

Zitierhinweis

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(latín o griego), dificultando su lectura, y otras añade en nota a pie de página el texto completo en original, facilitando la ya por sí compleja lectura del pasaje escogido. Por otra parte, aun sabiendo de la dificultad que presenta la traducción de muchos tecnicismos musicales griegos y latinos, considero que algunos de ellos no son muy acertados; por citar unos cuantos: σύστημα/*systema* como “sistema”, siendo preferible “escala”, como ya se ha indicado; τετράχορδον ὑπάτων como “el tetracordo de las supremas”, siendo más acertado “el tetracordo de las (notas) graves”; o los nombres de las notas, como igualmente también se ha indicado. En cuanto a la bibliografía, se echan en falta los muchos trabajos sobre la voz, el canto y sobre otras cuestiones de teoría harmónica y musical del profesor Luis Calero Rodríguez, así como el trabajo colaborativo de Tosca Lynch y Eleonora Rocconi de 2020, *A Companion to Ancient Greek and Roman Music*, por citar algunos. Por último, la extensión de este libro y la temática tan amplia y densa dificultan, y mucho, su lectura y seguimiento. Hubiera sido preferible la publicación de trabajos de temática musical más especializados y menos voluminosos. Con todo, el mérito de este trabajo reside en recoger en un único volumen la trayectoria investigadora del profesor Luque en cuestiones, sobre todo, métricas y rítmicas y, en menor medida, músico-harmónicas.

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ANDREAS MARKANTONATOS, VASILEIOS LIOTSAKIS, ANDREAS SERAFIM, *Witnesses and Evidence in Ancient Greek Literature*, Trends in Classics 123, Berlin-Boston: De Gruyter, 2022, vii+306 pp., 109.95 €, ISBN: 978-3-11-075116-1.

This volume presents a selection of the papers delivered at a conference at the University of the Peloponnese in Kalamata on the theme of *Witnesses and Evidence: Information and Decision in Drama and Oratory. From Antiquity to Byzantium*. Speakers actually ranged well beyond these two genres, and this volume also includes papers on history, tragedy, and epinician poetry. Although this broad range results in many varied and interesting observations, it also makes it difficult to find unifying ideas or reach general conclusions to which there are not many exceptions. Thus I found *Witnesses and Evidence* more valuable for its specific insights into various areas of Greek literature than for any overall conclusions about witnesses and evidence.

In Chapter 1, Edward Harris discusses “The Role of Written Documents in Athenian Trials.” He soon makes clear that he is speaking about public trials, and the reader needs to keep this distinction always in mind so as not to be misled. For example, in discussing documents kept in archives or by officials, he states, “first, there were records of trials” (19). There is no good evidence of records being kept

of private trials. It would also help to make clear what sort of “records” he means. I think he probably means that the indictment and the verdict were kept in public trials, but not what we might think of today as a full record. Despite such quibbles, Harris’ survey of written documents and his summaries of the documents used in most of the public cases that survive are a useful reminder of the role played by written documents in the Athenian democracy.

In Chapter 2, Asako Kurihara discusses “Rumour and Hearsay Evidence in the Athenian Law-courts.” She argues that the rules regarding the presentation of hearsay evidence by a witness are intended to ensure that someone is responsible (*hypeuthynos*) for the truth of the evidence presented; i.e. that someone must be liable to prosecution for false witness if the evidence presented is false. Thus, either an absent witness takes responsibility by acknowledging that the testimony presented is his, or if does not acknowledge it, then the witness in court who reports the testimony will be held responsible for its truthfulness. This leads Kurihara to modify the view of Humphreys, Todd, and others that the main purpose of witnesses was to support the litigant rather than to verify the facts.¹ As for rumor, she notes that this is generally presented by the litigant not by a witness, and thus none of the rules regarding hearsay evidence apply to rumor. A litigant could ask the jury to act as witnesses to the rumor, but this was a metaphorical use of “witness,” and he certainly was not asking the jury to be legally responsible for the truthfulness of the rumor.

Chapter 3, “Audience Memory as Evidence in the Trial ‘on the Crown,’” by Guy Westwood, is the only paper in this collection that was not delivered at the original conference in Kalamata. Westwood argues that Demosthenes’ near avoidance of witnesses in his speech *On the Crown* – they testify only twice – is “part of a concerted strategy to co-opt the judges ... as the most significant witnesses to his own career, ... and part of a wide-ranging effort to capitalize on Aeschines’ failure ... to build explicit meaningful connection with the judges.” The case is thus seen as a competition between litigants vying to persuade the jury to see – and thus bear witness to – recent events in accordance with each litigant’s own view. Westwood presents a convincing analysis first of Aeschines’ failure and then of Demosthenes’ success in this effort.

In Chapter 4, Noboro Sabo discusses “Additional Information in Witness Testimonies in Classical Athens.” Although the content of most witness testimonies is omitted in the forensic speeches, some do survive, and speakers also sometimes indicate what the contents of a witness’ testimony was. Sabo classifies these into (a) the witness’ identity, (b) character evidence for the speaker, (c) character evidence against the opponent, and (d) “parallel cases” (i.e. cases related to the present case). Sabo discusses many cases in (a), and argues that the witness’ identity clearly adds to his credibility, but he should acknowledge that often the

¹ I have argued against this view for different reasons in “The Function of Witnesses in Athenian Law”, *Symposium 2019*, Kaja Harter-Uibopuu, Werner Riess, eds., Vienna 2021, 81-97.

witness' name would mean nothing to most of the jury. The benefits of presenting such witness testimony were to save time because the witness testimonies did not count against the speaker's time allowance, and to avoid having the speaker present evidence of his own good character or good deeds.

In Chapter 5, Pasquale Massimo Pinto discusses "Self-Quotations as Witnesses and Evidence: The Case of Isocrates' *Antidosis*." The enormous complexity of *Antidosis* leads Pinto to focus on one specific and unusual feature, the presentation of quotations from three of Isocrates' earlier speeches as evidence in this (fictional) case. Parts of these speeches are cited in the same way as witness testimonies and other documents are cited in real forensic speeches, and taken together they show clearly that Isocrates' teachings are not such as to corrupt the youth, the crime for which he is (fictionally) charged. Pinto then examines the loosely-related use by Isocrates of his pupils and their lives, especially Timotheus, again to show that his teachings have not corrupted any youths.

In Chapter 6, Robert Sullivan discusses "Antiphon's Witnesses: Extending the Earliest Greek Theories of Argumentation." Sullivan's focus is on Antiphon's "paratextual" statements (what I would call his "metadiscourse"), namely statements about the nature and value of witness statements and other sorts of proofs. He begins with the First and Third Tetralogy (the Second has no witnesses), then analyzes the three courtroom speeches, and finally ends by summarizing Antiphon's views. These include that slaves are generally unreliable witnesses though torture can change this, and more generally that witness testimony is stronger when it is consistent and is strongest when corroborated by facts (*erga*). Facts, in turn, are established by witnesses. This points to a hierarchy: "conjecture (*eikazontas*) can point towards probabilities (*eikos*), which, when corroborated by witnesses, can yield facts (*erga*), and these facts, in turn, can act as indications (*tekmēria*) of the truth of a statement. Finally, Sullivan suggests that these are not Antiphon's own personal views but most likely conventional sophistic notions.

In Chapter 7, Andreas Serafim discusses "The Questions in (Answering the Question about the Historicity of) Plato's *Apology of Socrates*." Thus he first analyzes the many questions in the *Apology* as serving three purposes: introductory, ethos-depicting, and investigatory. He then argues that the frequency and use of questions gives us additional reason to accept the historicity of Plato's version of Socrates' speech (though the fact that Xenophon's version is also full of questions does not apparently give us reason to think that his version is the more accurate). Despite the claim that Meletus' answers to Socrates' questions provide evidence for the jury to consider, the chapter seems to have little connection to the theme of the volume, witnesses and evidence.

In Chapter 8, Ioannis N. Perysinakis also analyzes "Plato's *Apology of Socrates*: The Rhetoric of Socrates' Defence and the Foundation of the Ancient Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry." Although Perysinakis similarly ignores the subject of witnesses and evidence, unlike Serafim he considers the *Apology* "a fictional literary composition of a historical case," rather like the speeches in

Thucydides. Its purpose is both Socrates' defense of himself and Plato's defense of philosophy, and in particular his defense of philosophy against poetry and its archaic moral values. Thus Socrates begins by addressing his old accusers, the poets, whose misrepresentations have created prejudice against him, in part by picturing him as wise (*sophos*), which he denies being. (Perysinakis interestingly suggests that the oracle that declared Socrates wisest is Plato's literary invention.) In his defense Socrates then argues that he is a positive good for the city, which needs his (Plato's) kind of philosophy and not the ancient values of Meletus and the poets.

In Chapter 9, Vasileios Liotsakis returns to the book's main theme with a piece on "Witnesses and Evidence in Thucydides: The Institutional and Rhetorical Context of the Digression on the Tyrannicides." The digression comes during Thucydides' account of the mutilation of the Herms, which took place in 415 just before the start of the Sicilian Expedition. He asserts that the popular view of the tyrannicides is wrong mainly because their motive was not to liberate Athens from tyranny but rather personal hostility brought about by an attempted (homosexual) seduction. In a close reading of Thucydides' text Liotsakis examines the distortions that created the popular view, especially in the testimony of informers, and the climate of fear and hostility which led to these distortions. And throughout he notes that a similar climate of fear resulted in distortions in the accounts of witnesses to the mutilation of the Herms. Liotsakis emphasizes, moreover, the "institutional framework" that fostered this climate of fear and the resulting false testimony, and shows how this framework was susceptible to the corrupting influence of powerful individuals. Finally, Liotsakis examines several passages in fourth-century forensic speeches that make use of the popular view of the tyrannicides, which show by contrast the superiority of Thucydides' historical method.

In Chapter 10, David Mirhady provides an interesting analysis of "The Torture of Prometheus" as providing insight into Athenian democratic ideology about the differences between free persons and slaves. As background he first examines the story of the tyrannicide Aristogeiton who was tortured and, according to the "democratic" account reported in *Ath. Pol.* 18, lied about his co-conspirators. This points to the fundamental difference between slaves, who will tell the truth when tortured (in the right circumstances), and free persons, who cannot be persuaded by torture. The torture of Prometheus is similarly ineffective, as is, in general, the torture of free people in tragedy and oratory. Mirhady elaborates this ideology with many diverse examples to produce a consistent picture, but as no ideology is completely consistent, one can point to counter examples or interpretations. For instance, tragedy reports that Agamemnon put on the yoke of necessity and killed Iphigeneia, thus acting slavishly and eventually paying the price, but from another perspective Agamemnon also obeys the command of a goddess and in so doing successfully punishes the crime of Paris and conquers Troy.

In Chapter 11, “Poet, Patron, Message: Witness-Roles and the Game of Truth in Epinician *Eidography*,” Margarita Sotiriou investigates “the function of juridical phraseology” in Pindar and Bacchylides, and especially the role of the poet as witness or messenger bringing the truth to his audience (e.g. the beginning of Pindar *Olympian* 4). Others can also serve as messenger, such as the chorus-producer, or even places. The poet may also add an oath to his message (as in *Olympian* 6.19-21), which serves to emphasize the truth of the message. And finally, the audience itself is invited to play a role in confirming and supporting the poet’s message.

In Chapter 12, “Information and Decision in Sophocles’ *Trachiniae* and Euripides’ *Medea* and *Ino*,” Smaro Nikolaidou examines the role played by witnesses and evidence in the fatal decisions of three tragic heroines. She spends most time on the two fully extant plays, showing first how Deianeira gradually learns the truth about her husband and his relationship to the captive Iole by means of a quasi-judicial investigation, and there is more judicial language and imagery in the last part of the play. A close analysis of Medea’s situation and her ultimate revenge concludes the chapter.

The final chapter by Rosalia Hatzilambrou is on “Scandals as Evidence in Attic Forensic Oratory: The case of Aeschines’ *Against Timarchus*.” Her main point is that “the narration of scandalous stories could compensate for the lack of factual evidence and could thus contribute to the success of a legal action.” She further argues that the Attic logographers understood the power of such narrations. She focuses on the claim that Timarchus prostituted himself with a slave named Pittalacus and tries (somewhat speculatively) to reconstruct how Aeschines would have investigated this scandal and other parts of Timarchus’ past, such as his gambling problems, in order to construct the vivid, detailed narration, with all its gory details, that we find in Aeschines 1.

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PIERRE CHIRON, BENOÎT SANS, *Les Progymnasmata en pratique, de l’Antiquité à nos jours*, Études de littérature ancienne 27, Paris: Rue d’Ulm, 2020, 552 pp., 30,00 €, ISBN 978-2-7288-0676-8.

Les Progymnasmata en pratique, de la Antiquité à nos jours, como indica su título, se centra, esta obra se centra en la práctica de los *Progymnasmata* desde la Antigüedad hasta el presente. El volumen consta de 29 contribuciones a las que precede un prólogo de los editores, en el que estos señalan que los trabajos son aportaciones a un congreso internacional, pero que han pasado por la revisión de un consejo científico. Todos los *Abstracts* aparecen juntos tras las contribuciones