.

Una parte degli interventi riguarda uno degli aspetti più discussi dell'edizione di Tarrant, quello delle espunzioni. Nel libro X due espunzioni proposte da Merkel ed accolte da Tarrant interessano il discorso diretto che Ovidio fa pronunciare ad Apollo dopo l'accidentale morte di Giacinto: i vv. 200-1, nei quali Apollo «passa a razionalizzare» (come osserva Galasso, *comm. cit.*, p. 1295) il senso di colpa per la morte di Giacinto, *quae mea culpa tamen? Nisi si lusisse vocari / culpa potest, nisi culpa potest et amasse vocari*; ed i vv. 205-8, nei quali Apollo preannuncia la successiva vicenda di Aiace, dal cui sangue nasce un giacinto (13.396-8). Per la prima espunzione Reed (p. 213) osserva che la considerazione di Apollo, «retoricamente opportunistica», ricalca un passaggio usuale nei monologhi delle eroine sofferenti. Avrebbe meritato quale osservazione la lezione *pro te* al v. 202, dove parte della tradizione legge *merito*, lezione difesa con argomenti interessanti da Galasso (*comm. cit.* p. 1295). La seconda espunzione è scartata da Reed (p. 214) in considerazione del parallelo con il v. 728, dove Venere commemora Adone con il riferimento alla metamorfosi in fiore, e della inusuale ripetizione di *ore* in fine di esametro che sarebbe determinata dall'espunzione.

Tarrant espunge anche il v. 10.549, dove Venere mette in guardia Adone dal cacciare animali feroci, che non sarebbero colpiti dalla sua bellezza: *non movet aetas / nec facies nec quae Venerem leones / saetigerosque sues oculosque animosque ferarum* (vv. 547-9). Per Tarrant si tratterebbe di un'interpolazione suggerita dal successivo riferimento a cinghiali e leoni (vv. 550-1: *fulmen habent acres in aduncis dentibus apri, / impetus est fulvis et vasta leonibus ira*), ma il verso espunto, come nota Reed (pp. 275-76), «è sufficientemente efficace», crea un parallelo chiastico ai vv. successivi, e preannuncia le successive vicende di Adone e Atalanta.

A 10.637, Atalanta colpita d'amore per Ippomene, Tarrant pubblica *quod facit ignorans amat et non sentit amorem*, dove *quod* è lezione del Sangallensis 866, contro il *quid* degli altri codici. Reed preferisce restaurare l'interrogativa (già difesa da Possanza nella sua rec. di Tarrant in *BMCR* 2005-06-27): nella nota di commento spiega l'uso dell'indicativo ed afferma che *quod* è solo un «equivalente più debole della domanda indiretta» (p. 286).

Altri casi in cui Reed modifica il testo di Tarrant sono presenti nel libro XI. Al v. 464 Alcione vede Ceice *stantem ... in puppe recurva*: così Tarrant, mentre Reed (p. 348) preferisce a *recurva* la variante *relicta*, che considera *lectio difficilior* e funzionale al punto di vista di Alcione, che assiste con dolore alla partenza dell'amato. Dopo la partenza di Ceice, a 11.472, Alcione si abbandona sul letto, *renovat lectusque torusque*: così il testo di Tarrant, dove *torusque* è congettura di Gronovius ed Housmann (ma attestata già

nel sec. XIII) in luogo di *locusque* della maggior parte dei codici. Lo stesso Tarrant mostra qualche dubbio sulla propria scelta, in quanto in apparato accompagna la lezione dei codici con la notazione «fort. recte» ed il rinvio ad un paio di luoghi ovidiani. Reed (p. 349) pubblica senz'altro *locusque* ed osserva che la correzione è «fuorviante» e che la lezione trádita denota efficacemente il dolore di Alcione, suscitato dalla vista del letto ma anche «della camera da letto o anche dell'intero palazzo».

L'espunzione dei vv. 510-3 (di Merkel, ripresa da Tarrant) è condivisa da Reed, per l'oscurità e la durezza che caratterizzano il passo: le onde che colpiscono la nave di Ceice sono paragonata ai leoni che si avventano contro i cacciatori: *sic, ubi se ventis admiserat unda coortis, / ibat in arma ratis multoque erat altior illis*. Così il testo di Reed, dove *arma* (che riecheggia il v. 511, dove i leoni si avventano *in arma*) sarebbe un «riferimento metaforico a qualche aspetto della struttura della nave come le vele o l'apparato del timone» (p. 353), che l'onda sommergerebbe portandosi più in alto. In considerazione del fatto che si tratta di un'interpolazione, e non del testo ovidiano, appare forse più convincente la correzione *in alta* proposta da Shackleton Bailey e ripresa da Tarrant, che fa di *ratis* il soggetto, per cui la nave sarebbe scagliata più in alto delle stesse onde: un'amplificazione dell'immagine dell'imbarcazione che cavalca l'onda proposta da Ovidio al v. 503.

A 11.674 Alcione piange e muove le braccia nel sonno: *ingemit Alcione; lacrimas movet atque lacertos*. Così il testo di Tarrant, il quale non esclude però, in apparato, la possibilità di accogliere la variante *lacrimans* («fort. recte»). Reed accetta questa variante ed accogliere l'emendamento con cui Gronovius correggeva il trádito *movet atque: ingemit Alcione lacrimans motatque lacertos*. Ambedue gli interventi appaiono condivisibili: *lacrimans* elimina l'incongruo zeugma dove *move* *lacrimas* sarebbe riferito al soggetto, e non (come d'uso) ad altra persona. L'emendamento di Gronovius, che pure Reed accoglie «con esitazione» (p. 367), ha il pregio di eliminare una difficoltà conseguente all'adozione di *lacrimans*, e cioè l'anomala posizione di *atque*.

Nel libro XI Reed contesta un'ulteriore espunzione di Tarrant, che era stata motivata dall'editore già in *HSCP* del 2000 (pp. 429-30): quella dei vv. 600-1, dove è descritto il silenzio che regna nella dimora del Sonno: *non fera, non pecudes non moti flamine rami / humanaeve sonum reddunt convicia linguae*. Un'espunzione che Reed ritiene «senza un motivo valido», non giustificata dai paralleli lessicali addotti da Tarrant e sconsigliata dal fatto che la descrizione è funzionale alla localizzazione remota del Sonno.

Nel libro XII il testo di Tarrant è modificato al v. 167, dove è segnalata l'invulnerabilità di Cigno: *invictumque a vulnere erat ferrumque terebat*. La lezione dei codici è *feribat*, modificata in *terebat* da alcuni correttori medievali: correzione accolta non solo da Tarrant, ma anche da numerosi editori precedenti (Merkel, Anderson e altri). Reed osserva che *terebat*

«dovrebbe riferirsi a un graduale consumarsi, non al danno istantaneo» (p. 398), e preferisce la lezione trádita *ferebat* («sopportava»), che avrebbe anche il pregio di produrre un gioco di parole fra *fero* e *ferrum* analogo a quello che si può osservare a *met.* 13.91-2. Ma in questo caso *terebat* sembra più adeguato all'invulnerabilità che caratterizza Cigno e alla sua capacità miracolosa di rimediare ai colpi inferti contro di lui («ottundesse il ferro» traduce Paduano nell'ed. Einaudi). Un'ulteriore modifica del testo di Tarrant, ma semplicemente editoriale, è costituita dall'inserzione nel testo, con segno di espunzione (e non in apparato, come fa Tarrant), di 12.434-438, un'evidente interpolazione testimoniata da una parte dei codici.

Nel complesso quella di Reed è un'intelligente revisione del testo di Tarrant, che si unisce all'eccellente commento che egli ha allestito dei libri delle *Metamorfosi* pubblicati nel volume.

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THOMAS RIESENWEBER (ed.), *C. Marius Victorinus, Commenta in Ciceronis Rhetorica*, Bibliotheca Teubneriana, Berlin/Boston: Walter De Gruyter, 2013, pp. xxviii + 264, ISBN 978-3-11-031359-8.

En 1863 se publicaban por primera vez en la Bibliotheca Teubneriana los *Commenta* de Mario Victorino en un monumental volumen dedicado a los *Rhetores latini minores*, a cargo de K. Halm, con el añadido del *Incerti auctoris tractatus de attributis personae et negotio*. Han tenido que pasar 150 años para que la colección produjera una nueva edición, ahora ya individual, de esta obra del cristiano del siglo IV, con la inclusión del *Incerti auctoris tractatus*. Su responsable es Thomas Riesenweber, un todavía joven investigador alemán, que ya ha dado muestras, sin embargo, de una sólida formación y de una madurez filológica propias quizá de personas con más experiencia.

Quedan de los *Commenta* 59 manuscritos que transmitan la totalidad o la mayor parte de la obra. Pues bien, entre los méritos que permiten colegir que el *opus* de T. Riesenweber es extraordinario destaca el que se ha preocupado por consultarlos todos, ya sea físicamente, ya sea en imágenes, aunque no haya podido con dos de los más recientes, según manifiesta (xvi). Lo mismo ha hecho con todas las ediciones precedentes, como era lógico, por antiguas que fueran. Porque, a todo esto, entre la edición de Halm y la suya, tan solo una rompió el silencio del tiempo transcurrido, la también muy meritoria de A. Ippolito de 2006 para la casa Brepols, aunque esta no se realizó sobre la base de todos los manuscritos disponibles. Mas de todos los editores que le preceden obtiene beneficio Riesenweber, lo que honra más su trabajo y lo hace más valioso: aquí y allá *laudantur* los unos y los otros en el aparato crítico por sus intuiciones y aportaciones, en general, a la mejora del texto.

La obra, como es habitual en la *Bibliotheca Teubneriana*, consta de *Praefatio* (vii-xviii), *Index editionum et commentationum* (xix-xxv), *Conspectus siglorum* (xxvi-xxviii), el texto propiamente dicho (1-220), *Index locorum* (221-226), *Index nominum* (227-229) e *Index rerum et uerborum* (229-264).

La *Praefatio*, como también es habitual, es muy breve, tanto más cuanto que el autor ha preparado, aparte, dos volúmenes de comentario a la obra (*C. Marius Victorinus, "Commenta in Ciceronis Rhetorica". Prolegomena und Kritischer Kommentar*), que aparecerán a finales de este año (2014) en la misma casa De Gruyter. El primero de ellos (*Prolegomena*) estará dedicado a la descripción de los diferentes manuscritos y a las relaciones que existen entre ellos; en el segundo (*Kritischer Kommentar*) ofrecerá

explicaciones tendentes a justificar las distintas lecturas adoptadas, en función de las variantes, así como de las diversas conjeturas que propone. En esta *Praefatio*, por lo demás redactada en latín, siguiendo la más añeja tradición de la crítica textual y de la colección que publica la obra, se hace una sucinta revisión de los principales manuscritos supervivientes y de las relaciones que parecen haber mantenido entre sí, de las fuentes comunes que pueden conjeturarse para unos y otros, a tenor de los errores comunes que muestran... Todo ello se refleja claramente en un *stemma codicum*, a la vieja usanza (xi). Siguen unas cuantas consideraciones sobre cuestiones ortográficas que justifican la adopción de determinadas grafías que pudieran chocar al lector; otras sobre los *lemmata* que preceden a las explicaciones de Victorino y que, en ocasiones, se confunden con ellas; otras sobre los aparatos críticos que contiene la obra, uno de los cuales contiene las fuentes de Victorino, mientras que el otro muestra las distintas lecturas de los códices. Al respecto del aparato crítico propiamente dicho, cabe decir que es de tipo positivo, lo que facilita muy mucho su lectura y comprensión, a pesar de que pueda en ocasiones, cuando el texto al que se refiere es amplio, resultar recargado. El otro, el de fuentes, es completísimo, como no podía ser de otro modo, e incluye en muchas ocasiones referencias de autores más recientes.

En el *Index editionum et commentationum* (xix-xxv) se nos ofrece la relación escuetísima (autor, lugar y año) de las ediciones precedentes (xix) y de obras referidas a Mario Victorino, al *De inuentione* de Cicerón, al *De attributis personae et negotio* o a ediciones de otros autores que se mencionan en el aparato crítico, a propósito de distintos autores latinos, por cuyo orden alfabético se ordenan. El *Conspectus siglorum* (xxvi-xxviii) pone fin a esta parte de la obra.

Tras los textos editados, el libro se completa con dos índices. El primero es un *Index locorum* (221-229), que reúne todas las citas que hace el propio Victorino, con excepción, claro está, de las del propio tratado *De inuentione* que comenta. El otro es un *Index rerum et uerborum* (229-264), que incluye términos latinos y griegos (a veces ambos en la misma entrada), así como expresiones técnicas de interés para la materia. Su amplitud y densidad es el mejor aval de su utilidad.

Por lo que se refiere al texto propiamente dicho, lo primero que hay que destacar es la pulcritud con que ha sido editado: difícilmente se encontrará una errata. Luego, la gran cantidad de cambios introducidos en él en aras de hacerlo claramente mejor, a pesar de lo reciente que estaba aún la edición de Ippolito. Las intervenciones del editor en el texto abarcan todas las posibilidades: adiciones, seclusiones, mejoras tomadas de manuscritos, *scripturae*, conjeturas, mejoras en la puntuación, transposiciones. Al margen, hay un contingente de propuestas y sugerencias en el aparato crítico que no llegan a plasmarse en el texto.

El resultado es, como digo, un texto que parece muy mejorado con respecto a las ediciones precedentes. Sería muy largo enumerar el catálogo de aciertos que, en mi opinión, adornan el trabajo de Riesenweber, pero también sería injusto no hacer alusión a algunos. Unas veces se justifican por el sentido común, otras por comparación con pasajes del propio Victorino o de Cicerón, otras se avienen al estilo del autor. Cada uno tiene su propia enjundia.

Así, por ejemplo, me parecen acertadas intervenciones como la frase que borra en 15.11 s. (página 15, líneas 11 y siguiente) (*immo grauitatem ad sententias, suauitatem ad uerborum ornamenta referamus*); la corrección al texto de Halm en 23.8 al escribir *auxesin* en lugar de *auxesis in*; la adición de *quidam* en 39.26 en una laguna señalada por Zwierlein; el cambio que hace en 59.23 s., donde escribe *circa definitionis numerum* en lugar de *circa definitionem numeri*; la frase que borra en 68.7 ss.; la corrección de *ut* por *id* en 83.29; el establecimiento de una pequeña laguna en 87.14 y la sugerencia que hace en el aparato crítico (*nec deus prior est*); la escritura en 97.11 de *numeratas* por *nominatas*; el cambio en 102.7 de *Haec quidem* en lugar de *Haec quaedam*; la adición en 133.9 s. de *aeque firmum*; la eliminación en 135.26 de *facta et dicta*; la corrección en 146.22 de *temporis* por *tempore*; la eliminación en 164.16 de la frase *id est fides sine arte* y en 167.21 de la palabra *defnitiua*; la escritura en 170.8 de *discrepant* en lugar de *discrepauit*; la transposición de *ex* en 172.23; la escritura en 194.31-195.1 de *si uidebunt* en lugar de *sibi debebunt* o la de *fortunae* en lugar de *fortuna* en 216.4. Hay, naturalmente, muchas más intervenciones acertadas en el texto, a veces de detalle, pero no es posible dar cuenta de todas.

Son pocas las ocasiones en las que, como lector, he dudado del criterio de Riesenweber. A continuación, voy a examinar algunas, aunque previa advertencia de que todas ellas son perfectamente discutibles y en ninguna pueda decir que tenga la seguridad de estar en lo cierto.

En 12.9 añade Riesenweber al texto un *aliud* del modo siguiente:

Ergo primum sit illum solum honestum, quod per se placet nulla adiuncta gratia, <aliud> hoc medium honestum ciuile, quod utilitate est; tertia sit commoditas, quae solis lucris intenta es abiecta omni honestate.

Admitiendo, como creo que hay que admitir con el editor, que en una cadena de este tipo en la que se da una correlación ordinal *primum...*, <...>, *tertia*, hay que esperar un término que introduzca el segundo miembro, estimo que la forma adecuada no sería *aliud*, sino *alterum*, que tiene el valor de dual, añadido al de alteridad, que le permite adquirir ese sentido ordinal en secuencias semejantes del propio Cicerón (*Verr.* 2, 4, 129; *Cluent.* 178; etc.) y otros autores clásicos. Claro que también es cierto que Victorino, en 67.22 y ss., aunque introduciendo distintos y densos párrafos, escribe:

Ergo tria genera narrationis esse dicit: unum, quod sit in causae expositione... (...) Aliud genus narrationis est, quod extra causam est (...) Tertium genus narrandi est, quod extra oratorem est.

Cabe pensar en un uso propio de la época (también se encuentra en Mauro Servio Honorato, s. IV), aunque sea extraño en un autor como Victorino, tan ciceroniano. Creo, en todo caso, que en el pasaje que nos ocupa no hubiera estado de más plantear en el aparato crítico la posibilidad de que tal vez hubiera escrito *alterum*.

En 29.6 s. el editor hace una transposición:

Cum enim exhortor, nihil persuadeo, sed uolentem aliquid ut magis uelit instigo; et cum dehortor, [nolentem aliquid] non tunc primum persuadeo ut nolit, sed <nolentem aliquid> ut magis nolit instigo.

El cambio, desde luego, tiene sentido, aunque solo por el paralelismo que permite ofrecer entre las dos partes de la frase, no porque añada algún matiz de contenido nuevo al texto. Dicho esto, hay que decir entonces que el texto también tiene sentido sin hacer la transposición y permite, además, conferir al autor un margen de libertad creativa al proponernos una especie de acusativo proléptico que rompe el paralelismo de las frases. Creo que no debería adoptarse el cambio, aunque sí indicarse su posibilidad en el aparato crítico, como hace otras veces Riesenweber.

En 37.19 quedan unas cruces en el texto, en las que se inscribe un término griego:

Alii hanc constitutionem *realem* uocarunt, quod enim quaeratur, utrum res, de qua agitur, facta esse uideatur; alii †stadiazon† Graeco quidem uocabulo, quod enim de incerto inuestigando...

No traigo aquí a colación el pasaje porque crea que puedo aportar alguna luz sobre él, sino porque, si no me equivoco, contiene la única palabra griega transcrita en caracteres latinos. En otros lugares, incluso cuando los manuscritos transcriben en caracteres latinos, los editores adoptan los griegos. Quizá también aquí Riesenweber hubiera debido hacer lo mismo, o sea, adoptar caracteres griegos.

En 43.14 Riesenweber escribe:

Ergo tollit duo (id est nec unum esse nec nullum), ut id, quod reliquum est, adprobetur: nullum, inquit, causae genus esse non potes dicere; nam quia artes scribis multasque dicis esse causas, nullum non potes dicere: tollit rem unam.

Los manuscritos transmiten unánimemente *qui artes scribis*, pero el editor, sobre la base de la comparación con 112.2, donde se lee una frase similar: *Nullum, inquit, causae genus esse non potes dicere, quia artis praecepta das...* decide cambiar el texto y poner *quia artes scribis*. Pese a ello, en este caso el paralelismo no es exacto, pues ni las palabras son las mismas ni pertenecen al mismo locutor, ya que estas están puestas en boca de un interlocutor, mientras que las primeras son del propio Victorino. La modificación, pues, me parece cuando menos discutible. Quizá debería haberse propuesto en el aparato crítico.

En 65.9 el editor cambia un *fuertis* por *fuertas*:

Postremo docet, quo pacto beniuolentiam nobis a iudicibus comparemus, si forte ipsi iudices defatigati fuerint multos audiendo. Primo, inquit, oportebit polliceri breuius te quam fueras esse dicturum.

En este caso tenemos una oración comparativa en dependencia de una completiva de infinitivo: “En primer lugar, lo oportuno será que prometas que vas a hablar más brevemente de lo que...” En este tipo de oraciones no está claro, ni siquiera en latín clásico, qué modo debe adoptarse. Parece que, dado el valor de la conjunción *quam*, que se comporta como si fuera coordinante, esperaríamos más bien un infinitivo; sin embargo, se observa que este modo alterna ocasionalmente con el subjuntivo, pero nunca con el indicativo. Por esta razón, no veo motivo para escribir aquí el indicativo que presentan algunos manuscritos, en lugar del subjuntivo de otros, que, por lo demás, se entiende muy bien: “...de lo que lo hayas sido”.

Algo parecido ocurre en 188.5:

Contra haec defensor conuersione utetur horum, maxime autem ut defendat uoluntatem et augeat quod uoluntati fuit impedimento, et doceat nihil amplius se potuisse facere quam fecit.

Y lo mismo en 189.8:

Subiungit praecepta, primo eius, qui ut ignoscatur postulat: ut sua beneficia commemoret, si qua habuerit in uita praeterita, et ea doceat esse maiora quam est factum, unde reus est.

En ambos casos tenemos sendos indicativos, *fecit* y *est* tras *quam*, también como segundos términos de comparativas insertas en completivas de infinitivo, donde cabría esperar o bien infinitivo o bien subjuntivo en latín clásico. De ahí que Halm haga notar en su aparato crítico “*fecerit malim*” en el primer caso y que escriba directamente *sit* en el segundo, sobre

la base de un *eset* que aparece en algunos manuscritos. Lo que pudieran estar delatando esos *fecit* y *est* es la ignorancia al respecto del modo que estas oraciones debían adoptar ya desde antiguo; una ignorancia acrecentada con el paso de los siglos. En estos casos, estimo que lo más prudente es mantener el texto como está y, si hay posibilidad de escoger entre indicativo y subjuntivo como en 189.8, optar por el subjuntivo; en otras palabras, hacer lo que hizo Halm.

La meticulosidad de las correcciones de Riesenweber llega a extremos como el de cuestionar incluso la fuente de todas copias disponibles en detalles aparentemente insignificantes, como ocurre en 86.2, donde se lee:

Praenomen porro interdum una, interdum duabus, interdum tribus litteris continetur, ut C Gaius, ut CN Gnaeus, ut SEX Sextus,...

Los manuscritos transmiten *G Gaius*, *GN Gnaeus*. Creo que en este caso hubiera sido más prudente plantear el cambio en el aparato crítico, como hace otras veces, como una posibilidad, ya que, si bien estamos seguros de que la pronunciación de C era la de *Gaius*, no estamos tan seguros de que en la escritura papirácea o tal vez en pergamino ya, y no en la epigráfica, como era costumbre, la grafía de la abreviatura no fuera efectivamente G, como transmiten los manuscritos, y no C, como quiere el editor.

En 90.23 hace una adición al texto:

IN FORTVNA QVAERITVR] Hoc quasi naturae esse magis uidetur, ut <consideremus> *seruus quis an liber sit*; serui enim saepe nascuntur.

La inserción del *consideremus* parece basarse en el hecho de que más abajo el texto sí introduce dos interrogativas indirectas con ese verbo, mediante los giros *considerandum* y *considerare etiam debemus*. No obstante, hay diferencias entre una y otras: en el texto que nos ocupa ya hay un verbo introductor, *uidetur*, mientras que en los otros dos son esas formas las únicas que aparecen. Estimo, por ello, que una de dos: o se deja el texto como estaba, pues es comprensible o, si se añade algo, es *-trum* al *ut-* para completar la interrogativa indirecta: *Hoc quasi naturae esse magis uidetur, ut<trum> seruus quis an liber sit...* Y quizá lo más apropiado fuera plantear esta posibilidad como sugerencia en el aparato crítico, como hace otras veces: “*ut: an utrum scribendum?*”

En 93.10 introduce una nueva adición:

Verum haec per tria, inquit, tempora debemus inspicere: tunc enim de futuro argumentum possumus facere, si id ita et ante fuisse <et nunc esse> doceamus, ut puta: *Quia hoc fecit hoc facit, etiam hoc facturum est.*

Lo que quiere decir Victorino es que podemos obtener un argumento referido al futuro, si lo podemos sacar referido al pasado y al presente. De ahí que Riesenweber considere oportuna la adición <et nunc esse>, que establecería la referencia al presente, en coordinación con la referencia al pasado *et ante fuisse*. Sin embargo, estimo que el texto no precisa el añadido, simplemente si sobreentendemos una forma *esse* coordinada con *et ante fuisse* así: *si id ita (esse) et ante fuisse*. Lo que dice, entonces, Victorino es “si enseñamos que esto es y ha sido así”. No hace falta, pues, la adición.

En 107.25 Riesenweber propone otra adición:

neque enim potest inueniri nisi quod latet; est porro quod latet animaduertendum. <Quaerendum> itaque qui fuerint illi, qui primi illud fecerint, unde nunc agitur, qui deinde factum probauerint ac secuti sint.

En este caso, creo que tampoco hace falta el *Quaerendum*: con poner dos puntos tras *animaduertendum* se entiende que esta forma es la que rige de nuevo las interrogativas indirectas que siguen: “hay que descubrir lo que se esconde: en consecuencia, quiénes fueron aquellos de los que ahora se trata, quiénes aprobaron el hecho luego y lo siguieron”.

En 121.9 s. el editor propone un cambio bastante discutible:

De materia et argumento iam dictum est; nunc tertium illud est, ut de argumentatione dicamus, quae pertinet ad elocutionem et quam Cicero ex dialectica sumptam in *rhetorica* posuit *latiore*.

Los mejores manuscritos ofrecen la lectura *in rhetoricam posuit latiore*; una importante familia exhibe *rhetoricam... laxiore*; y un editor, Orelli, basándose en un manuscrito propuso *rhetorica... laxiore*. Riesenweber, sin embargo, prefiere el ablativo en ambas formas. Por mi parte, no veo motivo para ello y sí para optar por la lectura mayoritaria: *rhetoricam... latiore*. En efecto, la construcción *ponere aliquid in + ac.* es frecuente en latín clásico y puede tener el mismo sentido que *ponere aliquid in + abl.* La única diferencia entre ambas construcciones es que la de acusativo permite un sentido más amplio, aunque también incluye el de locativo propio de *in + abl.* En el pasaje en cuestión el empleo de *in + ac.*, especialmente en *latiore*, da lugar a más posibilidades de interpretación en su contexto, ya que podría referirse o a *rhetoricam* o a *quam*. Al revés, el uso de ablativo en las dos formas restringe drásticamente las posibilidades de interpretación, cosa que tal vez sea lo que pretende Riesenweber con su propuesta.

En 152.25 s. escribe lo siguiente:

(...ut uero in causis forensibus, <si> quis [cum] eum dicatur necasse, cuius heres non sit, sed tamen <se> sperarit heredem), accusatoris locus...

En esta ocasión Riesenweber añade *si* y elimina *cum*. Pero creo que no hay necesidad de una intervención tan drástica, si se echa un vistazo al aparato crítico. Basta con fijarse en la lectura de un conjunto de manuscritos que permiten inferir *cum quis* para que todo cuadre perfectamente sin añadir *si*: *cum quis eum dicatur necasse...*

En 158.22 tenemos otro caso de adición de texto discutible:

Sin uero est uita turpissima <ac> nullo genere defensionis supra posito purganda, locus communis induci debet:...

Desde luego, no diríamos que sobra ese *ac*, pero tampoco lo echaríamos en falta, si tras *turpissima* colocáramos una simple coma.

Estos son algunos de los muchos lugares en los que interviene el autor; y solo algunos en los que, como decía más arriba, me atrevo a discutir la oportunidad de los cambios. Normalmente, las modificaciones que Riesenweber hace del texto son tan evidentes que queda fuera de toda duda su admisión. Y se cuentan por decenas.

Otras veces, como dando pistas a un futuro editor que algún día pueda contar con más y mejores manuscritos a su disposición, Riesenweber se plantea preguntas en el aparato crítico, más o menos acertadas, sobre cómo podría haber sido el texto. Algunas veces da la impresión de que acierta de pleno en su propuesta y, a la vista de otras propuestas que hace en el texto, mucho más discutibles, uno no se explica por qué no las adopta; otras veces, sus propuestas son razonables, pero acierta al no introducirlas en el texto, porque no lo modifican sustancialmente; de vez en cuando, en fin, no parece que sus sugerencias sean tan admisibles. Veamos algunas.

En 45.30 se pregunta si no se debería escribir *iuuenta* en lugar de *iuventas* las dos veces que aparece:

Aetas, cum in homine sit, tempore in ordinem secernitur: si dicas *iuventas*, utique consideratione temporis *iuventas* ante senectutem est.

Y no le falta razón a su intuición, porque Cicerón no usa en otro lugar *iuventas* y sí, en cambio, *iuuenta*. Ahí debería haber sido quizá más atrevido Riesenweber y haber escrito, efectivamente, *iuuenta*.

En 61.31 ss. plantea un cambio en el orden de palabras:

Deinde ab aduersariorum persona tribus ex locis beniuolentiam iudicis conparamus, si eos aut in *odium* aut in *contemptionem* aut in *inuidiam* deduxerimus. In *odium* sic:...; in *inuidiam* sic:... Deinde, in *contemptionem* sic...

El cambio parece lógico, pero en este caso estimo que acierta al no trasladarlo al texto, puesto que no afecta para nada a su sentido.

En 84.24 se pregunta si no habría que escribir *quod* en lugar de *cui*:

FIDEM ET AVCTORITATEM ET FIRMAMENTVM] Fides est argumentum, quo crimen probamus, id est fidem crimini facimus; auctoritas est argumentum uerius atque honestius et *cui* quasi necesse habeat credi; firmamentum est creberrima argumentatio.

En mi opinión, no hay necesidad siquiera de plantearse el cambio: parece claro que *cui* es el régimen en dativo esperable de *credo*, con la particularidad de que no se refiere a una persona, sino a una cosa.

Para terminar, quisiera añadir dos pequeñas minucias a propósito del latín de la *Praefatio*.

Una es la que se lee en xiv.2 (página xiv, párrafo 2):

Lemmatum *duo* genera a Victorino adhibita possunt inueniri, *unum*, sub quo (...), *alterum*, sub quo...

o del mismo modo en x.1:

...ex *duobus* libris ibi exaratis... quorum *unus* est codex miscellaneus Berolinensis..., *alter* Oxoniensis...

No es que estén mal esos *unum* y *unus* respectivamente, pero ahí creo que en latín es donde cabría muy bien usar las formas *alter*... *alter* en los dos términos de la correlación, justamente por ser dos sus miembros, tal como el propio Riesenweber hace en xv.3:

*Duos* apparatus sub ipso textu collocaui, quorum *alter* Victorini fontes et locos similes continet, *alter* codicum uarias lectiones exhibet.

La otra es que, curiosamente, a pesar de usar números romanos para expresar los días, por ejemplo, en la fecha que pone fin a la *Praefatio*, no hace lo mismo para expresar los años, ni en el texto (x.1) ni en la fecha de la *Praefatio*. No hubiera estado mal que, al menos en esta última, hubiera empleado números romanos.

Pero como digo, todo lo apuntado no son sino minucias que no empañan para nada la extraordinaria obra que el editor ha puesto en manos de los filólogos. En las últimas líneas de su *Praefatio* Riesenweber encomienda a los manes de K. Halm, un maestro en el tiempo, la recepción de la obra y confía en que su espíritu benévolo sepa perdonar los errores. Estoy seguro de que

Halm se sentirá muy satisfecho allá donde esté con el trabajo de este digno discípulo suyo.

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SAN AGUSTÍN, *La ciudad de Dios, Libros VI-VIII*. Edición crítica, traducción y notas de Ana Pérez Vega y Pablo Toribio Pérez, vol. III. Madrid: CSIC, 2013. xv + 142 pp. (dobles). ISBN 978-84-00-09731-8.

This edition, with translation and notes, belongs to the series *Alma Mater: Colección de autores griegos y latinos* directed by Francisco R. Adrado. It is, after fifty-five years, the continuation of the edition by Lorenzo Riber and Juan Bastardas in 1953 (vol. I) and 1958 (vol. II). Ana Pérez Vega prepared the full collation of the *codices meliores* and the first draft of the translation; Pablo Toribio Pérez inspected the *codices recentiores*, revised the translation, and prepared the notes. The present edition is the only one of *De civitate Dei* that has used for its collation Manuscript 29 of the Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid (tenth century, parchment, abbreviated R), which the editors list among the *meliiores*, given that it often contains the *lectiones meliores et difficiliores*<sup>1</sup>.

Even if the present reviewer is not a Spanish native speaker, the translation clearly endeavours to reproduce what the editors call the magisterial Latin of Augustine, the complexity and elegance of his Ciceronian prose, as well as the richness of the vocabulary, especially from the philosophical viewpoint. The translation has thus avoided, as far as possible, both lexical and syntactical oversimplifications. This is a choice that, especially from the syntactical standpoint, can be followed more easily in languages such as Spanish or Italian – although clearly not the Spanish or the Italian of contemporary SMS messages and the like –, and less easily in others such as English or German.

The volume might appear a bit “bare bones”: there is no introduction, but only an initial prospect of *sigla codicum* – which also lists the previous editions, prominent among which is that of Dombart and Kalb –, a very essential *apparatus fontium*, and few and short notes. However, as is explained in the preface, a new general introduction, a new bibliography, and a new *stemma codicum* will be offered at the end of the whole edition of *De civitate Dei*, as an epilogue (*Epílogo*). The manuscripts that the editors deem *meliiores* are, for these books of *De civitate Dei*, C, K, F, and R. The last has already been dealt with above; the others are:

– C or *codex Corbeiensis, postea Germanensis* 766 (sixth-seventh cent.), which included Books 1-10 but is now divided into two: *codex Parisinus* n. 12214 (Books 1-9) and *codex* ß Q v. I Nr. 4 (Book 10);

<sup>1</sup> Its description is found in E. Ruiz García, *Catálogo de la sección de códices de la Real Academia de la Historia*, Madrid 1997.

- K or *codex Coloniensis* 75 (Darmstadt 2077; eighth cent.), also containing Books 1-10;
- F or *codex Monacensis (Frisingensis) lat.* 6267 (ninth cent.), which comprises Books 1-18.

On every page the Latin edition is faced by the Spanish translation and has at the bottom a critical apparatus and, very sparsely, an *apparatus fontium* that might have been much richer. References and allusions to classical literature and philosophy as well as Christian literature, *in primis* the Bible itself, are legion in these books, as well as in most of Augustine's *De civitate Dei*. Likewise the footnotes, which are placed at the bottom of the translation, are extremely occasional and succinct. A fuller commentary, even just in the same form of footnotes, might perhaps have been desirable, but this was clearly not in the plans. Thus, the choice of which points in Augustine's discourse deserved an elucidation is inevitably arbitrary. However, it would be simply unfair to judge a volume from what one might feel is missing, all the more so in that what is there – the edition and the translation – is certainly a fine work.

In Book 6 Augustine takes issue with Varro's *theologia tripartita*, that is, divided into *tria genera*: 1) *fabulosum*, 2) *naturale*, and 3) *ciuile* (I keep the spelling of the edition). Now, even though this is not remarked in the notes, it is interesting to observe that Varro was elaborating on the tripartition of theology into τρία εἶδη theorised by the Old Stoic Chrysippus (SVF 2.1009): μυθικόν, taught by poets, φυσικόν, taught by philosophers, and νομικόν, established by individual cities by means of norms, customs, and cultic and ritual traditions. This theory proved to be extremely influential on classical theological allegoresis, down to Varro himself and to Cornutus, the Roman Stoic who authored the *Compendium theologiae graecae* and took over Chrysippus's and Varro's tripartition<sup>2</sup>. Even if there is a Christian reception of Cornutus<sup>3</sup>, it is from Varro that Augustine – who was virtually ignorant of Greek – drew Chrysippus's theory of the threefold transmission of theology.

In CD 6.10-11 Augustine expresses appreciation of Seneca on account of his criticism of “pagan” cultic traditions and practices. At the same time, however, Augustine criticises Seneca because he, as a senator, did worship pagan divinities, instead of repudiating them (*colebat quod reprehendebat*

<sup>2</sup> As demonstrated in I. Ramelli, *Anneo Cornuto: Compendio di teologia greca*, Milan 2003, on which the German edition is admittedly based: *Cornutus: Die Griechischen Götter. Ein Überblick über Namen, Bilder und Deutungen*, Hrsg. H.-G. Nesselrath, Tübingen 2009; see also my “The Philosophical Stance of Allegory in Stoicism and its Reception in Platonism, Pagan and Christian: Origen in Dialogue with the Stoics and Plato”, *International Journal of the Classical Tradition* 18, 2011, 335-71.

<sup>3</sup> As I have shown in “Cornutus in Christlichem Umfeld: Märtyrer, Allegorist, und Grammatiker”, in *Cornutus: Die Griechischen Götter*, 207-31.

... *quod culpabat, adorabat*<sup>4</sup>). However, Seneca's philosophical criticism of traditional religious rituals and cults had already elicited Tertullian's fairly enthusiastic definition of Seneca as *saepe noster* (*De an.* 20). A similar appreciative attitude may have brought about the composition of the Seneca-Paul correspondence, which is usually thought to be a fourth-century forgery or rhetorical exercise – this is the *communis opinio* to which fn. 35 on p. 30 here also adheres –, but which for several philological, historical, and especially intertextual reasons should probably be dated back to the second century<sup>5</sup>.

In Book 7, when in ch. 11 Augustine speaks of the epithets of Iuppiter-Zeus and explains that they do not refer to different deities, but to one and the same, he is again drawing on the Stoic allegorical theological tradition<sup>6</sup>. In this same book, Augustine repeatedly uses the terms *paganus* and *paganitas*, already in the titles of chs. 15 and 18. He seems to have been among the first to use this term in reference to traditional polytheistic religion, as opposed to Christianity (and Judaism). This is indeed the interesting reassessment of the first attestations of *paganus* and *paganitas* recently offered by Douglas Boin<sup>7</sup>.

In Book 8 Augustine sketches a kind of compendious history of philosophy, highlighting Socrates and especially Plato (who *excellentissima gloria claruit, qua omnino caeteros obscuraret*, ch. 4.1) and the Platonists: *nulli nobis [sc. Christianis] quam isti propius accesserunt* (ch. 5.2). Augustine maintains that Christians should discuss of theology principally with the Platonists, whose doctrines he – like Origen, Eusebius, Gregory Nyssen, Evagrius and most Patristic philosophers – deems better than those of all other philosophical schools in every branch of philosophy, including logic and ethics. Augustine also sets Plato's position that gods are only good against later Platonic demonology, in order to argue that demons are all evil, as asserted by the Christian tradition, which also identified "pagan" deities with demons. But when in ch. 14 he reports the opinion of those philosophers who divided up rational souls (*animas rationales*) into three kinds, *in diis*

<sup>4</sup> See my "Seneca in Plinio, Dione, s. Agostino", in *Neronia VI. Rome à l'époque néronienne. Actes du VIème Colloque International de la Société Internationale des Études Néroniennes (SIEN), Rome 19-23 mai 1999*, ed. J.-M. Croisille – Y. Perrin, Bruxelles 2002, 503-13.

<sup>5</sup> As I argued in "A Pseudepigraphon inside a Pseudepigraphon? The Seneca-Paul Correspondence and the Letters Added Afterwards", *Journal for the Study of Pseudepigrapha* 23, 2014, 259-89.

<sup>6</sup> See on this I. Ramelli, *Allegoria, I, L'età classica*, Milan 2004, and Eadem, "Valuing Antiquity in Antiquity by Means of Allegoresis", in *Valuing the Past in the Greco-Roman World. Proceedings of the Penn-Leiden Colloquium on Ancient Values VII, Leiden 14-16 June 2012*, eds. J. Ker and Chr. Pieper, Mnemosyne Supplements, Leiden 2014, 485-507.

<sup>7</sup> D. Boin, "Hellenistic 'Judaism' and the Social Origin of the 'Pagan-Christian' Debate", *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 22 (2014) 167-96.

*caelestibus, in daemonibus aeriis, et in hominibus terrenis*, one cannot help drawing a parallel with the Christian Platonist Origen's tripartition of rational creatures into angels, demons, and humans. The main difference is, of course, that Origen speaks of creatures, since God does not belong there. The Platonists too, however, in their henotheism, distinguished the highest God from inferior deities.

Toward the end of Book 8, in ch. 27, Augustine sharply criticises the cult of the dead (*sacra uel sacrificia mortuorum tamquam deorum*), as fn. 166 rightly informs. Even Monica, Augustine's mother, was accustomed to practicing this cult, and would do so even in Milan, while bishop Ambrose was endeavouring to eradicate this practice. As is typical of these extremely essential notes, no secondary literature is given, but one major, very relevant study in this respect is that by Ramsay MacMullen, *The Second Church. Popular Christianity A.D. 200-400*, Writings from the Greco-Roman World Supplements 1, Atlanta: 2009.

This is a careful work, very concise in terms of elucidations, comments, and apparatuses, but well done from the point of view of the edition and of the very "mimetic" and somewhat solemn translation.

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PETER RIEDLBERGER, *Domninus of Larissa, Encheiridion and Spurious Works. Introduction, Critical Text, English Translation, and Commentary*, *Mathematica Graeca Antiqua* 2, Pisa/Rome: Fabrizio Serra Editore, 2013, pp. 285. ISBN 978-88-6227-567-5.

We, the classicists, usually have a tendency to accept the certainty of some ideas about ancient figures especially if our acquaintance to them is through our greatest predecessors. We promote such opinions as if they are facts by including them in some manuals and encyclopaedias thanks to our trust in our colleagues of the ancient times. Actually our attention to these illustrious individuals in antiquity is directed through others' lenses notwithstanding the fact that they mostly provide just an illusionary view. For instance, in the ancient world, Heraclitus was called *skoteinos* on account of his obscurity, while the renowned remark "Delian diver" indicates his deep reflections, so that until now we commonly assumed his discourse to have been "obscure" as well as being one of the "deepest" in his milieu. It is almost impossible to find the historical Socrates among the multiple images of him told by his followers and his ingrained adversaries, being fully frustrated by these perceptions of which some are totally different from one another. In the same manner, Domninus of Larissa, like many other notable intellectuals in antiquity has been perceived by views nourished by extant information, which could have been easily misinterpreted.

Domninus of Larissa was a student of Syrianus and a fellow disciple of Proclus according to the entry in *Suda* ( $\Delta$  1355 Δομνῖνος). The scholarly assessment about Domninus and his work was under the influence of this important fact that he was contemporaneous with Proclus. So Domninus' identity and his point of view on philosophical and mathematical issues in his own milieu have been evaluated within the determination of his relation with Proclus who was one of the heads of the Platonist school of Athens in Late Antiquity (412-485). The most prominent and effective diagnosis about Domninus was argued by Paul Tannery which said that he reacted to the arithmetic of Nicomachus of Gerasa and returned to the rigorous approaches of Euclid that is still considered valid by some of the members of the modern scholarly milieu. Riedlberger invites his readers to set this blurry and misleading lens aside to have a clearer view of the facts about the historical Domninus of Larissa.

This noteworthy book consists of a meticulous critical edition of three texts commonly attributed to Domninus of Larissa and a detailed commentary supported by exhaustive indices. The book includes critical

editions and translations of the following three relatively short texts: primarily (1) Domninus' *Encheiridion* of "Arithmetical Introduction" (Ἐγχειρίδιον ἀριθμητικῆς εἰσαγωγῆς), with two shorter works which Riedlberger convincingly argues should not be attributed to Domninus, (2) *How to Separate a Ratio from a Ratio* (Πῶς ἔστι λόγον ἐκ λόγου ἀφελεῖν) and (3) *Scholia on Nicomachus*. Comparing the compendiousness of these texts, Riedlberger presents a prolific commentary and an exceptional introduction to bring into some of the crucial questions on the apprehension of Domninus from Tannery's biased view into the recent scholarship<sup>1</sup>.

By scrupulously following the extant evidence Riedlberger demonstrates that the entrenched view about Domninus that he is an "Euclidean maverick" who rejected the arithmetic of Nicomachus does not stand upon either firm ground or a scientific foundation. This accurate pursuit starts from the beginning of the book and extends to the end of the commentary.

The introduction has five separate, mutually complementary parts. These parts provide two main prerequisites both for the readers and for the author. Firstly, it is a proper prologue to make the reception of the texts easier both for the readers who are generally familiar with Greek literature but not with the ancient mathematics and those readers who are generally familiar with mathematics but not with Greek literature. Secondly, it also has a well-established discursive demonstration to expose Riedlberger's arguments on Domninus' aims as a mathematician/philosopher and his position in the *Encheiridion* step by step.

In the first part of the introduction which is on the "cultural backdrop" (19-41), Riedlberger focuses on the school of Athens and the philosophical curriculum as a background of the shadowy life of Domninus of Larissa which evidently shows that he was not only a "maverick mathematician" in his milieu but also an active philosopher in the philosophical school he belonged to. Riedlberger (34ff.) cogently shows that the mathematical interests of the late Platonic philosophers, an intellectual group that Domninus was also part of, have roots that go far back to their traditional philosophical points of view (especially on teaching practices among the students of late Platonic philosophy).

In the second part of the introduction, which is a close examination of *testimonia* on Domninus (43-64), Riedlberger argues that Domninus does not appear as an exceptional figure among the other late Platonist philosophers, specifically when compared to Proclus who is certainly one of the most brilliant intellectuals in Domninus' milieu. Due to this investigation

<sup>1</sup> Cf. P. Tannery, "Domninos de Larissa", *Mémoires scientifiques. II. Sciences exactes dans l'antiquité. 1883-1898*, ed. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, Toulouse 1912, 105-117; W.L. Gombocz, *Geschichte der Philosophie. IV. Die Philosophie der ausgehenden Antike und des frühen Mittelalters*, Munich 1997, 206; S. Cuomo, *Ancient Mathematics*, London 2001, 237.

of Riedlberger, if there was a “certain esteem” (40) for Euclid at the school of Athens in the 5<sup>th</sup> century A.D., Domninus might have had the same attitude as a member of the school, but there is no evidence that Domninus belonged to the Euclidean tradition any more than his fellow disciples.

In the third part of the introduction which is on Domninus’ works (65–90), Riedlberger tries to reconstruct Domninus’ image by examining “his” works closely, not only the extant ones, but also the works of which we have only the titles. After discussing these lost works (*Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus*, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations*), he goes on to *Arithmetical Stoicheiosis*, which is mentioned by Domninus himself at the end of the *Encheiridion*. At the end of this discussion Riedlberger concludes that we cannot even be sure whether *Arithmetical Stoicheiosis* was actually composed by Domninus himself.

The subsection on *Encheiridion* in the third part of the introduction (72–77) places this important source about Domninus in question: “what can the *Encheiridion* tell us about Domninus the mathematician? Virtually nothing, actually” (77). Because of the common approaches in opposition to Domninus, Riedlberger indicates that Euclid was only one of the main sources of Domninus’ mathematical demonstration, while Nicomachus’ *Introductio Arithmetica* must have been the most important of these sources. Putting aside the prevailing claim that Domninus’ *Encheiridion* is a rebuttal of Nicomachus’ mathematical approaches, he even suggests that it was an *epitoma* of Nicomachus’ *Introductio*. Riedlberger testifies to this argument with the full title of the *Encheiridion*: Ἐγχειρίδιον ἀριθμητικῆς εἰσαγωγῆς. As argued by Riedlberger (73–74), if the word ἐγχειρίδιον denotes a “booklet” or “pocketbook”, instead of a “manual, handbook”, it would be “a very condensed introduction to the basic notions of ancient Greek arithmetic” based on Nicomachus’ popular work in Domninus’ milieu, namely ἀριθμητικὴ εἰσαγωγή. In the subsection on *How to* of the third part of the introduction (77–83), Riedlberger examines closely the references of the scholars that argue *How to* can be attributed to Domninus of Larissa. He concludes that the extant evidence is not sufficient to assume that this work belongs to Domninus, although authors of both *How to* and Domninus seem to cherish Euclid in some way. The following subsection which is on *Scholia on Nicomachus*, a title devised by Riedlberger himself, has no basis in the manuscript (83–88). He emphasizes the reason for publishing these two texts with the *Encheiridion*: “proving their spuriousness was only possible on the basis of a careful study” (83). In this “careful study” Riedlberger not only tries to examine the origins of these spurious texts, but also challenges us to find a more reliable basis for evaluating scientifically Domninus of Larissa and his work *Encheiridion*. In the last subsection of the third part of the introduction, which is on a transmitted ancient text that is entitled κεφάλαια τῶν ὀπτικῶν

ὑποθέσεων (88-90), Riedlberger states his sceptical approaches concerning the authorship of the text. Riedlberger does not present a critical edition of this text; namely *Summaries of the Principles of Optics*, for two reasons: (1) this work was not linked by scholarly tradition to Domninus of Larissa, (2) a new edition of the *Summaries* is to be published soon by Fabio Acerbi.

In the fourth part of the introduction, which is a general “appraisal” (91-2), Riedlberger presents the inferences of his research on Domninus. His picture of Domninus is quite different from the common scholarly assumptions that he was “a scientifically-minded, possibly Jewish, maverick philosopher” who implied that “serious science brought him into conflict with his colleagues” (91). On the contrary, Riedlberger states that there is “no evidence for a Jewish extraction” (91; cf. 53-55), Domninus represented a “typical picture of a late Platonic philosopher,” not of a maverick not one, who prefers Euclidean definitions to those found in Nicomachus except in a few cases only but following Nicomachus rather than Euclid. These scholarly challenging conclusions enable the readers to readily and thoroughly encounter the critical editions, that is with the right questions in mind about Domninus and his work.

In the fifth part of the introduction, which is a *prolegomena* to the editions (93-106), Riedlberger presents the history of the critical editions of the *Encheiridion* from the *editio princeps* of Boissonade<sup>2</sup>, and criticises the previous editions. He clearly criticises Romano’s edition (see fn. 6) in particular because of his “unusual rules of enclitic accentuation,” and “unfortunate mistakes” in his apparatus (94)<sup>3</sup>. As he himself declares, Riedlberger’s studies on Πῶς ἔστι λόγον ἐκ λόγου ἀφελεῖν ensue one single edition published in 1883 by Ruelle with a French translation, and the more recent English translation of Knorr in 1989<sup>4</sup>. The third text is a part of the *scholia* on Nicomachus of Gerasa that comes after *How to* in the manuscript Paris. gr. 2531. This text does not even have a title and Riedlberger’s edition is an *editio princeps* of this short *scholia*.

I have not checked the text against all manuscripts, but benefiting from the fact that I am living in Istanbul, I had the opportunity to examine

<sup>2</sup> J. F. Boissonade [de Fontarabie], “Δομνίνου φιλοσόφου Λαρισσαίου ἐγχειρίδιον ἀριθμητικῆς εἰσαγωγῆς”, *Anecdota Graeca e codicibus regiis*, Vol. IV, Paris 1832, 413-429.

<sup>3</sup> While Romano for his mistakes in the critical edition and some omissions in his arguments (for example see p. 141, fn. 245, p. 147-149, p. 161, p. 175 fn. 325, p. 177-178, p. 186) criticized or his preferences are suspected (for example see p. 195) by Riedlberger, while he objectively gives credit to Romano where it is due in the commentary on *Encheiridion* (for example see p. 140, p. 157 fn. 290, p. 165).

<sup>4</sup> C.-É. Ruelle, “Texte inédit de Domninus de Larisse sur l’arithmétique avec traduction et commentaire”, *Revue des philologie, de littérature et d’histoire anciennes* 7, 1883, 82-94; W. R. Knorr, “On Eutocius: a thesis of J. Mogenet”, *Textual studies in ancient and medieval geometry*, Boston 1989, 155-211.

the original manuscript Chalcensis Panagia 157 (abbreviated K)<sup>5</sup>. According to the results of this examination, I should admit that Riedlberger's edition and *apparatus criticus* are clinically accurate. This modest proof is just one of the indicators displaying the preciseness of the critical editions of the book.

Riedlberger's translation of the *Encheiridion* is the fourth modern translation of Domninus' work into Western languages, the first published in 1906, the other two in 2000<sup>6</sup>. Riedlberger's translation is evidence of his exacting point of view in reconstructing the texts scientifically, and for this reason it evidently has a literal disposition. He often corrects the ambiguous phrases in the translations of Tannery, Romano, as well as that of Brown himself accepted these corrections<sup>7</sup>. As he reflects, this book is hardly "perused by non-specialists" and the translations of the Domninus' works are "intended for readers familiar with basic concepts of ancient Greek mathematics" (105). Although this fact is still in force, the fully developed commentary, which follows the edited texts, provides "non-specialists" with the essential information concerning ancient number theory to make them feel at home. In this detailed running commentary, Riedlberger consolidates his general judgements of Domninus and his work by comprehensively comparing Nicomachus of Gerasa, Euclid, Theon of Smyrna, and other eminent ancient mathematicians to one another. Presenting philological and lexical notes to explain both the philosophical and mathematical aspects of basic concepts of ancient number theory he also clarifies some essential distinctions in this field of study. He strengthens his main arguments with evidence from the other two editions of spurious works. His comments on these two spurious works pave the way for grasping the intellectual environment of Domninus. So it is well formulated by Riedlberger as to why the readers need to work through these two

<sup>5</sup> I would like to express my gratitude to the librarian Georgios Benlisoy, the supervisor of the library Archimandrite Agathangelos Siskos for his kind help, and His All Holiness Bartholomew for his grand beneficence in the Library of the Οικουμενικόν Πατριαρχεῖον.

<sup>6</sup> The first translation was published by Tannery in French in 1906: P. Tannery, "The manuel d'introduction arithmétique de philosophe Domninus de Larissa. Traduction par Paul Tannery", *Mémoires scientifiques. III. Sciences exactes dans l'antiquité. 1899-1913*, ed. Johan Ludvig Heiberg, Toulouse 1915, 255-88. In the nearer past, one of the translations in Italian appeared in a monograph on Domninus with an edition of the *Encheiridion*: F. Romano, *Domnino di Larissa. La svolta impossibile della filosofia matematica neoplatonica*, Catania 2000. The other was an English translation of the same work with an introduction and notes published in the same year: P. Brown, "The *Manual* of Domninus", *Harv. Rev. Philos.* 8, 2000, 82-100.

<sup>7</sup> P. G. Brown, "Peter Riedlberger, *Domninus of Larissa. Encheiridion and spurious works. Introduction, critical text, English translation, and commentary*. *Mathematica Graeca Antiqua Bd. 2*. Pisa/Roma: Fabrizio Serra 2013, 279 S." *GFA* 16, 2013, 1253.

other texts to grasp the inner significance of Domninus' philosophical and mathematical points of view through cutting loose from the biased scholarly views of this late Platonic philosopher.

At the end, the book has a full bibliography and three very functional indices: two of them in Greek; an *index locorum*, and an *index verborum*, the last is a general index in English. These indices facilitate following the editions as well as Riedlberger's commentary with ease. Consequently, Dr. Dr. Riedlberger presents a complete and authoritative edition of the *Encheiridion* of Domninus which most probably will become the standard edition of these texts for many years to come.

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PETER RIEDLBERGER, *Philologischer, historischer und liturgischer Kommentar zum 8. Buch der Johannis des Goripp: Nebst kritischer Edition und Übersetzung*, Groningen: Forsten, 2010. Pp. 503, ISBN 978-90-6980-157-5.

This is a first-rate work of wide-ranging scholarship on the final book of a work which was described not so long ago as ‘one of the worst epic poems ever published’, as the editor and commentator himself tells us in his *Vorwort*. R. has given us a very thorough and perceptive study of book 8 of the *Johannis*, the final book of the epic in which Justinian’s general John defeated the Moors in 548. R’s new text is carefully and critically prepared, and his commentary is full, detailed, and judicious. There is a most informative introduction of about 100 pages, and a bibliography of some 500 items, and an index (*Sachregister*) of the many names mentioned and discussed in the book, and of grammatical and other such terms. One feature of the work must be mentioned immediately; as readers of this review may have already noticed, R. opts for the name-form Gorippus, which is seldom even mentioned in reference books or earlier studies; perhaps it was assumed that the familiar name occurred frequently in incipits or explicits to each book, but that is not the case. The rare but vital pieces of evidence are here presented on pages 29–33 of the Introduction, and in this well-argued choice I will follow him in this review. (As for the title, this is less controversial: the suggested (twentieth-century) versions *Iohanneis* and *Iohannias*, noted in the edition of Goodyear and Diggle (ix), are dismissed briefly by R. on pages 74/75).

The introduction first describes the single manuscript on which the text must be based; there are also lost manuscripts, and a handful of lines from other sources. There is then a careful biography of G., necessarily short, and invaluable sections on sixth century Africa; the Berbers; Roman officers; and Johannes and his staff. The second main section of the introduction concerns the poet’s style. R. discusses register and vocabulary, asking if the poem is ‘vulgar’ or ‘late’ in its style; he prefers to stress the poet’s deliberate innovation. While G. imitates classical authors, Vergil of course in particular, he seeks variation here too. R. has an amusing but helpful notion of ‘Baukunstjunktur’ (this means ‘building box’: the poet will choose his components carefully). On this area I have two comments. Sometimes the variations, as they are claimed to be, seem to diverge quite far from the classical intertext; R. speaks of the Vergilian line (A. 6. 853) *parcere subiectis et debellare superbos* as being imitated six times, but on referring to the note cited (on line 464) one wonders if they can be considered Vergilian at all (For one thing, there is a

strong Biblical tinge). Secondly, R. is reluctant to give a list of other authors used. Although he asks some very pertinent questions (is the imitation made deliberately? could the poet have thought of a particular *Junktur* himself; should we reckon with the possibility of authors now unknown?), it is a pity that he does not set forth more clearly at least the more likely cases of G. imitating other poets. Even if speculative, such comments can help scholars gain a wider picture of what authors were read in this period. Moving on, one finds in the capacious introduction discussions of the genre of the work and of the question of the poet's source for his detailed information on the war, and the question of whether the word 'propaganda' is appropriate.

The text, critical apparatus, and translation are presented in close conjunction with the commentary, not above it or below it, but in small blocks, of between two or ten lines, on the top right hand side of almost every page, which is most helpful, though the match cannot always be exact, and one does not have the convenience of being able to read the text section by section. Another notable feature is the illustrations, in the form of photographic reproductions: most often these present unclear readings of words in the manuscript, but there are also illustrations of swallows (to clarify a simile), of an imperial bodyguard, and of contemporary altars, important in the liturgical section of the book. In his notes R. discusses all questions of textual criticism and meaning, and many concerning style (especially pleonasm, and the register of words such as *nihilominus*, *necare*); he gives many intertextual parallels, discusses historical questions (Procopius is often quoted, for example on how to fight against a 'Kamelburg'), clarifies topographical matters and religious questions, including discursive notes on Ammon and Gurzil (son of Ammon by a cow: polemic is certainly not absent in this poem, a contest between the good and the bad). Liturgical commentary comes in when the poet narrates the *Feldmesse* preceding the final battle. It appears to be closest to the 'Leonine Sacramentary' (311/2), which, as R. notes, is not a sacramentary, nor related to Pope Leo.

In terms of clarity, scholarship, and thoroughness, this work deserves admiration. Only very, very rarely, was I aware of typographical error (on page 407 (lines 528-9) a line from Book 1. 46 is quoted with the impossible *doleres*); or of a passage where there could have been more attention to a word (perhaps on page 165 (line 87) *diripite* (translated, as it must be, as 'ergreift!')). Unlike his comments on the emendations of others, R.'s own emendations do not always convince: so *montis ab alto* (line 36) or *nostras* (line 533). But something is better than nothing, as the aforementioned Cambridge editors realised when they wryly described their contributions as 'imaginative'.

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